The Canadian Embassy has, with some insistence, scheduled my visit to
Ottawa for Thursday May 28. I, therefore, plan to depart in the
afternoon of May 27 and return in the morning of May 29. I will be
accompanied by Mr. Chester Cooper of CIA.
Attached is a draft talking paper which builds upon your original cables
to Lodge concerning the terms of
reference for the Canadian interlocutor. While it does not accept
Lodge’s suggestions
concerning “punishment of North Viet Nam” it does expound upon the
massive military power of the United States available in the area and
the vulnerability of North Viet Nam should that power be brought into
play.
I would be most appreciative if I could have your approval or revision of
this paper prior to May 27. Mr. Ball and Mr. Bundy have already
reviewed and approved it.2
Attachment3
SUBJECT
- Talking Paper for Canadians
It is our hope that Commissioner Seaborn, upon assuming his new
duties in Viet Nam, will place much greater stress than heretofore
upon the nature and frequency of Canadian contacts in Hanoi. Since
Seaborn has had considerable experience in Communist countries, he
should know the means to establish useful arrangements in Hanoi
which will bring him into touch with significant officials of the
North Vietnamese Regime. He should make it clear to these officials
that he is a political personality who can be dealt with and is not
merely an observer who functions as a customs inspector.
In the course of his initial rounds in Hanoi Seaborn should express
considerable interest in attempting to understand the North
Vietnamese motivations for their policy in South Viet Nam. He should
perhaps begin by giving all North Vietnamese officials who so desire
an adequate opportunity to express not only their policies but their
various complaints and the rationale for the course of action they
are pursuing.
In the course of these discussions, Seaborn should attempt to
determine what the state of mind is among the various high
functionaries in Hanoi. He should specifically be alert to:
- a.
- Differences in attitude with respect to the Sino-Soviet
split;
- b.
- Frustration or war weariness with the slowness of the
effort in the South;
- c.
- Indications of the North Vietnamese desire for trade or
other contacts with Western nations;
- d.
- Evidences of cliques or factions within the Party and
Governmental apparatus; and
- e.
- Evidences of differing points of view between the
political cadres and the military group.
Seaborn should additionally seek to develop the best information
concerning the prevalence and the importance of the Chinese
Communist presence in North Viet Nam. While it may not be possible
for him to develop direct contacts with the Chinese Communist
representation there he should learn as much as he can about the
nature of that representation and particularly its relationship to
other official representatives in Hanoi. Drawing upon his Moscow
experience [he] ought to be able to establish contact with the
Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi and draw him out on his evaluation of
both domestic and international issues affecting the North
Vietnamese regime.
[Page 353]
In addition to these efforts, Seaborn should also establish himself
as the authority upon United States motivations and policies. He
should use every convincing evidence, including his discussions with
United States officials in Saigon, to present to the North
Vietnamese the full measure of the United States commitment to South
Viet Nam. He should make clear that the United States views the
problem in South Viet Nam as something which affects its policies
and its stature throughout the entire world. Because the United
States holds this view he should make it resoundingly clear that we
do intend to see the problem through in Viet Nam and not withdraw
ignominiously. He should carefully and deliberately stipulate that,
if it becomes necessary for the United States to choose an
alternative to the course it is now pursuing, that alternative would
be in the direction of enlarging the military action and escalating
direct pressure against North Viet Nam. He should draw on examples
of United States actions in other parts of the world and in other
circumstances to underline this statement.
At the same time, he should make clear the limitations of United
States ambitions in Southeast Asia. He should specifically state
that the United States seeks no military bases or other permanent
installations in that area. Our purpose instead is to assure that
the South Vietnamese are able to live independently free from
external aggression. He should point out that we know that the
aggression against South Viet Nam is directed and controlled from
Hanoi. He should state that we hold Hanoi directly responsible for
the guerrilla action in South Viet Nam.
He should state that the United States evaluation of North Vietnamese
intentions suggests that Ho Chi
Minh and the Viet Minh truly hope to succeed to the territorial
control exercised by France in its colonial regime over the
Indo-Chinese states. He should therefore emphasize that the United
States holds North Viet Nam responsible, in the execution of this
ambition, for the evidences of Communist subversion and terror
throughout all the Indo-Chinese states. He should specify that we
have convincing evidence of North Vietnamese presence in Laos and
participation in the aggressive actions against Souvanna Phouma’s
Government. He should also stress that we are aware of flagrant
North Vietnamese violations of Laotian territories in the course of
infiltrating personnel and material into South Viet Nam. He can if
he chooses use Wilfred Burchette’s public journalistic accounts of
his use of the Ho Chi Minh
trail complex in his clandestine trips into South Viet Nam. Finally
he should stress the fact of our awareness that Viet Cong units
under North Vietnamese control regularly and frequently violate
Cambodian territory and constitute an irritating factor in the
Cambodian-Vietnamese border region.
