449. Letter From the President to Senator
Mike Mansfield1
Washington, December 17,
1964.
DEAR MIKE: I want to thank you for your memorandum of December 9,2 which I
read with care. I asked Mac Bundy to comment on it,
[Page 1010]
and in particular to see which of your
policy suggestions we could fit into our current program. He has written
me a memorandum of comments, which I enclose as of possible
interest.
I think we have the same basic view of this problem and the same sense of
its difficulties. The one suggestion in your memorandum which I myself
would take direct issue with is that we are “overcommitted” there. Given
the size of the stake, it seems to me that we are doing only what we
have to do. That we could always do it better is clear, and it is in
that spirit that I greatly welcome your memorandum on the subject.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
Washington, December 16,
1964.
Memorandum From the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the
President3
SUBJECT
- Senator Mansfield’s
Memorandum of December 9
- 1.
- Senator Mansfield’s
memorandum is characteristically thoughtful. There is a
difference in emphasis between him and us, but certainly no
difference in fundamental purpose. I think he agrees with us
that the most important task is to try to help in getting a more
effective and better supported government in Saigon; of course
this is a point that you have hammered on in every meeting in
recent months. And we certainly agree with him “that American
and Western interests are best served by the frugal use of
American resources to forestall Chinese political and military
domination of the area and to keep open an opportunity for the
development of native institutions of national independence,
regional cooperation and popularly responsible government.” What
seems frugal to us may seem too much to him, but this is not a
difference in principle.
- 2.
- Senator Mansfield’s
memorandum makes seven policy suggestions and I comment on them
in order:
- (1)
- We think it would be a mistake to make a commitment
against any U.S. action of any kind beyond the borders
of South Vietnam. On the other hand, you have repeatedly
said that we seek no wider war
[Page 1011]
and intend no reckless action. I
myself do not see the grounds for the flatness of the
Senator’s recommendation, given the facts of
infiltration and of North Vietnamese control over the
Communists in the South.
- (2)
- There is a lot of force in the Senator’s
recommendation that we avoid entanglement on the
Cambodian border. But Communist infiltration across this
border is a fact, and it is hard to see how we can
impose the stringent restrictions on the Vietnamese
which the Senator suggests. As a practical matter, we do
agree that there are other areas of higher priority, and
this position is being urged on the Vietnamese
authorities by the country team. We do not fully share
the memorandum’s very high judgment of Sihanouk, but we
agree that it is important to negotiate differences if
possible. I myself would suppose that negotiation
implied some give on both sides, and we do not find much
give in Sihanouk’s current position.
- (3)
- We agree on the importance of supporting Souvanna
Phouma; this has been our position for two years. We do
not quite agree that the initiative in these relations
should be “his totally” because that seems to us not a
good way of conducting relations which involve U.S.
commitments and responsibilities. Souvanna himself has
given repeated indications of his satisfaction with our
current policy in Laos. Souvanna, indeed, is
considerably more favorable to U.S. action outside South
Vietnam than the Senator’s memorandum, so that if we
followed all his advice we could not follow all of
Senator Mansfield’s.
- (4)
- We do not currently share the view that we should
stand aside entirely from those who are trying to
increase their contacts with Hanoi. We do recognize the
advantages of detaching Hanoi from China, but at the
moment we have also the quite tangible problem of what
Hanoi is doing in South Vietnam. This seems to us to
argue against a present policy of Free World
friendliness to North Vietnam.
- (5)
- We agree with the general purpose of this
recommendation, but it is not clear to us that peaceful
unification of all Vietnam is the best slogan for a
government which has all it can do to deal with its own
immediate problems. Nevertheless, this suggestion is
worth further consideration and it is being reviewed
with the State Department.
- (6)
- No matter what course is taken, it seems likely to us
that we face years of involvement in South Vietnam,
though not necessarily “a vast increase in the
commitment.” The Administration has regularly insisted
that this problem is not one which will be solved
tomorrow, but it may well be important to make this
point still more clear to the American people. In
general, the Administration’s policy seems to correspond
to the view of most thoughtful Americans: We do not want
a big war out there, and neither do we intend to back
out on a 10-year-long commitment.
- (7)
- Right now we do not see how we can have useful
exploratory talks with the Chinese, in the light of the
extraordinary virulence of their public and private
comments about the U.S. It takes two to conduct a
conversation, and everything we currently know about
Peking suggests that there is no interest there in a
serious conversation on any terms that are remotely
acceptable to us. Recent reports from leaders of the
British Labour Party, who have been in touch with the
Chinese and who might be expected to sympathize with
suggestion No. 7, only confirm our current pessimistic
assessment of this possibility.
