406. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1415. SEACORD met Saigon November 5 and discussed agenda items transmitted to Dept in Saigon’s 1290 to Dept info CINCPAC 708.2 In addition to representatives from Bangkok, Vientiane and Saigon, the meeting was attended by representatives of CINCPAC.
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]
Group reviewed accomplishments of T–28 operations in corridor and post-strike photography has shown serious damage has been done to many installations. It was agreed that this was a generally commendable performance as far as it went, although it appears from post-strike photography that damage on several targets was slight. MACV and Vientiane will exchange info on target photography holdings to resolve current differences in assessments and to obviate those that might arise in the future. Additional T–28’s now scheduled for Vientiane will allow photo reconnaissance planes to accompany strike aircraft and eliminate major source of differences.
Group also supports Vientiane’s need for more T–28 strike aircraft to meet additional requirements now being refined. Requirements for additional aircraft include armed recce.
[Page 893]It is anticipated that the RLAF is capable of generating 200 sorties in the Panhandle during the month of November to strike interdiction targets to the degree that close support requirements permit.
From a list of 39 targets in the Laos corridor (22 USMACV recommended targets; 17 USAIRA Vientiane targets), the RLAF attacked 13 of the USMACV targets during the period 14 October–2 November. Three additional interdiction targets not on the target list were also attacked at RLAF initiative. Post-strike damage assessment indicates re-strike against 10 of these targets is necessary to achieve the desired 80–90 [%] damage. These re-strikes and initial attacks against 8 other targets on the combined list are currently planned by the RLAF during November and will fully utilize RLAF capability. AmEmbassy Vientiane reports that the RLAF has additional potential corridor targets under study.
Cross border operations: unilateral planning for cross border operations both on the US and GVN side has continued in order to minimize the time lag when operations are approved by Washington for implementation. By cable MAJ3 10906 DTG 090015Z3 MACV advised that a reevaluation of a starting date would be made when significant changes occurred in the political and military situations inside Vietnam. The cable also advised that it was unlikely that we could contemplate any significant cross border operations prior to January 1, 1965. However, under present conditions it is now estimated that cross border operations under concept set forth in Saigon telegram 9134 could begin between 1 December and 1 January in central area if authorization is received 15 days prior to execution. When authority is given to execute cross border operations, the group is still of the unanimous opinion it would be preferable to have no publicity with regard to operational details and no comment made in response to questions and accusations.
In addition to renewing recommendation for approval Yankee team strikes against fixed targets, group also discussed additional action that could be taken against increasing scale of VC infiltration through corridor. In this connection group discussed desirability increased US air participation in striking both fixed targets and targets of opportunity in Laos Panhandle. It was recognized that such increased US activity in Laos would raise political problems re US relations with Laos and US posture toward Geneva accords. Various formulae were discussed that might reduce such problems. For example, it was felt consideration could be given to modifying rules of engagement for US aircraft providing CAP and escort for RLAF to permit such aircraft to provide frequent or routine escort for T–28 missions. This would involve [Page 894] additional authorization for US aircraft to retaliate against hostile ground action. Vientiane and Bangkok may wish to submit further views in this regard.
There was considerable discussion of the Route 9 improvement concept and general agreement that it deserved further consideration by all three posts with the view of additional discussion at the next meeting. Saigon will transmit by septel,5 summary of concepts discussed and suggestions to provide a basis for discussion at the next meeting.
Based on a proposal by General Westmoreland, the group considered the requirement for a military coordinating committee. In view of the political-military composition of the SEACORD committee and in light of experience to date, it was determined that there is no need for a military committee. Experience has indicated that ad hoc military staff back-up to SEACORD deliberations will suffice. Accordingly proposed terms of reference of the military committee6 will be withdrawn. The group requests that the matter of a military coordinating committee will be dropped from further consideration.
In summary, recommendations are as follows:
[Numbered paragraph 1 (2–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified] 2. T–28 operations in corridor.
- a.
- MACV and Vientiane exchange info on target photography holdings to resolve current differences in target assessments and to obviate those that might arise in future. Action Saigon and Vientiane.
- b.
- Support Vientiane’s need for more T–28 strike aircraft to meet additional requirements, including armed recce. Action Washington.
3. Cross border operations can now begin between 1 Dec-1 Jan in central area 15 days after Washington authorization. Action Washington.
4. Yankee Team strikes.
- a.
- Renewed recommendation for approval of Yankee Team strikes against fixed targets. Action Washington.
- b.
- Desirability increased US air participation in striking both fixed targets and targets of opportunity in Laos Panhandle. This would involve additional authorization for US aircraft to retaliate against hostile ground action. Action Vientiane and Washington.
It was agreed that the next meeting will be held December 2–3.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, JCS, Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.↩
- Dated October 27. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)↩
- Not found.↩
- Document 346.↩
- Telegram 1434 from Saigon, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
- Transmitted in COMUSMACV telegram 191420Z, October 19. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11966)↩