476. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1999. Following is Alex Johnson’s report of his two and one-half hour meeting this afternoon with Oanh, General Thieu and Admiral Cang:
We had what I feel was quite a satisfactory session, at least as an opener, but with the crunch issue left open by how military are going to establish that they will not again irresponsibly intervene in governmental affairs. PriMin Huong informally spoke to us briefly at the beginning on importance he attached to our work in restoring effective relations between our two countries, etc. Oanh did a surprisingly good job as chairman.
In opening both Oanh and Thieu made it immediately clear that they considered working out a solution to governmental question arising from Dec 20 Armed Forces Council actions an integral part of the job and I accepted this. We discussed questions in order of: (A) our Dec 20 meeting with four Generals; (B) our Dec 21 meeting with Khanh; and (C) governmental question.
While it took some pulling and hauling, I finally got Thieu and Cang to state what was bothering them with respect to Dec 20 meeting by pleading that we had only heard rumors and indirect reports and I wanted facts directly from them. They raised only the issues of the “wasted dinner”, “do you speak English” and Amb Taylor’s general manner at beginning of Dec 20 meeting. I patiently went into the “wasted dinner” issue at great length, it being evident that both of them had interpreted, or chose to interpret, the remark as indicating the Amb’s regret at the waste of money on the Westmoreland dinner. I of course explained this furthest from Amb’s mind, he intended no such offensive connotation. He was simply stating evident fact that [Page 1054] what he had said there was evidently not understood or accepted. Thus what he had said was “wasted”. I explained that question with respect to speaking English had simply been straightforward query as to what language they preferred.
With respect to manner I said that both Amb Taylor and myself were understandably upset and felt ourselves offended at action they had taken and we made no apologies for this. I then recounted at considerable length Amb Taylor’s deep personal involvement in and responsibility for our policy with respect to Vietnam, going back to 1961 and reviewing events since his arrival here. I explained in general terms the great efforts he had made [during] his last trip to Washington, the policy decisions that were reached there, the subsequent discussions on his return, including those with Vien, Huong and Khanh, the reasons in the background for his meeting with the Generals at Gen Westmoreland’s dinner, his sense that progress was being made and moving toward the goals he had been seeking for Vietnam only to be awakened early Sunday morning and told that during the night their actions had dashed all of these hopes without even the courtesy of informing the Amb until hours after everything was done, etc., etc. Thus he had deep reason for both personal and official offense at their actions. He had talked to them man to man and I felt no apology was necessary or required from his side. In fact as both men recalled I was so concerned that the very sympathetic and understanding attitude he had taken later in the conversation would be misinterpreted by them as not indicating the real depth of our concern that I had intervened to make certain that they understood the fundamental issue involved. I also recalled my own pleading with them not to “close doors” if they nevertheless went ahead with a press conference but leave open the question of the dissolution of the institution of the High National Council.
They listened carefully and sympathetically and acquiesced in Oanh’s observation that they should pass on my remarks as they considered them appropriate to other members of the Armed Forces Council and unless we heard otherwise from them the matter would be considered closed.
On the Amb-Khanh issue, they recounted Khanh’s report of the conversation along lines that we had previously heard, that is, Amb first questioning Khanh on who was responsible for the coup, that is, Khanh or the Armed Forces Council, and Khanh’s accepting responsibility as C-in-C. They then quoted Khanh as reporting that Amb Taylor had said, “In this case you must leave your post of C-in-C and leave the country”, this allegedly confirmed by a telephone conversation between the two the following day. This was “gross interference in internal affairs, etc., etc.” I replied that, “They faced me with a very deep dilemma.” As they knew, I was the only other person present at [Page 1055] the conversation. While the substance of the first part relating to responsibility was generally correct, I could firmly and emphatically say that the last part relating to Amb Taylor’s alleged statement was not correct. In response to their obviously eager questions as to what was actually said, I replied that I did not feel I should say because this would put me in a position of calling Khanh a liar, or he, in turn, calling me a liar and this would only exaggerate the situation. I told them that I had taken careful notes and we had gone directly from General Khanh’s office to that of the PriMin and had recounted conversation to PriMin in detail from my notes (Oanh interjected that yes, he knew, because he was in next room when we were meeting with PriMin). However, could categorically say to them that Amb Taylor at no time had ever made any demand of any kind on Khanh and that if he was understood to have done so it was a misunderstanding. I then passed over a copy of Dec 24 Beverly Deepe interview with Khanh, as well as her interview with him last August, and a Stars and Stripes article directly quoting Gen Ky as stating that Amb Taylor had said that he was a General while Khanh was still a cadet.2 I said as long as we were clearing the air I thought we should clear the air all about and, although these direct quotes were deeply and personally offensive for him, Amb Taylor has refrained from replying or engaging in public vendetta.
I also noted the portion of Dec 24 Beverly Deepe article reporting that Gen Khanh and the Generals were going to undertake an anti-American campaign. I feel that all this served to clear the air somewhat and to shock Thieu and Cang. It resulted in a vigorous exchange in Vietnamese between the three, apparently over who was going to beard Khanh with all this, the conclusion being that this prickly job was left to Oanh.
As a footnote to this portion: Thieu and Cang said that “they had heard that Amb Taylor was going to Vung Tau to see Khanh this evening. I said that I was sure that Amb Taylor “did not know this” and this, in turn resulted in considerable Vietnamese exchange between Cang and Thieu (in fact, as reported through CAS channels, there was an apparent feeler from Khanh today on a meeting with Amb Taylor and/or myself to which no reply thus far has been made).
On governmental issue, I went to great pains at length to explain the whole rationale of our position, the problem presented for us in our cooperation with Vietnam (particularly in seeking to move ahead with greater support, in face of the “two govt” situation resulting from the Dec 20 act of AFC). I explained that we were not taking a legalistic view but rather a practical view, using as an illustration our call on [Page 1056] PriMin on the morning of Dec 20 when PriMin knew only what he had been told by some military officers at 0200 that morning and when he had obviously been put in a position where he could not speak for Vietnam and had no control over military forces. A situation in which this could recur was not tolerable for USG. We were not seeking to dictate what Vietnam should do and did not allege that there was any single answer although all we had been able to think of was a reversal of the dissolution of the HNC either by the AFC or by the military acquiescing in a statement by the govt not recognizing the legality of the Dec 20 action. I deliberately took a hard line on this in not further introducing the possibility of other compromises, as at this phase I felt it best to let them wrestle further with the problem they have created.
Discussion of this was amicable, straightforward and if they did not do so before, I believe that at least Cang and Thieu now appreciate the problem in terms of our ability to work with them. I emphasized that the two essentials from our standpoint were “stability”, that is, a govt that is not arbitrarily going to be upset and “effectiveness”, that is, a govt that could speak authoritatively to us on behalf of all the country, including the armed forces, and which was able to carry out its commitments including those involving the armed forces.
There was some discussion at Thieu and Cang’s initiative of the proper role of the Armed Forces Council vis-à-vis the military, they explaining its creation as an effort to prevent coups by various elements within the armed forces in an effort to keep the armed forces united. I praised them for this effort and discussed with them in light of our own experience the difference between various advisory groups and committees and attempting to run the armed forces by committee.
No firm date was set for the next meeting, it being left that Cang will get in touch with me after he has seen Khanh. I made it clear that I was available at all times.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 12:20 p.m. and transmitted to the Texas White House as CAP 64378.↩
- Presumably a reference to the article in Pacific Stars and Stripes, December 25, 1964, pp. 1–2; the other references have not been identified.↩