35. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Secretary of State1
Washington, February 4,
1964.
SUBJECT
- Viet-Nam
In addition to Deptels 1165 and 1166 to Saigon (attached),2 we believe you should be aware of the following in connection with the lunch which you are having with the President and Secretary McNamara on Viet-Nam:
- 1.
- Khanh’s reaction to the President’s letter—Khanh has expressed pleasure at receiving the letter President Johnson sent on Saturday. He has issued a press release with the text of the letter and the comment that the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments have an absolute identical [Page 62] point of view on intensifying the war against the Communists (Saigon’s telegram 1481, February 4).3
- 2.
- Diemist Revival?—We have a few inconclusive signs that Khanh’s coup signifies a Diemist revival. This would lead to political instability because of the strong opposition of the students, Buddhists and intellectuals to a return of the Diemists. There has already been a student demonstration in support of “complete revolution” (and at least partly in support of General Minh-Saigon’s telegram 1482, February 4).4
- 3.
- Low-level American Advisers—The displaced junta did not give us a final answer on our proposal of assigning American advisers at District level and in other lower level capacities than they now function. We believe this proposal should be taken up with Khanh and at least pushed on an experimental basis. We are inclined to think that the increase in efficiency would outweigh the risk of successful Viet Cong capitalization on American presence at a low level. An experimental approach should prove the validity of our belief. We propose to move a cable to Saigon along these lines.
- 4.
- North Viet-Nam—In the present context resulting from France’s recognition of Communist China we believe that it is desirable for the U.S. to search for some means of action for recovering the psychological initiative. We are therefore cooperating with Defense and CIA in a new review of possible actions against North Viet-Nam.
- 5.
- Laos—We believe that it would be useful and important to supply Prince Souvanna Phouma with existing evidence of Viet Cong use of the Laos corridor for infiltration into Viet-Nam, and taking steps to see that this is done. Such information should be politically useful to Souvanna in dealing with the DRV and also build political support for intelligence collection operations in southern Laos.
- 6.
- Reporting—Secretary McNamara may raise the question of reporting from the U.S. agencies in Saigon. This question is now being actively worked on by the Interdepartmental Working Group on VietNam and we expect to send instructions to Saigon shortly. We are reviewing the substance, mode of presentation and frequency of assessment reporting-both overall and by province—as well as the personnel and sources of material for reporting. Defense has urged the dispatch of a State-DOD-CIA team to Saigon to improve reporting, but we have resisted this suggestion on the ground that the first task is for Washington to define what it considers the weaknesses in the reporting. If this can be done it ought to be possible to get a satisfactory response from Saigon without sending still another team out there.