Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

346. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/10

London, December 19, 1963, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Assistant Secretary Tyler
  • Oscar V. Armstrong, American
  • Embassy, London
• United Kingdom
  • Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies
  • Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office
  • Sir Hilton Poynton, Permanent Under-Secretary, Colonial Office
  • N. B. J. Huijsman, Principal Private Secretary to Mr. Sandys

SUBJECT

• Southern Rhodesia

Mr. Sandys said that the British have made it clear that independ-ence would not be granted on the basis of the present franchise. The situation has now reached a point of deadlock. The Southern Rhodesian Government will not go as far as the Afro-Asian countries want, and these countries probably recognize that some compromise is necessary. The Government is in a relatively strong position: one-tenth of the population is white; they have their own European forces; the police force is African but loyal to the Government.

In response to the Secretary’s question, Mr. Sandys said that he doubts that the Southern Rhodesian Government will unilaterally declare its independence. There are three possibilities: (1) a solution acceptable to all (2) an illegal declaration of independence (3) Southern Rhodesia’s dropping its demand for early independence. The Southern Rhodesians are probably aware of the serious effects of an illegal declaration of independence. Moreover, what would they get out of it? They now pass their own laws, have their own military forces, conduct some of their external relations. They could not get into the United Nations or the Commonwealth; their ability to obtain loans would be wrecked. Since they would be on the “wrong side of the law,” they would be exposing themselves to military attacks from outside. The Southern Rhodesians may continue their clamor for independence, but probably won’t go through with it. It is not clear how long such a situation would last, but short of a solution acceptable to all, it may be the best answer.

Sandys said he had been trying to obtain Commonwealth assistance in finding a solution. Canada, Australia, Nigeria, and Tanganyika have agreed to meet jointly with the British and Southern Rhodesians. Field, however, rejects this idea, although he says he is willing to have private informal talks with some Commonwealth countries, presumably on a bilateral basis.

The Secretary asked if the British have publicly stated they would not grant independence on the basis of the present franchise. Sandys said they had, and referred to his recent speech in Parliament. (He later read excerpts from this speech.)

The Secretary commented that we had the impression that African countries are taking a more moderate stand on the subject than a year ago. Mr. Sandys agreed, but said he hoped the U.S. would help “take the heat out of the subject,” particularly by using our influence at the UN.¹

The Secretary noted that several months ago he had asked Ambassador Ormsby-Gore if the U.S. could privately tell the Africans that the British had assured us that independence would not be granted on the basis of the present electoral franchise. The Ambassador had demurred at the time. Mr. Sandys said that he thought that what he and the Prime Minister have said on this point (for example, his speech in Parliament) adds up to a fairly clear expression of the British position, but the British might be able to make a more precise statement if the U.S. thinks it would be helpful.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Armstrong on December 19 and approved on December 26. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” The conversation took place in Sandys’ office at the Commonwealth Relations Office.
1. On October 14, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1883 (XVIII), “Question of Southern Rhodesia,” by a vote of 90 to 2, with 13 abstentions (including the United States). The United Kingdom did not participate in the voting. The text of Resolution 1883 was substantially the same as that of the draft Security Council resolution vetoed by the United Kingdom on September 13. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 719-720.