Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, February 23, 1965, 9:47 p.m.

1805. Subject to final execute instruction tomorrow, we believe next strike should take place Feb 26² and that you should seek political clearance Feb 25.

We believe departure of Khanh essential before either clearance or strike and that Saigon situation generally should appear to have settled down as completely as possible. In this connection it would be a great help if generals and Quat, with other leaders if possible, could join in statements of solidarity and resolve to prosecute war firmly. We are also concerned over possibility Buddhist demonstrations or other action contributing to picture of unsettled situation.

You will get through military channels suggestions to have operation consist of two naval targets, one to be struck by VNAF and one by US.³ This is to focus operation heavily on boat incident although we agree with your excellent suggested draft release⁴ stressing other VC operations also as warranting response.FYI: One object in stressing naval rationale is to reduce risks serious flare-back on gambit described Deptel 1783,⁵ which remains active. As you can see, this gambit continues to have great broad policy importance. Secrecy on it remains essential, although stories today from London have given us grave concern whether it can be preserved. End FYI.

In response to concerns Embtel 2706⁶ (which we did not pass to other addressees as they had not received our 1718 and 1724)⁷ you are correct that we have been reconsidering sequence and forum of public statement and presentation of case against DRV. Not clear yet just how these will work, and we hope for clearer picture by tomorrow. In any case, developments do not yet warrant any new statement to Quat other than to say that we still contemplate public statement our purposes and objectives and also presentation of case, but timing on these not yet firm.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you, along with Alex, Westmoreland, and your whole mission, on your expert handling of the recent semi-coup. It had all sorts of dangers whether US hand might be charged, and Thao and his friends certainly did their best to implicate us. But we seem to have come out relatively untouched, and perhaps the results will be for the best.⁸

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved by Rusk.
2. This planned strike was designated Rolling Thunder IV.
3. Not further identified.
4. The Embassy’s proposed text of a press release was transmitted in telegram 2710 from Saigon, February 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. Document 150.
6. In telegram 2706, February 23, Taylor reported that it appeared from recent Department of State cables that the U.S. Government was considering modifying the procedures agreed for the previously planned Rolling Thunder missions regarding the announcement of the strikes and the raising of Hanoi’s aggression in the U.N. Security Council. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S)
7. Documents 115 and 117.
8. In telegram 1815 to Saigon, February 24, the Department of State instructed Taylor to seek political clearance on February 25 for an air strike against North Vietnam on February 26. In telegram 5327 to London, February 24, the Department informed Ambassador Bruce of this decision and also indicated that Ambassador Harlech had been informed of the decision earlier that day. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Bad weather, however, forced further postponement of this first Rolling Thunder mission.