Office of the Historian

438. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President1

Washington, December 5, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • The British and Vietnam
1.
I think you should know that the British will find it very, very difficult indeed to increase their commitment in Vietnam right now. That does not necessarily mean that we should not hit them hard while Wilson is here, but I think it does mean that we cannot expect a definite and affirmative answer.
2.
There is no political base whatever in England, in any party, for an increased British commitment in Vietnam now. For 10 years we have accepted a situation in which the British give political support, but avoid any major commitment on the ground of their other interests and their position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The most that Wilson could possibly do at this stage would be a slight enlargement of the Thompson advisory mission and of their police training effort, with perhaps a green light to a few bold British officers to get themselves in the line of fire as our men do. All this he would have to do quietly. There is no workable basis for a public change in [Page 982] British policy at a time when there is no public change in ours. You might press him to go from the current level of 7 Britishers to about a hundred, but we would be lucky to get 50 in this first phase.
3.
When and if we open a second phase and need to land a mixed force of U.S. and other troops, we might conceivably get a small British contingent along with larger ones from Australia and New Zealand. Our own commitment would have gone up and there would be a better case for asking the British to join in. On the other hand, Tommy Thompson points out that if the British Co-Chairman send troops in, that might be the trigger, or at least the excuse, for the Soviet Co-Chairman to help Hanoi.
4.
The reciprocal price of this would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployments designed to cool off Sukarno. This kind of bargain in this part of the world makes a good deal of sense, and Rusk and McNamara will be ready to go forward with the British in detailed discussions on this basis.
5.
The point of this memorandum is simply to make sure that you know how very hard it will be for Wilson to do as much for us in South Vietnam as we need him to. It is hard to treat a thing as our problem for 10 years and then try to get other people to take on a share of it, just because it is getting worse (though we choose not to say so).
McG.B.2
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President. Secret.↩
  2. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