Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 27, 1965, 1 p.m.

2780. Embtel 2603.² Government of Phan Huy Quat can be characterized as government of “national union” dominated by small, cohesive group of prominent politicians. It is this combination which is new in post-Diem political scene (Khanh’s government had broad representation; Huong’s government was dominated by tightly knit clique), and which just could provide stimulus to exploit atmosphere created by US/GVN reprisal strikes against DRV.

Quat government reflects religious, political and regional diversity of Vietnam:

A) Religious—Buddhist (Quat, Do, An, Diem, Thuan); Catholic (Thieu, Hoang, Vinh Tuan); Cao Dai (Tuyen, Hoach); Hoa Hao (To).

B) Political—Dai Viet (Quat, Hy, Diem (northern); Thieu (southern); VNQDD—Tuyen (northern); Hiep (southern).

C) Regional—northern (Tuyen, Diem, Hy, Kien, Hong); Center (Quat, Thuan, Anh, Thieu); southern (Do, Hoach, Hiep, An, Nguyen).

Government, however, is dominated by small group of prominent politicians (Quat, Do, Tuyen, Diem and Thuan) which is heavily weighted in favor of Centrists, northerners and Buddhists, and is unanimous in its “anti-Diemism.” As far as we can determine, this group coalesced last fall in effort to form lay Buddhist party which would seek to use the influence wielded by Buddhist Institute leadership and Buddhist mass as political base, but would enable that leadership to stay out of direct political activity. This group through Thuan and Bui Tuong Huan—had support of Tri Quang, and appears to have remained entirely separate from group of civilians around Tam Chau; Thuan and Huan were in fact furious with Chau for having embroiled Buddhist Institute in confrontation with Huong government. From all we can gather, Quat’s group has over past several months remained cohesive, despite differing religious, regional and political backgrounds. Group is made up of intelligent, educated, articulate, imaginative men. One might even say that group represents first nucleus of political entity in post-Diem South Vietnam to emerge out of country’s present political turmoil and needs and not held together (or divided) by issues of past eras.

Now that group is in power it faces its biggest test: Will it be able to provide dynamic leadership and remain together in face of monumental problems and pressures which confront it? Odds in its favor are not good.

While membership of new government and of dominant clique within it compares favorably with any other group in sight, it has had little chance to date to demonstrate its abilities having been faced with a coup attempt shortly after investiture. Its ability to exercise leadership in facing problems of war effort will depend in large measure on its success in relieving pressures of contending political power factors, most important of which are UBA, Catholics, and military. Each of these elements has power at the very least to generate pressures which would force GVN to devote self to putting out brush fires and prevent GVN from achieving record of accomplishment which will be vital to its retention of political control.

As noted above, GVN starts with support of UBA’s dominant faction, Centrist group led by Tri Quang and Thien Minh, and in fact represents government which this element has apparently wanted. Remains true, on other hand, that UBA leadership has never yet supported any government for very long; furthermore, we suspect that Tam Chau probably feels that he has gotten little satisfaction in make-up of cabinet. Only man that can be identified with Chau is Minister of Chieu Hoi Tran Van An (Khanh’s efforts for An may indicate that old Khanh-Tam Chau alliance retained force, supposition which receives support from rumor that Khanh and Chau met in Phu Yen on February 20 during failing hours of coup attempt). Khanh’s exile may accentuate Chau’s unhappiness, since it deprives him of one more source of strength.

However, it is not clear that Chau is in much of position to act against new GVN, if government retains support of Quang faction. In any case, GVN has taken steps to satisfy some UBA desires. Buddhist bete noire Tran Thanh Ben has been replaced as director of national police, and GVN has announced release of all individuals who had been arrested for participation in anti-Huong demonstrations. Current question on UBA policy therefore is whether they will press other demands (e.g. replacement of Capital Military District [Commander] Pham Van Dong, closure of newspapers which had taken line hostile to them, withdrawal of license of rival general Buddhist association) and whether they intend proceed to develop “peace” campaign.

On Catholic side, there has been apprehension of growing UBA influence. Militant northern refugees suspect Quat of being in UBA’s pocket, and these fears are being fed by concessions already made and would be accentuated by further concessions. Furthermore, many Catholics fear themselves compromised by February 19 coup manque leadership of which was heavily Catholic and which indicated nostalgia for Diem regime thus giving new impetus to fears that Catholics will suffer from Buddhist reaction. Most important, should Buddhists push “peace” theme, Catholic fears that Communist take-over being facilitated might well become extreme. GVN has shown awareness of importance of quieting Catholic fears that government may be hostile to them, but possibility remains real that if GVN shows self too solicitous toward Buddhists, or if UBA continues to mount political pressures, Catholics may go over into opposition.

Final major element in position to create great political problems for GVN is military. Removal from scene of General Khanh has eliminated one major source of instability, but other candidates for this role remain within AFC. Despite protestations of a desire to return to fighting the war, we can expect further political turbulence from this quarter. AFC is still clearly prime mover of government structure today (despite AFC’s retention of provisional charter), and has direct representation both in GVN (Thieu, Vien and Hong) and in new legislative council. AFC appointed Suu as Chief of State and (contrary to charter) named Quat as Prime Minister. Before Quat’s government was officially announced, AFC had issued policy declaration (Embtel 2620).³ Moreover, that declaration stated clearly that AFC had watchdog role over government until latter could be based on popular choice. Seems clear that Quat government will be plagued by AFC looking over its shoulder and Quat group could even be discredited individually and collectively as puppets of military. Although in wake February 19 coup attempt AFC has reaffirmed its support for Suu and Quat primacy its position remains unimpaired.

On positive side of ledger, increased direct role of US air power in struggle will give both GVN and population as whole psychological lift which will both provide momentum for GVN to mount program and may also serve to damp down factional pressures.

In sum, we believe Quat government has potential, whether it will live up to that potential or not cannot yet be judged. It appears to have ridden out successfully its first storm, thanks largely to fact that coup plotters were widely unpopular within military establishment.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Tokyo, Vientiane, London, Manila, Seoul, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received in the Department of State at 3:08 a.m.
2. In telegram 2603, February 15, Taylor reported on a meeting with Khanh in which Khanh commented on a list of proposed cabinet members. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)
3. Dated February 16. (Ibid.)