Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

205. Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁰

JCSM-78-62

Washington, January 31, 1962.

COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF GHANA, GUINEA AND MALI

Considerations

1. Communist influence in these three countries does not appear to have reached a stage where the Communist Bloc dictates the policies of these countries. However, if considered in terms of balance of influence vis-à-vis the West, there seems to be little doubt that the Communist Bloc now has the preponderance of influence in Guinea and Mali. In the case of Ghana, Communist Bloc influence is not so great, but appears to be increasing. Unless this trend is checked, Communist dominance could become a reality soon.

2. In regard to the current situation and Communist Bloc influence in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, an evaluation of intelligence reports does not indicate a conclusion that significant changes in the current situation in these three countries should be expected. The recent action of President Toure of Guinea in removing the Soviet Ambassador, and the attempted coup with which this action was associated, represent a setback for the Soviet Union, the full ramifications of which are not yet clear. However, the importance which the USSR attaches to Guinea was underscored by the rapidity with which it dispatched Mr. Mikoyan to the scene.

Basic Approach

3. US access to and presence in these suspicious, “neutralist,” Marxist organized countries is limited to what might be considered correct diplomatic representation with some small opportunities in the social, economic, and information areas. US military presence is limited to an Army attache in Accra, and a small mission staffed by the US Army in Mali which has been under pressure to leave. Our military presence in Guinea is nil. All these countries have shown interest of varying degrees in social, economic, and arms assistance from Western sources but have actually accepted little. The most recent significant events offering us an entry into one of these three countries have taken place in Ghana. In addition to the Volta Dam project which the United States has agreed to finance, there are both British and Canadian training missions in Ghana and the Ghanaians have purchased Canadian Caribou aircraft. Recent information from Accra indicates that Ghana has secured the services of a Pakistani general officer to serve as deputy to the Chief of the Ghana Defense Staff and that the Ghanaians have requested Pakistan to make six artillery officers available to serve with the Ghana army. Mali has made some tentative soundings for additional military material. Despite Guinea’s growing disenchantment with the Communist Bloc, new concrete opportunities in that country have yet to materialize.

4. Because of limitations on funds, higher priorities elsewhere, and the US policy against fostering an arms race in Africa, US military assist-ance programs to any of the three countries are unlikely to be of such magnitude as would significantly affect the evolution of the political situation in the recipient countries. At best, they can only assist in (a) reflecting the US presence and interest in the country; (b) permitting the observation of Sino-Soviet Bloc activities in the area; (c) providing a tenuous connection with the West for elements out of sympathy with the local government, and (d) serving as a symbol of a possible Western alternative to reliance on Communist Bloc military assistance.

5. The timing and scope of such programs as are instituted with Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, will necessarily depend primarily on the assessment by the Department of State of the political advantages to be gained by US military assistance. Because of the need to make certain that US assistance does not simply reinforce a Communist-oriented regime already in power, frequent reviews should be made of all US operations in each country to ascertain the extent to which specific US political objectives have been achieved or are in the process of achievement.

6. In view of the foregoing, it may be readily concluded that prospects for expansion of our influence will be slow. Moreover, it is unlikely to accelerate if our readiness to help remains a one-way street with the United States essentially “begging” to be allowed to help. Nearby are the friendly, Western oriented countries of Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and the Conseil de l’Entente countries. Accelerated efforts to be responsive to the military aid requirements of these more deserving countries could be the catalyst which might render Ghana, Guinea, and Mali more receptive. Moreover, it is in our interest to foster and strengthen the viability of these countries in any event, as geographically, culturally, and ethnically, they dilute the potential of a Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union and can exert a moderating influence on their radical policies. Therefore, it appears timely and logical to expand our activities in these countries while selectively exploiting such opportunities as may arise to enhance our position in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.

Recommended Actions

7. The following courses of action, lying primarily outside of the capabilities of the US Military Establishment, would enhance our position in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, and would contribute to the success of the courses of action listed in paragraph 8 which utilize primarily the resources of the Military Establishment.

a. Expose by all means [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Communist Bloc activities in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, which are inimical to the rights and aspirations of the individual. (This program should be carried on not only by the appropriate US agencies, but by the use of the third party principle.)

b. Discredit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Communist oriented or Communist trained governmental personnel. (The third party principle should be used to the fullest extent.)

c. Assist [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pro-Western opposition parties, individuals, or refugee groups in gaining prestige and in building a strong opposition movement to Communism.

d. Assist pro-Western groups in gaining control of news media by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] providing funds and assist-ance.

e. Assist personnel in categories c and d above, in gaining prestige by orientation visits to the United States.

