32. Memoranda of Telephone Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Manning) and the Secretary of State1
TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MANNING, 3:45 p.m.
Mr. Manning called from the White House and said he was under a handicap since he did not yet have a copy of the Pres’s press conference transcript but the Pres had said on the neutralization of Vietnam, we were sympathetic to neutralization of both North and South. Manning said this didn’t pose too much of a problem. Pres had said we were opposed to De Gaulle’s idea of neutralization. The Sec said the two didn’t quite fit. Manning said the French press were dictating stories and tearing this apart. The Sec suggested Manning call Harriman. Manning said he would call Sec back when he got hold of a transcript.
TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. MANNING (at the WH), 4:25 p.m.
The Sec said he had been watching TV on the Pres’s press conference on the question of neutralization of Vietnam and also on what De Gaulle had said. Mr. Moyers got on the phone and asked the Sec if he would dictate to him a clarification of what the Pres had said on these two things.
Sec said:
“It was obvious from what he said that the President was concerned about the interpretation put on President De Gaulle’s discussion of neutralization in Southeast Asia itself. Out there it was taken to mean some sort of neutralization of South Vietnam which will simply expose that country to continued penetration from the north. Since President De Gaulle has not made any detailed proposals, it is easy to see how this interpretation could cause such deep concern in South Vietnam.”
The Sec said he would not put this clarification in the Pres’s mouth but as background clarification from Salinger’s office. Moyers asked if they couldn’t say that the Pres and the Sec had discussed this matter of interpretation only today. The Sec said they could add to above-“The President had discussed just today with the SecState the depth of concern of the anxiety in South Vietnam.”
[Page 58]TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MANNING (from WH), 4:55 p.m.
Mr. Manning said we were not completely finished with the clarification. He said in the middle of the two questions in the Pres’s press conference a newsman had asked if De Gaulle’s proposal interfered with our objectives and the Pres had said: yes. The Pres said that De Gaulle was entitled to his opinion and we had expressed ours. We thought our course was the only wise one and we planned to pursue it on a stepped up basis. Manning said that De Gaulle, in talking about Southeast Asia, was referring to what was formerly Indochina. The Sec said that, just [as] in the classroom, the Pres did not completely [and] accurately understand just what De Gaulle was talking about. We ought to deflect the whole business to what the people in Southeast Asia think De Gaulle is talking about. Manning said we should make ourselves clear that what the Pres was rejecting was the neutralization of South Vietnam. That was what South Vietnam was concerned about.2 As far as De Gaulle was concerned, let him come up with details.
- Source: Department of State, Rusk Papers: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Mildred Asbjornson.↩
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In telegram 1170 to Saigon, February 1, 7:15 p.m., the Department sent to the Embassy the following information on the President’s statements on neutralization:
“There may be attempts to distort the meaning of what the President said at press conference this afternoon regarding the De Gaulle neutralization proposal. In order head off conflicting interpretations, you should make absolutely clear in response to any inquiries, or direct statement by you if need be, that President firmly opposed to De Gaulle proposal for neutralization, that this has been and continues to be the position consistently taken by the US Government. It would be incorrect to read any change in policy into the President’s remarks. This borne out by letter which Present sent General Khanh this afternoon.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
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