Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I,
Vietnam, 1964
191. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Taylor) to the
Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1
CM–1450–64
Washington
,
June 2,
1964
.
SUBJECT
- Transmittal of JCSM–471–64.
“Objectives and Courses of Action-Southeast Asia”
- 1.
- On 30 May 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the subject
paper and directed the Joint Staff to recast certain parts to make
it acceptable to all Chiefs. The recasting was done but because of
the desire to get it to you before your departure for Honolulu on 31
May, it was dispatched by the office of the Director, Joint Staff
before being seen by all the Chiefs in its modified form. When I saw
it on 31 May prior to leaving with you for Honolulu, I found that it
did not entirely conform to my views and directed its withdrawal
from your office pending further consideration by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Nevertheless, because of its pertinence to the impending
discussions in Honolulu, I made it available to you and Assistant
Secretary McNaughton as a
paper still under consideration and not approved in its existing
form.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on this paper on June 1 and made
several changes in language which they have cabled to Honolulu. They
requested that the paper be modified and transmitted to you. To meet
their request, I am attaching it in modified form to this
memorandum. It should now be considered an agreed JCS paper less the views of the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I will submit later.2
Maxwell D.
Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Attachment
JCSM–471–64
Washington
,
June 2,
1964
.
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)3
SUBJECT
- Objectives and Courses of Action—Southeast Asia
- 1.
- Over the past few months and particularly in recent weeks, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have given considerable attention and
thought to our national purpose in Southeast Asia. In this
context they are concerned because of what they consider to be a
lack of definition, even a confusion in respect to objectives
and courses of action related to each objective.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is their first
obligation to define a militarily valid objective for Southeast
Asia and then advocate a desirable military course of action to
achieve that objective. Based on military considerations, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should
seek through military actions to accomplish destruction of the
North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel
the Democratic Government of Vietnam (DRY) to cease providing
support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. Only a
course of action geared to this objective can assure that the
North Vietnamese support of the subversive efforts in Laos and
South Vietnam will terminate. The Joint Staff currently is
developing a new plan of action against North Vietnam designed
to achieve this objective. This plan will be completed as a
matter of urgency.
- 3.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that the military
validity of the objective stated above may not be recognized.
They note that some current thinking appears to dismiss this
objective in favor of a [Page 438] lesser objective, on visualizing limited military action
which, hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to
terminate their subversive support of activity in Laos and South
Vietnam. This lesser objective is thus not geared to destruction
of capability but rather to an enforced changing of policy and
its implementation which, if achieved, may well be temporary in
nature. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this lesser
objective just described is militarily an inadequate objective
for the present situation, but would agree as an initial measure
to pursue a course of action to achieve this lesser
objective.
- 4.
- In the event that US action is to be related to achievement of
the lesser objective, it is incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to furnish their views as to the implementing military
actions. Assuming national authority chooses to pursue the
lesser objective, resort to a broad range and evolutionary
development of miscellaneous activity can perpetuate the
inadequacy of present response and the impact on the North
Vietnamese could be delayed and even diffused and uncertain.
Reluctance now to take positive action will almost inevitably
increase the price and gravity of such action when it is finally
taken. This situation exists because, in spite of more than two
years of effort to convince a determined enemy of our
determination that he will not prevail, he has clearly increased
his effort and achieved improvement in his relative situation.
Thus, even within the lesser second objective, the time for
continuing a monologue of “messages” that repeat the substance
or maintain the intensity of our past effort seems to us to be
well past. If we mean to send a “message” to convey the
determination which must be part of our national purpose if we
really intend to prevail in this situation, we must recognize
the requirement to convey directly, sharply, even abruptly, that
the situation has indeed changed insofar as the United States is
concerned. It appears that the way to convey that “message” now
is along the following lines:
- a.
- Select carefully a limited number of target
complexes-perhaps two-in North Vietnam.
- b.
- In selecting these target complexes, screen carefully
to assure that those chosen are in fact directly and
significantly associated with support of the effort in
Laos and North Vietnam; that they represent completely
valid military objectives; that they are susceptible to
reasonable quick and precise destruction by air attack;
that their destruction can be achieved with minimum
impact on civilian populations. (Appended hereto are
summary data on the target complexes selected in keeping
with these criteria.)4
- c.
- Once the targets are chosen, appropriate planning
action should be initiated to establish readiness for
implementation.
- d.
- In relation to establishing readiness for this action,
we must, of course, establish a related readiness for
implementing the course of action related to the first
objective discussed above since readiness for escalation
must be clearly established as a matter of military
prudence and clearly demonstrated to achieve the full
impact of the initial effort.
- 5.
- In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
- a.
- There is no basis to be hopeful about the situation in
Southeast Asia until and unless North Vietnam is forced
to stop supporting the insurgent activities in Laos and
South Vietnam.
- b.
- The best way to achieve this objective is through
destruction of the North Vietnamese will and
capabilities as necessary to compel the DRV to cease providing such
support.
- c.
- If there should be a national decision that the United
States will resort to lesser measures to cause the North
Vietnamese to make a decision to terminate their
subversive activities, then we should not waste critical
time and more resources in another protracted series of
“messages,” but rather we should take positive, prompt,
and meaningful military action to underscore our meaning
that after more than two years of tolerating this North
Vietnamese support we are now determined that it will
stop.
- d.
-
Just as it is essential to convey a meaningful
“message” to the North Vietnamese, it is obviously
also important that we convey to our Allies the will
and determination of the United States in this
matter. In this connection, your attention is
invited to the recent comment of the US Ambassador
to Thailand, who, in discussing current attitudes of
our important Thai Allies, made this significant
statement (reference U.S. Embtel Bangkok to Department of State
2014, DTG 241345Z
May 64):5
“It should be clearly evident from recent
reporting that events propelling Thai toward
massive re-examination value their commitment to
West. At this moment they still believe we would
honor our undertakings but rapid pace recent
events and mini mum U.S. responses are almost
visibly eroding confidence manifested last
October, when I first arrived.”
- 6.
- In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
- a.
- In any national level discussions of action against
North Vietnam, you seek precise delineations of both
objectives and their supporting courses of
action.
- b.
- In defining objectives, it be recognized that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that termination of North
Vietnamese support efforts in both South Vietnam and
Laos can be assured only through destruction of North
Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel
the DRV to cease
providing such support; based on military
considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate
acceptance of this objective and the initiation now of
measures designed to increase readiness for its
achievement.
- c.
- If is be determined that a lesser objective is to be
adopted, the military implementation thereof be geared
to demonstrating an early sharp change in US outlook and
determination, generally as discussed in paragraph 4,
above; that necessary supporting actions be incorporated
in an appropriate scenario, without however diffusing or
delaying in any way the impact of the deliberate signal
of change.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
J.W. Davis
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint
Staff
