Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

156. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, February 23, 1965.

FRENCH DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI AND PEIPING

1. Source of Information. On February 2, the French Foreign Office filled us in on French contacts with Hanoi and Peiping, mostly in Paris, but on one occasion in Peiping. A similar fill-in was given on February 17, just prior to Couve’s departure for Washington, and this covered Couve’s talk with the ChiCom Ambassador on February 13, to which Couve referred in his talk with the President on February 19th. The reporting cables are Paris 4295, 4390, 4445, and 4692,² as supplemented by Couve’s talk with the President.³

We have no information of any other French contacts with either Communist country in recent months. Our supposition is that the French have informed us fully, although there are significant differences in interpretation from one French talk with us to another. Notably, Couve in his talk with the President was much more optimistic about ChiCom views than the French Foreign Office source who reported to us separately on the same February 13 conversation.

2. Dates and Places of Contact. The French talked in Paris with the Hanoi economic delegate, Bo, on December 22 and January 20. They have talked to the ChiComs in Paris on December 17, January 15 and 25, and February 13, and the French Ambassador in Peiping talked to ChiCom Foreign Minister Chen Yi on January 9.

3. French Talks with Hanoi. The French have put three questions:

a. Would Hanoi accept and join in guarantees for a neutral and completely independent South Viet-Nam?

b. Would Hanoi agree to knock off political and military subversion in South Viet-Nam?

c. Would Hanoi accept some control mechanism more serious and with wider checks than the present ICC?

The French have reported that Bo showed considerable interest in a and c but was evasive on b.

As to a, Bo was quoted as saying that such a settlement would require bilateral negotiations and the resumption of relations between the two Viet-Nams, as well as wider international guarantees and a control mechanism.

As to b, Bo has refused to admit Hanoi’s activities in South Viet-Nam, but has said that “what was needed was an honorable compromise based on real forces present in Viet-Nam.” For some reason, the French interpret this statement—which would seem much more likely to mean legalization of the Liberation Front—to indicate some sympathy with a bilateral withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam as the basis for settlement.

The Hanoi representative has at no time stated that he was speaking on instructions from Hanoi. The French have pressed him for an official statement of Hanoi’s position, but he has not produced it. The French Foreign Office, in its last briefing to us, nonetheless believes (for some unstated reason) that Hanoi in fact approved Bo’s replies on points a (affirmative but general) and c (affirmative but avoiding any specifics). The last French report on February 17 indicated that the French Foreign Office “believes further clarification Hanoi position required.”

It is extremely hard to make anything of Bo’s reported comments. The lack of Hanoi express authority for his statements, plus the fact that there have been no reported contacts since February 7 and 11, make the reading from these contacts extremely obscure at this time. It certainly cannot be said that the contacts—which were apparently at French initiative—have produced any serious indication of Hanoi’s attitude or terms. Nonetheless, because of their interpretation of Bo’s statements, as indicated above, the French have told us they think Hanoi’s position is somewhat more forthcoming than Peiping’s.

4. French Talks with Peiping. The French have stated that these were initiated by the Chinese.

Initially, the ChiCom representative called for a unilateral withdrawal of the US from South Viet-Nam as the only basis for settlement. They also attacked the position the US had taken in the Warsaw Talks as purely propagandistic.

On January 15, the ChiCom representative, on instruction from Peiping, had asked whether France would assume a more active role in Viet-Nam and would approach the US with a view to discussing a negotiated settlement. In both of the first talks, the French put to the ChiCom representative the same three questions they had addressed to the Hanoi representative. The ChiComs had evaded any precise reply to these, and the conversation since then has apparently revolved around whether there might be a reconvened conference and whether any preconditions were required for this purpose.

On this point, in the January 15 conference the ChiComs allegedly did not reject the idea of a conference but said that US bellicosity and desire to extend the war made it impossible to propose a conference. (They also complained of the Korean troops going to SVN.)

On February 13, the ChiCom Ambassador—to Couve—pointed to the US attacks as showing US bellicosity and contradicting the French assurance that the US did not wish to extend the war.

Couve replied that the French still thought a conference should be convened without prior conditions and that its first task should be a cease-fire. The ChiCom Ambassador allegedly responded “positively” but went on to say that the US had now introduced a new element by attacking North Viet-Nam and that a halt to this aggression constituted a new prior condition for a conference.

The French believe that the ChiComs were thus moving away from their propaganda position that there must be a total US withdrawal from SVN before negotiation. (This same theme was apparently covered between the French Ambassador and Chen Yi on January 9, in which Chen Yi had said that such a total US withdrawal was not a prior condition to negotiation but might be a goal thereof.)

In summary there has been no Chinese response to the basic three points, and it is by no means clear that the ChiComs are not insisting on a cessation of attacks on the DRV as a precondition to any conference. In his talk with the President, Couve said that the ChiCom Ambassador could hardly have been expected to agree verbally with the French position for a conference without preconditions, and Couve seems to draw the conclusion that the ChiComs would in fact now accept a conference. However, it seems absolutely clear that their objective in such a conference would be, at a minimum, to obtain total US withdrawal from SVN, and there is no indication in any of the French contacts with the ChiComs that they even admit North Viet-Nam’s role or would set up its cessation as an acceptable quid pro quo for US withdrawal. The Chinese position, as stated to the French, seems to be that we must stop attacking the DRV before there can be any negotiation, and that we must agree, in any negotiation, to get out of SVN. This is hardly a very promising or forthcoming position!

5. References to US Position. The French tell us that they have not purported to speak for the US in any of these contacts. However, they have made clear to our Embassy that they believe they understand the US position correctly, as being acceptable to a neutral SVN with adequate assurances and solid guarantees. Prior to the two most recent ChiCom contacts, the French indicated that they had read with great care the reference to negotiations in Mr. William Bundy’s speech of January 23.⁴ Since this may now be the basis of French representation of US views, the relevant paragraph is as follows:

“As to the basic alternatives, so long as South Viet-Nam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954 Accords and thus an independent and secure South Viet-Nam would of course be an answer, indeed the answer. But negotiation would hardly be promising that admitted Communism to South Viet-Nam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South Viet-Nam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with only nebulous or remote guarantees.”

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jan.-Mar. 1965. Top Secret.
2. All four cables are ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.
3. See Document 144.
4. See footnote 2, Document 48.