222. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President
Johnson1
Washington,
March 31,
1965.
Dear Mr. President:
Following the NSC meeting last
Friday,2 you asked me for recommendations of any
additional actions that might be taken in South Vietnam
[Page 495]
to improve the prospects of accomplishing
United States purposes and objectives in that country. Attached is a
list of 12 actions which can be taken and which I believe will help. All
are designed to improve the viability of the government, to promote
cohesion within the South Vietnamese military structure, and to
encourage South Vietnamese people to support their government and to
participate more actively in the defense of their country.
Some of the proposed actions are not dissimilar to current undertakings
of the U.S. Mission. However it is my belief that additional effort in
the proposed areas, performed by men who have had long backgrounds of
experience in South Vietnam, would be very useful.
Respectfully yours,
Attachment3
Washington,
March 31,
1965.
Memorandum From the Deputy Director
for Plans (Helms) to
Director of Central Intelligence McCone
SUBJECT
- CIA Proposals for Limited
Covert Civilian Political Action in Vietnam
Outlined below are twelve key points that we believe should be
intensified or initiated in the general field of covert political
action. Some of these actions are covert in the traditional sense of
secrecy and non-attributable sponsorship. Others are on the overt
side, but are properly undertaken by CIA because of our flexibility and capability to move
into situations quickly, bypassing cumbersome governmental
mechanisms on both the U.S. and South Vietnamese sides. All of these
actions are, of course, essentially complementary to the large,
overt activities of the U.S. mission in its large-scale
collaboration with the South Vietnamese government. Based on our
experience in Vietnam, however, we believe that the listed actions
should and could be undertaken by CIA with proper
[Page 496]
approval and authority. We realize that the obstacles to success
are substantial, but feel that the effort should be made, and
promptly.
- 1.
- Extension of covert support to key Buddhist
leaders, especially in the social, cultural and
anti-communist political fields. Both Buddhist lay and
religious leaders have requested help in the organization and
training of cadre to work in the countryside on various
anti-communist projects.
- 2.
- Covert subsidy of a political party in
support of Quat. The training and placement of political
organizers to evoke positive popular reactions to Quat’s programs could
contribute to the stability of his government.
- 3.
- Expansion of covert contacts at all levels
of the military structure to influence them toward cohesion
and collaboration with the Quat government. Considerable personal
and non-official involvement with these personalities is
necessary to provide a means through which advice, encouragement
and admonition can be proffered on a non-official level.
- 4.
- Provision of covert support to the
development of free labor unions to conduct social, civic
and political action throughout the country at the
provincial level. Through judicious subsidy of labor
activities, organization of specific anti-Viet Cong labor
projects and exhortation to protect the gains of free labor,
this politically inert group could possibly develop into a
significant anti-Viet Cong force.
- 5.
- Covert support and stimulation of
non-governmental farmers cooperatives and agricultural
extension organizations. Cooperative purchase and use
of farm tools and fertilizers, cooperative harvesting and
marketing, and increased knowledge and training in means to
expand agricultural production would provide for many farmers a
good reason to resist communist appeals.
- 6.
- Covert support to non-governmental
responsible youth and student leaders and
organizations. Emerging moderate student and youth
leadership should be supported and encouraged, both financially
and through training and participation in international youth
activities, to provide an outlet and a channel for youth and
student energy and expression.
- 7.
- Expansion of current political action and
similar teams working in disputed areas. Some 3,300
indigenous personnel, operating in 28 provinces in teams ranging
from seven to forty men, now engage in successful civic action,
psychological warfare, intelligence and local defense
activities.
- 8.
- Organization, training and supply of
Montagnard development communities and self-defense units in
a highly flexible manner. In the absence of a positive
political approach to the Montagnards, a large Montagnard
dissident group, with Cambodian and Viet Cong support, is
growing throughout the high plateau. CIA has contacts among the Montagnard leadership
dating back several years and has the flexibility, if augmented
by United States Special Forces support, to undertake to reverse
this trend.
- 9.
- Provide flexible assistance, in coordination
with Province Chiefs, to local partisan groups indicating a
will to defend their communities against the Viet Cong.
In addition to the Montagnards, there are large numbers of
ethnic Vietnamese who, given arms, organization, training and
support, can and will defend their home areas against
small-scale communist foraging, tax collection, conscription and
political indoctrination.
- 10.
- Expansion of guerrilla and harassment teams
working in Viet Cong-controlled areas. Small,
well-trained and armed teams penetrate Viet Cong redoubts,
heighten peasant dissatisfaction with Viet Cong controls and
harass the Viet Cong through black propaganda, mining of trails,
neutralization of unpopular officials, and ambush of Viet Cong
patrols.
- 11.
- Develop small irregular elements to track
down, infiltrate and capture Viet Cong communication
centers. This entails creation of specially trained
quick reaction forces who have the capability of investing Viet
Cong communication centers rapidly, who know exactly what to
look for in terms of important intelligence materiel and
personnel and how to obtain quick exploitation of the
information received.
- 12.
- Covertly initiate and support assistance by third country
individuals and elements in support of the above programs,
e.g.[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] etc. Third country personnel having
necessary expertise should be utilized in the above programs.
Beyond this value, they tend to dilute the sense of overwhelming
American inspiration of these programs and encourage additional
participation and commitment of their governments to the
successful outcome of the Vietnam war.
