We hereby respectfully submit our views on what we believe the United
States can and should do to prevent or moderate wasteful and dangerous
military build-ups in Africa.
We are pleased that you are giving this matter serious thought at this
time. Our deliberations have led us to the conclusion that the dangers
of an excessive arms build-up are very real indeed. African leaders are
already showing signs of wishing to possess significant military power,
partly as a symbol of their newly won independence. The Communist Bloc
has surplus arms and is eager to supply them to Africans as a means of
creating chaos and of spreading Communist influence.
Now, while the arms slate in Africa is still fairly clean, is the time to
begin making whatever contribution we can to preventing the ills that
inevitably arise when nations enter into unbridled arms
competition.1
Enclosure2
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON ARMS LIMITATION IN AFRICA
A Report to the Honorable G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
[Here follows the body of the report.]
Conclusions
There is little if any present prospect for success in efforts to
impose arms control on Africa from the outside.
We must find ways of stimulating the Africans themselves to take the
initiative in working toward effective arrangements for arms
limitation.
This requires a discreet but purposeful educational program directed
to African leaders and other opinion-formers. This is a long-range
program—and a start should be made as soon as possible.
U.S. officials responsible for African problems, both in Washington
and in the field, must be made thoroughly aware of the fact that a
major U.S. interest is to bring arms build-ups in Africa under some
degree of control.
Restraints in military build-ups should be a major aim of U.S.
African policy. Such restraints involve a broad spectrum of
questions, from U.S. supply of arms to meet legitimate
requirements—to the possibility of “educating” the Africans in the
necessity for restraint—to the possibility of some agreed arms
limitation arrangements to prevent or moderate arms races in
Africa—to the concept of general disarmament.
The U.S. should continue to support its previous initiatives in this
field such as the one put forward at the UN in 1960.
Additional major public pronouncements on this subject may, however,
be unhelpful. Our principal effort should be to encourage African
leaders to become active in this field. One African zealot on arms
limitation could be worth ten American and other non-African
advocates of that cause.
U.S. arms supply policy can, if properly conceived, contribute to our
arms limitation objectives. A responsible U.S. arms supply program
that helps to meet legitimate requirements offers worth-while
opportunities for exerting a wholesome influence on African
political and military leaders.
[Page 307]
In general, in the case of the newly independent African countries it
would be better to have non-uniformed and non-service technical
military experts at our Embassies, rather than military attaches.
Where we have attaches, they, too, must be imbued with the arms
limitation philosophy.
The U.K. and France have large interests in the matter of African
security and should be of great assistance in any educational
process to develop restraint.
The U.S. should support, but not initiate, a proposal for an African
nuclear-free zone.
Arms control cannot be expected in isolation. It must proceed in
train with other developments giving the African nations a sense of
security.
