449. Letter From the President to Senator Mike Mansfield1

DEAR MIKE: I want to thank you for your memorandum of December 9,2 which I read with care. I asked Mac Bundy to comment on it, [Page 1010] and in particular to see which of your policy suggestions we could fit into our current program. He has written me a memorandum of comments, which I enclose as of possible interest.

I think we have the same basic view of this problem and the same sense of its difficulties. The one suggestion in your memorandum which I myself would take direct issue with is that we are “overcommitted” there. Given the size of the stake, it seems to me that we are doing only what we have to do. That we could always do it better is clear, and it is in that spirit that I greatly welcome your memorandum on the subject.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Enclosure

Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President3

SUBJECT

  • Senator Mansfield’s Memorandum of December 9
1.
Senator Mansfield’s memorandum is characteristically thoughtful. There is a difference in emphasis between him and us, but certainly no difference in fundamental purpose. I think he agrees with us that the most important task is to try to help in getting a more effective and better supported government in Saigon; of course this is a point that you have hammered on in every meeting in recent months. And we certainly agree with him “that American and Western interests are best served by the frugal use of American resources to forestall Chinese political and military domination of the area and to keep open an opportunity for the development of native institutions of national independence, regional cooperation and popularly responsible government.” What seems frugal to us may seem too much to him, but this is not a difference in principle.
2.
Senator Mansfield’s memorandum makes seven policy suggestions and I comment on them in order:
(1)
We think it would be a mistake to make a commitment against any U.S. action of any kind beyond the borders of South Vietnam. On the other hand, you have repeatedly said that we seek no wider war [Page 1011] and intend no reckless action. I myself do not see the grounds for the flatness of the Senator’s recommendation, given the facts of infiltration and of North Vietnamese control over the Communists in the South.
(2)
There is a lot of force in the Senator’s recommendation that we avoid entanglement on the Cambodian border. But Communist infiltration across this border is a fact, and it is hard to see how we can impose the stringent restrictions on the Vietnamese which the Senator suggests. As a practical matter, we do agree that there are other areas of higher priority, and this position is being urged on the Vietnamese authorities by the country team. We do not fully share the memorandum’s very high judgment of Sihanouk, but we agree that it is important to negotiate differences if possible. I myself would suppose that negotiation implied some give on both sides, and we do not find much give in Sihanouk’s current position.
(3)
We agree on the importance of supporting Souvanna Phouma; this has been our position for two years. We do not quite agree that the initiative in these relations should be “his totally” because that seems to us not a good way of conducting relations which involve U.S. commitments and responsibilities. Souvanna himself has given repeated indications of his satisfaction with our current policy in Laos. Souvanna, indeed, is considerably more favorable to U.S. action outside South Vietnam than the Senator’s memorandum, so that if we followed all his advice we could not follow all of Senator Mansfield’s.
(4)
We do not currently share the view that we should stand aside entirely from those who are trying to increase their contacts with Hanoi. We do recognize the advantages of detaching Hanoi from China, but at the moment we have also the quite tangible problem of what Hanoi is doing in South Vietnam. This seems to us to argue against a present policy of Free World friendliness to North Vietnam.
(5)
We agree with the general purpose of this recommendation, but it is not clear to us that peaceful unification of all Vietnam is the best slogan for a government which has all it can do to deal with its own immediate problems. Nevertheless, this suggestion is worth further consideration and it is being reviewed with the State Department.
(6)
No matter what course is taken, it seems likely to us that we face years of involvement in South Vietnam, though not necessarily “a vast increase in the commitment.” The Administration has regularly insisted that this problem is not one which will be solved tomorrow, but it may well be important to make this point still more clear to the American people. In general, the Administration’s policy seems to correspond to the view of most thoughtful Americans: We do not want a big war out there, and neither do we intend to back out on a 10-year-long commitment.
(7)
Right now we do not see how we can have useful exploratory talks with the Chinese, in the light of the extraordinary virulence of their public and private comments about the U.S. It takes two to conduct a conversation, and everything we currently know about Peking suggests that there is no interest there in a serious conversation on any terms that are remotely acceptable to us. Recent reports from leaders of the British Labour Party, who have been in touch with the Chinese and who might be expected to sympathize with suggestion No. 7, only confirm our current pessimistic assessment of this possibility.
McGeorge Bundy4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Names File, Mansfield. No classification marking. Drafted by the President and McGeorge Bundy. Senator Mansfield was the Senate Majority Leader.
  2. The memorandum [4 pages of source text] was not declassified. (Ibid.)
  3. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy. Secret.
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.