Office of the Historian

474. Paper Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, December 28, 1964.

PROS AND CONS OF A REPRISAL RAID AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE BARRACKS AT VIT THU LU (TARGET 36)

I. Considerations against the operation

1.
Six days will have elapsed since the Christmas Eve raid and the reprisal element will be blurred.
2.
The political confusion in Saigon will give this signal a very mixed meaning both to Vietnamese and to the world.
3.
A confusing response which may lead to escalation by the other side is not in our interest at this time.
4.
It seems unwise to escalate merely because security control in a U.S. BOQ is bad.
5.
The central problem is and remains the establishment of political stability in South Vietnam, and a major decision of this sort should await progress toward stability. At the least it should not be taken while the situation is more unstable then ever.

II. Considerations in favor of the operation

1.
Target 36 is a military barracks, and the fact that this is a reprisal will be evident to Hanoi and to others. Six days of delay in this reprisal is not significant, since the close parallel of one barracks against another will be apparent to all.
2.
The delay was justified by the need to pinpoint Viet Cong responsibility, which is now clear, on the basis of Hanoi radio broadcasts.
3.
We decided in December that we would execute reprisals from now on, and this decision was not tied, as other possibilities were, to increased political stability in Saigon. We have communicated this decision to those Allies who are closest to us on Vietnam—the Lao, the Thai, the British, the Australians, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders. We have said the same thing to the senior military and civilian officials of Saigon. They are now waiting to see whether we mean what we say.
4.
The operation is rated as a very low risk by General Wheeler, and because its character as a reprisal will be clear, it should not lead to escalation (but see separate intelligence estimate).2
5.
Seaborn’s report from Hanoi3 suggests that the Communists very much need a reminder of our will and determination.
6.
While a reprisal will not produce political stability in Saigon, it does seem likely that specific, firm action now will be somewhat helpful in assisting us to continue to make progress in resolving the impasse of last week.
7.
A firm reprisal will do wonders for the morale of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam.
8.
The theory of our policy of reprisal is that it can help to prevent gradual Viet Cong escalation in South Vietnam. This theory seems as sound now as it was when we decided to follow it.
9.
Ambassador Taylor and his entire country team are unanimous, and they are the people on the spot. One more consideration against:

It was Winston Churchill who said that you should never trust the judgment of the man on the spot.

Or, to put it another way, it is easy for advisers to be brave, but it i5 the President who must live with the decision.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President. Top Secret. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “This package went w/Mr. B to Texas 12/29/64.” Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 108A.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. [Footnote (4 lines of text) not declassified]↩