8. The following measures are designed to utilize the resources of the Military Establishment. They could enhance US influence throughout the area of West Africa and take advantage of any apparent swing away from Communist Bloc orientation in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.

a. Initiate US military assistance to the Conseil de l’Entente countries, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and continue such assistance to Liberia.

(1) Every effort should be made to secure early approval and implementation of the recommendations of the US Joint Survey Team to the Conseil de l’Entente countries which was submitted 1 December 1961.

(2) The initial effort in this area should be to create, train, and equip forces for internal security and border and coastal patrol to include appropriate air and naval elements. However, support should be extended to include support of the regional security arrangements currently being organized by France and the Entente countries. The purpose of this support should be to reduce the concern of Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Entente countries about the recent build-up of military forces and equipment in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, by improving the capability of these countries to defend themselves.

(3) Emphasize the development within the above countries of military intelligence assets which can be utilized to counter communist espionage, subversion, and insurgency by assisting them in establishing and maintaining high standards of security against communist penetration, and in the development of indigenous military intelligence assets to meet the requirements of combined or bilateral contingency plans.

(4) Implementation of aid programs to these friendly countries should be carried out with marked dispatch to create a psychological impact that it pays to be friends of the West.

(5) Utilize appropriate specially trained forces to provide counterinsurgency training for friendly forces in West Africa.

(6) Offer medical personnel to participate in local tropical medical research.

b. Expand efforts to gain and improve the US entree and influence in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, in order to create an increased US presence there, offer an alternative to dependence on Communist Bloc support, and increase the flow of information from them.

(1) Take advantage of Toure’s current disenchantment with the Communist Bloc to press for the establishment of a US military attache in Conakry.

(2) Take advantage of Mali interest in acquiring US military communications and other material to reopen the question of establishing a US military attache in Bamako.

(3) Follow-up on USEmbassy Accra message of 26 December 1961 (DA IN 188840) by inviting the Ghana Chief of Defense Staff to come to the United States for an orientation tour of US military facilities and schools. Extend similar invitations to the Chiefs of Defense Staff of Guinea and Mali.

(4) Continue to review the desirability of offers of military training to all three countries in terms of the over-all advantage of such training to the United States.

(5) Arrange for the visit of appropriate elements of US armed forces to Ghana, Guinea, and Mali.

(6) Offer medical personnel to participate in local tropical medicine research.

(7) Offer military Corps of Engineers technical advice especially in the civic area of construction and road building.

(8) Offer military Transportation Corps technical advice to assist in overcoming the problems of communications so important to the economies of these countries, especially Mali.

(9) Endeavor to encourage in these countries the development of Western oriented intelligence agencies capable of coping with the communist threat.

(10) In order to foster Western orientation of the Ghanaian military, consider on its merits the desirability of furnishing financial assistance to Western oriented countries who are otherwise prepared and capable of providing military technical advice, training, or other support to Ghana.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Africa, Jan.-Mar., 1962. Secret. This memorandum forms the appendix to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 31.

   The January 31 covering memorandum indicates that the memorandum printed here was written in response to a January 4 request from the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for recommendations on substantive courses of action designed to counter Sino-Soviet penetration of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The memorandum advises that the Joint Chiefs had re-examined measures they had recommended in the past, as well as others being pursued or planned by the Department of State, and were submitting the results of their review in the attached appendix. They recommended that the Secretary of Defense transmit the substance of the appendix to the Department of State and urged that it be considered by a State-Defense Ad Hoc Committee.

   On March 9, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bundy transmitted the memorandum and its appendix to Assistant Secretary Williams under cover of a letter calling it “a sensible and useful paper.” Bundy stated that he was prepared to accept Williams’ judgment as to whether an ad hoc committee would be useful, but noted that a continuing watch might have some usefulness. (Ibid.)