Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

303. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)¹

Saigon, August 8, 1964—3:15 p.m.

MAC JOO 7565. Joint planning discussions with GVN.

1. At 1100Z August [7?], selected members of MACV staff and I met with Generals Khanh, Khiem and Thieu, C/S JGS, and Col Thang, J3 JGS. Meeting at my initiative to set stage for effective combined planning with GVN High Command.

2. The meeting was opened with a short briefing for Gen Khanh on the current status of U.S. air defense measures and capabilities in the RVN and their tie in with the overall SE Asia system. Khanh and group interested and asked several pertinent questions. I then gave Khanh a summary of damage done to the DRV by recent naval operations.

3. I then reviewed the threat including air, sea, infiltration and sabotage, ground attack by VC in concert with overt outside Communist incursions. Also emphasized the psychological threat to RVNAF forces of their becoming defensive minded in their counterinsurgency campaign, stressing need for balance between security and mobile offensive operations against the VC. Vulnerabilities were specified to include airfields, Saigon port channel and POL storage. Khanh and group agreed and outlined some of the security measures already ordered.

4. Then took up the topic of need for combined planning. Acknowledged that we had both been doing much unilateral planning but it now seemed wise to get together. I noted that combined planning for increased crossborder operations into Laos was underway but should be accelerated. We must be informed and prepared for probable increased infiltration and movement of PAVN forces through Laos. Khanh agreed. I then emphasized that we must immediately plan for defense against overt aggression, particularly in the northern part of RVN.

5. I told him I thought any offensive operations outside the RVN should primarily rely on air to punish the DRV and interdict routes of communication and infiltration to the South while the RVNAF put offensive pressure on VC forces within the RVN to discourage or defeat them. I then outlined a concept of categorizing targets for contingency air operations. Category I targets directly support the VC insurgency within RVN. This category has two sub groups—those in Laos and those in the DRV. Category II includes all important military targets in the DRV. Category III includes non-military targets which if destroyed, would extinguish the will and capability of the DRV to launch and support aggression against the RVN. I stated I felt that we would be able to provide specific targeting materials when the time came for detailed planning.

6. Up to this point Gen Khanh had made only occasional comments. Gen Khanh then stated the DRV has already committed aggression against his country and was increasing it. I replied that I appreciated his point of view but that my government would deal on a timely basis with specific provocative acts by the DRV.

7. I then returned to combined planning, which I considered particularly urgent. There would be two simultaneous missions. One would be to continue pacification, while the other would be operations against the external threat. Command arrangements then came into the discussion. I suggested that we defer this subject to a later meeting but did mention that our Korean experience might be helpful in developing a concept. Khanh was agreeable to postponing further discussion on this subject.

8. Gen Khanh then asked how the US defines “overt aggression”. He said he was convinced that we would not see PAVN units coming into the RVN with “ID cards and in uniform.” They would come in as VC reinforcements, absorbing PAVN units into VC battalions or regiments, but all under the guise of VC. He was concerned that the PAVN would build up forces in places like the Attopeu area without our knowing it until they initiated an attack inside RVN. Gen Khanh further stated that he felt that Communist forces will increase pressure on Saigon with numerous units infiltrated from Cambodia through the Tay Ninh/Binh Duong/Hau Nghia area. He was certain that with French and Cambodian connivance the Communists could build up and concentrate large forces just across the border without our knowing about it. He identified a large French rubber plantation in Cambodia north of Tay Ninh province as one place he feared. I stated that it would be necessary to carefully review intelligence in order to determine the extent of aggression.

9. I then asked about the reported alternate CP at Vung Tau, stating we had done some preparatory planning plus installing some badly needed commo gear and that we could be operating in 24 hours. Gen Khiem and Gen Khanh then explained that Vung Tau was to be the alternate national command post. It would become a “second Saigon” if Saigon became untenable. They agreed that Nha Trang would be the best location for a combined, field command post for military operations.

10. Discussion then turned to civil defense at which time Gen Khanh outlined the decree of national emergency which he was to issue later in the day. His philosophy is to prepare the nation psychologically for more trying times. He made the interesting comment that for too long the people in the cities have been living in peacetime conditions while in the country there is war everywhere. The decree also would provide the legal basis for many measures that cannot be taken in peacetime associated with a ban on strikes and mass meetings, resource and population control, arrest and detention of VC and other security and anti-sabotage actions, etc. He also assured us that the p lan to pacify the Saigon area and to conduct a large and sustained RVNAF offensive operation in Binh Duong will be aggressively executed as scheduled.

11. The meeting concluded with agreement to have a JGS-MACV planning team get together immediately to start on specifics.

12. Comment: The meeting was a constructive one, both sides airing in general terms their views of the problems and agreeing to get together immediately at the staff level to start solving them.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 319, HQDA Message Center, Reel 11888. Top Secret. Repeated to the Embassy in Saigon and to the JCS.