274. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- West New Guinea
Dutch-Indonesian talks on West New Guinea in the presence of Ambassador Bunker are expected to resume July 12. Both the Dutch and Indonesians have agreed in principle to the Bunker proposal, i.e., the transfer of administration of the territory to the United Nations and then to Indonesia with the subsequent act of self-determination by the Papuans under circumstances which would assure a really free choice.
In a discussion on July 10, President Sukarno told our Ambassador that if progress is achieved in the early sessions of the resumed talks, Foreign Minister Subandrio will come to Washington to join in the talks.1Subandrio has said that before and during the talks, it is the [Page 604] intention of the Indonesian Government to limit military activity in West New Guinea to resupply and support of Indonesian units already in the field, However, he would not give an unconditional undertaking that Indonesian military activity otherwise would cease, claiming that the Indonesian military is difficult to control in the present circumstances.2
Ambassador van Roijen, who will head the Dutch delegation, has stated that he has been granted broad negotiating authority from the Netherlands Government. He has urged that maximum progress be achieved in the preliminary sessions prior to formal negotiations under U Thant. Van Roijen has also told me that his Government would most likely appoint a Cabinet minister who would head a large delegation to formal talks. In our view, Mr. Luns would be the probable choice. Van Roijen suggests that much more rapid progress will be possible in the restricted preliminary sessions, which will be free from the trappings and publicity that will be inevitable in the more formal New York atmosphere.3
Ambassador van Roijen has made such a strenuous effort to insure that the negotiations are virtually concluded by him within the framework of his present instructions that we are convinced he is worried lest this matter be opened up again within the Dutch Cabinet. Luns resents having been forced to accept the Bunker proposals as a basis for negotiation and if he takes over negotiations at the formal stage with considerable work left to be done, there is a distinct possibility that he will seize upon some negotiating point as a pretext for suspending negotiations. Under these circumstances, the Indonesians probably will resort to further, and probably large-scale, military action. The Dutch would likely throw the matter into the United Nations Security Council where the U.S.S.R. could be expected to veto any proposals unacceptable to Indonesia, including a simple appeal for a cease-fire and negotiations. The Indonesians now appear to recognize the desirability of accomplishing as much as possible in the preliminary sessions under Ambassador Bunker.
We have no rigid views on a solution and would be prepared to accept any arrangement agreed to by both parties. We will undoubtedly be called upon to exert pressure one way or another to help the participants reach compromise solutions to the difficulties we anticipate.
We can foresee a number of items on which differences in points of view are likely to arise in the course of negotiations. For example, the Bunker formula provides that the administration shall be transferred to the United Nations and thence to Indonesia within a two-year period. In [Page 605] accepting this formula, Sukarno has reserved his position on this time element and he may be expected to press for a shortening of the period. The Dutch, on the other hand, doubtless will consider the two-year time period as specified in the plan as a fixed minimum. The plan also calls for an exercise of self-determination by the Papuans at a time to be negotiated, but after assumption of administration by Indonesia. It is probable that the Dutch will wish a plebiscite or other form of expression to be conducted as soon as possible. Indonesians, who desire a maximum period in which to present their case to the Papuans, will press for the plebiscite to be held at a later time—probably some years after the transfer of the administration. The Dutch have exhibited concern for the human and political rights of the Papuans under Indonesian administration and their delegation doubtless will seek to obtain agreement on safeguards and guarantees for these rights.
We anticipate that the most major problem will center on the nature and scope of the mechanism for self-determination by the Papuans. The Bunker formula specifies that Indonesia, with United Nations assistance and participation, will make the necessary arrangements. The Dutch will endeavor to define the United Nations role in the strongest possible terms.
The Indonesian tendency to continue military pressure on the Dutch may cause serious difficulties. If a substantial attack is launched against West New Guinea, the talks may well collapse with the Dutch withdrawing in protest. In any event, we can expect continuing problems if the Indonesians undertake “resupply and support” missions.
In his role of moderator, Ambassador Bunker will seek to compose the different viewpoints and I believe that the United States should continue to assist him in this effort.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, General, 7/1 /62–7/10/62. Secret. A note on a transmittal sheet to this memorandum indicates that it was part of the President’s weekend reading, July 13. According to the Department of State copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Lindquist and Beaudry and cleared by Wallner and by Rice and Burdett in draft. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/7–1062)↩
- Reported in telegram 54 from Dkajarta, July 10. (Ibid.)↩
- Reported in telegram 36 from Dkajarta, July 9. (Ibid., 656.9813/7–962)↩
- In a discussion with Rusk on July 6, reported in telegram 26 to Djakarta, July 7. (Ibid., 656.9813/7–662)↩