128. Memorandum From Michael
V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)1
Washington, April 28,
1964.
SUBJECT
The attached memorandum from Bill Sullivan results from my request for a
status report on our responses to Lodge’s suggestions.
Bill’s memorandum is somewhat
cryptic, because the actions which Lodge has suggested have been incorporated into a
political-military scenario, which is now in the hands of the Joint
Chiefs. I sent you yesterday the latest version of the political half of
the scenario.2
I would suggest that the President see the narrative part (not the
charts) of the scenario and consider whether it isn’t time for you and
him (and perhaps Rusk and
McNamara) to discuss future
moves in Vietnam at one of your lunches. The point to keep in mind is
that almost any of the actions suggested by Lodge, but not yet implemented, could start a chain of
escalation for which we are not yet prepared.
Attachment
Washington, April 27,
1964.
Memorandum by the Secretary of
State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan)3
There are three categories of action in which Ambassador Lodge has made certain
recommendations which we have not as yet fulfilled. These are (a)
cross border probes into the Laos corridor; (b) hot pursuit into
Cambodia; and (c) tit-for-tat raids on North Vietnamese targets in
the event of terror against Americans.
All of these recommendations have involved certain contingencies. For
example, the tit-for-tat suggestion was first made as part of a
political-military scenario which involved covert diplomatic
contacts
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with the North
Vietnamese, offers of food and partial withdrawal of US forces,
etc., etc. The Cambodian hot pursuit suggestion was in the context
of further action by Sihanouk detrimental to the legal status of the
Saigon Government. The operations into Laos were recommended if we
considered current intelligence operations unsatisfactory.
Therefore, although we have not responded positively to these
proposals from Lodge, it
should be understood that the proposals themselves were in one
measure or another designed to be part of a larger schematic view of
our political and military posture in Southeast
Asia as a whole. On the other hand all of Lodge’s recommendations have in
one form or another been incorporated into a planning document which
has been roughed out on the political side here in Washington and is
currently under study in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine its
military consequences. Therefore. we have given positive
consideration to these recommendations.
The basic question of course is whether the planning document can be
considered a “live” plan directed toward ultimate accomplishment in
the forseeable future, or whether it is a contingency arrangement
which will always remain on the shelf. If it is the former, we can
categorically state that we are acting on all of Lodge’s recommendations. If it is
the latter, that statement would need considerable
qualification.
