202. Letter From the Consultative Group on Arms Limitation in Africa to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams)0

We hereby respectfully submit our views on what we believe the United States can and should do to prevent or moderate wasteful and dangerous military build-ups in Africa.

We are pleased that you are giving this matter serious thought at this time. Our deliberations have led us to the conclusion that the dangers of an excessive arms build-up are very real indeed. African leaders are already showing signs of wishing to possess significant military power, partly as a symbol of their newly won independence. The Communist Bloc has surplus arms and is eager to supply them to Africans as a means of creating chaos and of spreading Communist influence.

Now, while the arms slate in Africa is still fairly clean, is the time to begin making whatever contribution we can to preventing the ills that inevitably arise when nations enter into unbridled arms competition.1

  • Gerard C. Smith
  • Joseph M. Jones
  • Robert E. Matteson
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Enclosure2

CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON ARMS LIMITATION IN AFRICA

A Report to the Honorable G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

[Here follows the body of the report.]

Conclusions

There is little if any present prospect for success in efforts to impose arms control on Africa from the outside.

We must find ways of stimulating the Africans themselves to take the initiative in working toward effective arrangements for arms limitation.

This requires a discreet but purposeful educational program directed to African leaders and other opinion-formers. This is a long-range program—and a start should be made as soon as possible.

U.S. officials responsible for African problems, both in Washington and in the field, must be made thoroughly aware of the fact that a major U.S. interest is to bring arms build-ups in Africa under some degree of control.

Restraints in military build-ups should be a major aim of U.S. African policy. Such restraints involve a broad spectrum of questions, from U.S. supply of arms to meet legitimate requirements—to the possibility of “educating” the Africans in the necessity for restraint—to the possibility of some agreed arms limitation arrangements to prevent or moderate arms races in Africa—to the concept of general disarmament.

The U.S. should continue to support its previous initiatives in this field such as the one put forward at the UN in 1960.

Additional major public pronouncements on this subject may, however, be unhelpful. Our principal effort should be to encourage African leaders to become active in this field. One African zealot on arms limitation could be worth ten American and other non-African advocates of that cause.

U.S. arms supply policy can, if properly conceived, contribute to our arms limitation objectives. A responsible U.S. arms supply program that helps to meet legitimate requirements offers worth-while opportunities for exerting a wholesome influence on African political and military leaders.

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In general, in the case of the newly independent African countries it would be better to have non-uniformed and non-service technical military experts at our Embassies, rather than military attaches. Where we have attaches, they, too, must be imbued with the arms limitation philosophy.

The U.K. and France have large interests in the matter of African security and should be of great assistance in any educational process to develop restraint.

The U.S. should support, but not initiate, a proposal for an African nuclear-free zone.

Arms control cannot be expected in isolation. It must proceed in train with other developments giving the African nations a sense of security.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5/10-2361. Confidential.
  2. On November 6, Battle sent copies of the Consultative Group’s report to McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow under cover of a memorandum indicating that the Department of State intended to use it as a basis for further consultations within the Department and with other interested agencies in order to develop and refine U.S. policies for dealing with this subject. It noted that although the report was not a cheerful document, the Department believed it was an important one and that it merited Bundy’s attention. (Ibid., 770.56/11-761)
  3. Confidential.