[Page 354]
He should underline the nature and the purpose of United States
commitments in Southeast Asia. In doing this he should stress that
our conviction is that Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet Nam have every
right to be maintained free from the application of communist
subversion. He should state that we believe these countries do not
have the means within their own resources to resist this type of
aggression but that the United States is determined to provide those
means. He should point out that this is a matter of far greater
significance to the United States than the parochial concerns of
Southeast Asia. The United States, like the Chinese, understands the
“three continent” approach that is inherent in the application of
the Chinese doctrine of insurgency. Therefore, the position of the
United States in Latin America and Africa, as well as the rest of
Asia, is affected by the outcome of events in Southeast Asia.
Consequently the United States does not view the Communist
territorial nibblings in the scope of their immediate effect. The
United States has long since become sophisticated in the doctrine of
communist insurgency and indeed has developed a doctrine of
counterinsurgency which it fully intends to apply to this area.
Seaborn can draw, however, upon many other examples of United States
policy in other parts of the world to convince the North Vietnamese
that we do generally accept the practice of peaceful coexistence and
that we do tolerate “national Communism” as a fixture which it is
not our purpose to subvert. The example of Tito, and our response to
some of the recent stirrings in the East European Bloc may be used
for this purpose. He could even go further to demonstrate that our
policy encompasses the occasional provision of economic assistance,
particularly food stuffs. He should cite the PL-480 agreements with Yugoslavia and specifically with
Poland.
This sort of statement should be coupled with the frank
acknowledgment that both official and public patience with North
Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin. He should point out
the bipartisan nature of this impatience in the United States and
should stipulate that the existence of an election campaign in this
country cannot be taken as the existence of a policy vacuum into
which communist aggression can move at will. Hopefully, prior to
Seaborn’s initial approaches with the North Vietnamese, tangible
manifestations of this fact will have been made in the Congress and
should be drawn upon to underline this point.
Insofar as Seaborn considers that it might be educational, he could
review some of the military strength of the United States
immediately available to the area of Southeast Asia and could
graphically suggest the overwhelming ratio of forces which might be
thrown against North Viet Nam if the United States crossed the
Rubicon and decided upon a military punishment to North Vietnamese
intervention. At the [Page 355] same
time he might wish to indicate the well-known vulnerabilities of the
North Vietnamese to American military power and the incapacity of
the Chinese Communists to assist in resistance to this military
power. In whatever manner he deemed most effective, Seaborn could
paint a picture of the absolute havoc that would result in North
Viet Nam if United States military power were brought to bear or
indeed if North Viet Nam became a battlefield between United States
and Chinese Communist military forces.
Again he could contrast this circumstance with the prospects that
North Viet Nam could have for developing its own existence using not
only resources indigenously available to it but also resources which
could be introduced into a development of North Viet Nam both by
foreign trade and by some degree of external technical assistance,
perhaps even including assistance from international organizations
and agencies.
In addition to these activities, which would be directed primarily
toward North Vietnamese officials, Seaborn could apply his Eastern
European experience to the cultivation of indirect influences,
particularly with the Soviets and the Poles. In tracing some of the
same general outlines suggested for his discussions with the North
Vietnamese, Seaborn could elaborate with the Soviet and Polish
representatives in an effort not only to have them use their
influence upon North Vietnamese but also to modify their current
actions with respect to the Geneva Agreements. Specifically, he
should seek to convince the Pole that it is in Poland’s interest to
disassociate itself from the reckless and irresponsible aggressive
actions of the North Vietnamese. If the Pole can be convinced to
vote even occasionally (perhaps not significantly) with the Indian
and Canadian Commissioners on minor investigatory actions against
North Vietnamese or Viet Cong violations, this would be
progress.
In sum, the purpose of Seaborn’s mission in the North would be as an
interlocutor with both active and passive functions. On the active
side he should establish his credentials with the North Vietnamese
and incidently with the East Europeans as an authoritative channel
of communication with the United States. On the passive side he
should function as a channel which could bring back either
observances or direct communications concerning the North Vietnamese
attitude toward extrication from or escalation of military
activities. In each of his functions Seaborn should assume the
posture that the decision as to the future course of events in
Southeast Asia rests squarely with Hanoi and that the United States
is looking to Hanoi for the signal which will determine the nature
of events to ensue in Southeast Asia.
