48. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
4295. EmbOff has been shown in strictest secrecy large portions of record conversations on Viet Nam held here between ranking officials of Quai on one hand and separately with Chinese Charge Sung and North Vietnamese delegate Mai Van Bo on other. Conversation with Bo took place December 22 and was renewed again last week. Latest conversation with Sung took place also last week and all above talks antedate Bundy speech of Jan 23,2 which was received in Quai with great interest (especially two paragraphs on negotiation) for reasons which will be obvious from info below.
In addition to discussion of international conference along Geneva lines, conversation with North Vietnamese [garble], essentially to three questions put by French (1) Would Hanoi accept and join in guarantees for neutral and completely independent South Vietnam? (2) Would Hanoi agree to knock off political and military subversion in SVN 0135? [Page 106] (3) Would Hanoi accept some control mechanism more serious and with wider powers than present ICC? Total ineffectiveness of latter and paralysis through veto demonstrated, especially in Laos.
Mai Van Bo showed considerable interest in (1) and (3) and spoke of settling on basis 1954 Geneva Accords but was obviously embarrassed and evasive on (2), since affirmative response would have constituted confession. French told Bo frankly they could not accept Vietnamese protestations that there was only American intervention and that French were convinced of Hanoi subversive role. If Hanoi did not wish to own up, would they at least undertake guarantee not to engage in such activities in future?
At second meeting in January above questions explored further and French said that in order to discuss meaningfully, Bo should obtain precise answers from Hanoi on above three points. No answer yet received.
Similar line taken with Chinese Charge but less precisely, since discussion did not get much below shallows of Chinese reiterations of principle and calls for unilateral withdrawal of US (which solely to blame) from SVN as only basis for settlement. Charge described ChiCom contacts with US in Warsaw in terms almost exactly converse of those in Deptel 3600,3 saying that US merely reiterated, sometimes with violence, its propaganda positions and talks continued only because US wanted them.
When asked about American viewpoint, French have taken line with Sung and Mai Van Bo that French in no way authorized to speak for US but have given their estimate our position somewhat along lines of Bundy speech, mentioning USG negative attitude toward Geneva-type conference. French also said it was clearly unrealistic to expect Americans to agree simply to withdraw from SVN and that if one might doubt that war could result in clear cut victory for Saigon and US, it was equally illusory to believe Americans would ever negotiate on basis of position tantamount to defeat.
Net impression of our source was that DRVN reps more flexible and interested than Chinese, although latter do appear anxious avoid escalation and confrontation with US. Source referred to conversation between Chou and Chen Yi and Cambodia reps in Peiping (Embtel 4021)4 which he interpreted as advice of caution to RKG.
Comment: Above conversations do not appear as yet to have passed beyond soundings. They no doubt help explain public and diplomatic passivity of French and watchful waiting on Southeast Asia which Embassy has already signaled to Dept. disclosure of record to EmbOff was unauthorized and it is imperative that all above be closely held and [Page 107] not discussed outside USG. No mention whatever of contacts would be made to French Embassy Washington which has not been informed by Quai.