344. Memorandum of Conversation0

  • The President
  • Sir Roy Welensky

In response to a question from the President Sir Roy opened the conversation with a lengthy rehearsal of his well known views on the situation [Page 537] in Southern Rhodesia—the need for gradualism, the rights of the whites as long term inhabitants, multiracialism, etc.

The President asked Sir Roy’s estimate of the practical possibility of multiracialism in Africa.

Welensky conceded that there will be an eventual black majority but reiterated the case for gradualism. He said the whites are fighting for time now and will use violence to defend their basic interests. He expressed some discouragement and said he doesn’t see what the next step will be in light of black African intransigence.

In response to another question from the President Welensky said that there will be no closer links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and that Verwoerd had “repudiated” Southern Rhodesia as already too liberal for South African cooperation. He believes that South Africa will continue down its present road until the sheer impact of reality reveals such serious trouble as to make change unavoidable. However, he argued that there would be some Zulu support for the SAG in event of attack from the north.

When the President pressed him with regard to specific steps on the Southern Rhodesian problem Welensky expressed the hope that the United States will pressure the British to propose a constitutional settlement. He will urge Butler, in his forthcoming talks in London, to put to Prime Minister Field a proposal for independence coupled to concessions to the black Africans—primarily the blocking third and reform of the Land Apportionment Act. He insisted the British must take the lead in proposing terms for a settlement.

When the President asked what would happen if no such settlement could be reached, Welensky said with conviction that it is unthinkable not to find a solution and that the British role and leadership are crucial. He added that his American trip is really only a “facade” for his talks with Butler.

On African problems more generally Welensky suggested that big power cooperation in stabilizing commodity prices (he mentioned copper) would be a more practical help to Africa than conventional foreign aid.

The President pointed out that the tide of African nationalism is so strong that as a practical matter we can only try to moderate and influence, not stop it. He suggested that many of the problems are pragmatic rather than moral.

Welensky charged that the Congo has regressed seventy years since independence and declared that in spite of his own prior feelings, he feels that in the present situation the UN must stay in the Congo to avoid anarchy.

In response to a question by the President, Welensky observed that he does not think Communism is appealing to most Africans but that [Page 538] their disposition to non-alignment is to some degree a Communist victory in that it denies the West full access to Africa.

WB
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Rhodesia. Confidential. Drafted by Brubeck. A notation on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to the Department of State. The conversation was held at the White House.