319. Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
The South African issue will probably be up in the Security Council again in the next couple of weeks and Stevenson will be here this week to prepare with State a recommendation for a US position for the President’s approval. The Portuguese-African issue will remain at low temperatures so long as the talks don’t break down. Within State several new proposals are being argued involving expanded student programs and covert assistance for South African and Portuguese-African refugees. I think we need some basic reconsideration and clarification of policy at this point.
There are no early or easy solutions in prospect in Portuguese Africa or in South Africa. It will take a long process of political, economic and possibly military attrition before the Portuguese accept the necessity for serious negotiation; South Africa will be even tougher.
The United States has interests on both sides of these issues so substantial that we can’t afford to “choose sides.” Nor do we have sufficient leverage to compel the antagonists to come to terms. In the past several years, accordingly, we have sailed an improvised, often erratic course between the antagonists, with a series of minor concessions to the Africans as the pressures mounted, while avoiding an irreparable break with the Portuguese or South Africans.
While this has been the most sensible—indeed the only sensible—course open to us, we are beginning to run out of sailing room. I think we can gain some space for maneuver, and continue to defer the dilemma, if we raise our present tactic to a deliberate, systematic policy.
Here are some things we can do or, in some cases, just do better, to improve our position. They are based on the proposition that since we can’t now bet on a winner, we should be hedging our bets and buying time.
- 1.
- At the UN : The key fact is that we are reaching a point where no further concessions can be made to the Africans. We are going to have to take positions which will be more pleasing to the Portuguese and South Africans and less so to the Black Africans, as we did on the Portuguese African resolution in the Security Council in August and on the Southern Rhodesian resolutions since then. Plimpton has already proposed as [Page 506] much in recommending that we vote against any resolution for sanctions on the South Africans. Thus our position in New York will become more difficult, and we will have to seek offsetting gains with the Africans outside the UN. However, we can at least limit our damage in New York if, for negotiating with the Africans, our Mission has clearer guidance on our strategy and purposes. Our performance in the UN has been weakened by lack of firm instructions for the Mission itself, which has had conflicting feelings on the African issues.
- 2.
- With the Portuguese and South Africans: While our problem with the Portuguese and South Africans will be a little eased if we stop making further concessions to the Black Africans in the UN, we still need improved communications and whatever rapport can be developed through quiet diplomacy. The Ball-Salazar channel should be cultivated assiduously, primarily for friendship and only secondarily for education. Secretary Rusk and Alex Johnson should continue to cultivate their own special relations with the South Africans. With both countries we should take every opportunity for quiet cooperation and avoid unnecessary frictions.
- 3.
- With the Black Africans: Leaving aside the nationalists directly involved, in Portuguese Africa and South Africa, there is little we can do with the leaders of Black Africa that we are not now doing. However, I believe the Africans’ bark is much worse than their bite on the Portuguese African and South African issues. These are propaganda issues in the internal politics of Africa, but less important by far than their own domestic problems which are becoming more and more immediate and pressing. I believe the cost of resisting the Africans at the UN has been overstated and CIA analysis of African reaction to the August Security Council vote bears this out. In any event, we have one important asset, the President’s status and personal relations with the Africans, on which we can draw heavily—for example in personal communications with key African leaders.
- 4.
- Portuguese African and South African Nationalists: Most of the above is simply reiteration, perhaps with new emphasis, of things we are already doing. If, in fact, we follow a more restricted policy in the UN, that will itself ease our problem with the Portuguese and the South Africans. In the case of the Africans, I believe we can afford to pay some price; but only if, at the same time, we strengthen our ties to the Portuguese African and South African black nationalists themselves. This is where we should be hedging our bets, and are doing the least, even though the risks are slight and the potential returns large.
At the present time, US programs for South African and Portuguese African students support only sixty students in the Lincoln University program here and a small AID grant for the African American Institute’s secondary training school in Tanganyika. We do nothing with the large [Page 507] Angolan refugee population now in the Congo or the large exodus from both areas that will soon be moving through Northern Rhodesia. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Meanwhile bloc programs for wooing refugees are increasing particularly in Dar-es-Salaam. Communism is a really serious force within the South African nationalist movement. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Clearly, we cannot engage in military training or aid. However, we can expand our student program, help develop training and assistance programs for refugees within Africa (Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Congo) and [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
We need clear guidance for all involved as to our purposes and priorities and I think it might be useful to ask for comprehensive recommendations [2 lines of source text not declassified] so that the President himself can pass on the issues.