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  4. Document 22

22. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President 1

Washington , January 30, 1964 .

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam

As of 11 a.m. the situation is as follows:

1.
General Nguyen Khanh is in control. He has taken the leaders of the Military Committee, Generals Minh, Don, Kim and some of their associates into custody. There has been no bloodshed.
2.
Both Lodge and Harkins report that the reason for the coup was Khanh’s fear that the old government was dickering with the French in an effort to bring about the neutralization of South Vietnam.2 We have no hard evidence that this was so.
3.
Both Lodge and Harkins think that Khanh is a tough, able military leader. Harkins says that with proper help and support, he may prove to be stronger than the present set-up of Committee government.3 Khanh apparently does not intend to make wholesale changes in the lower echelons of government. This is good, if true.
4.
The Viet Cong appear to have been caught by surprise and have as yet not been willing or able to take advantage of the situation.
Mike
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. III, Memos. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the President saw this memorandum.↩
  2. Lodge made this observation in telegram 1443 from Saigon, January 30, 8:30 p.m., received at 7:34 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The White House copy of this telegram is published in Declassified Documents, 1975, 214A. Harkins reported Khanh’s motivation as such in telegrams MAC 321 and 325, both January 30, 12:30 and 2:05 p.m., respectively, received at the Department of State at 2:07 a.m. and 9:16 a.m., January 30. Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. 111 Cables, and Department of State, HarVan Files, Vietnam Coup Two, January 30, 1964. both of Harkins messages are in Declassified Documents, 1975, 156C and 156D.)↩
  3. Harkins made this prediction in MAC 321. He also characterized Khanh as “the strongest character in the military” and expressed surprise that given his outsider position and open disagreement with the MRC he had survived to stage a coup.↩