Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand⁰

Washington, July 15, 1963, 7:54 p.m.

91. Ref: Embtel 79.¹ You are authorized at your discretion to present the following to Sarit as unclassified Aide-Mémoire; “In his conversation with His Excellency the Prime Minister on July 15, 1963, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the American Embassy reaffirmed to the Prime Minister that the United States intends to meet its obligations in Southeast Asia. He said the United States would do whatever is necessary and appropriate in the event of a communist threat to Thailand’s borders. The Deputy Chief of Mission stated to the Prime Minister that, as publicly affirmed in the joint statement of Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of March 1962, the United States considers Thailand’s integrity and independence as vital to its own.”

We do not intend to publish foregoing but would have no objection if RTG wishes release it as Thai statement (not US Aide-Mémoire) with lead sentence along following lines: “In the course of a call on His Excellency Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat on July 15, 1963, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy reaffirmed to the Prime Minister that the United States intends, etc. (follow remainder of AideMemdire).”

You should explain to Sarit fully and frankly that in public statement of this nature we believe it not advisable single out Laos for particular mention. We fear statement might be viewed out of context and give rise to queries regarding possible new actions in or affecting Laos, thus raising more questions than it solved. As Sarit of course aware we can say nothing publicly on proposals we have outlined to him. Furthermore, we attempting insofar as possible maintain facade of Geneva Agreements. Public statement referring specifically to Laos might give impression we about to scrap those Agreements, thereby giving communists ammunition to use against us. We, therefore, trust Sarit will understand need for discretion in public statement. At same time you should assure him this in no sense represents any pull-back from what you told him July 15.

If given to press and depending on treatment it receives we think British, French and Australians may wonder whether this represents new assessment of situation in Laos and threat to Thailand or new US commitment to Thailand. Therefore in your discretion and if you feel it desirable, you may indicate to your British, French and Australian colleagues that this represents nothing more than further effort to reassure Thais and enlist their cooperation in coping with the Lao situation.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Emergency; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Masters; cleared by Koren and Rice and in draft by Cross, Abram E. Manell of FE/P, Czyzak, and Robert J. McCloskey of P; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Vientiane, London, Paris, and CINCPAC.
1. Telegram 79, July 15, reported that during a call on Sarit to obtain Thai cooperation in supporting the Geneva Accords on Laos, Puhan had assured Sarit that the United States would do whatever necessary to meet its obligations in Southeast Asia. Puhan also assured Sarit that the United States would “not sit idly by and allow Communists to become entrenched on Thailand’s borders.” Prime Minister Sarit was visibly gratified by this statement, (he called it “sweet news”) and asked if he could make the assurance public. Puhan promised to seek authorization from the Department for release. (Ibid.)