Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

191. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, April 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Arms Control Policy for Africa

JCSM-280-61

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, dated 27 January 1961, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to provide views on the military implications of the following two proposals:

a. An atom-free African zone.

b. Regional arms control arrangements for Africa.

2. In considering the above two proposals, together with the points cited in the referenced memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that these notions are inspired largely by a growing feeling that there is a need for action to forestall a possible African “arms race.” There is evidence of some armament activity in Africa. In the main, however, the present rate of acquisition of armed forces by new African nations arises from the need to furnish authority to government, to assure internal security, and acquire the trappings of sovereignty. Where some acceleration can be noted, it is mostly attributable to Sino-Soviet Bloc subversive activity in the military area. This is a symptom of the East-West Cold War in Africa rather than one of African arms competition.

3. The solution to the African “arms race” is tied up in the political solution to the East-West Cold War. While there is need to forestall any developing arms race, serious political and military disadvantages should not be accepted by the West in an attempt to achieve this end.

4. Africa as an atom-free area, and one in which arms control arrangements would be in effect, still would be open to strong Soviet pressures and influence. While the proposed measures could offer some impediment to Soviet military operations and could reduce Soviet military infiltration of Africa, the Soviets are unlikely to abandon their efforts to dominate the area. Any adoption of atom-free/arms control measures would simply cause the Bloc to intensify its political, economic and cultural efforts in attempting to make further gains on the African continent. Also, they could be expected to seize upon any defects in such arrangements as another avenue through which to debilitate the power of African national governments and to lessen the external protection now furnished them by the West.

5. US military interest requires that US atomic capable forces not be prohibited from deployment to or transit through Africa. Otherwise, the US military posture would lose flexibility and be denied full exploitation of its capabilities in the support of our NATO and CENTO Allies.

6. The Cold War is tending to enlarge US military interests in Africa. Foreseeably, this interest especially in tactical or strategic base rights will grow, if communist penetration of the area increases. The possible loss through some regional arms control arrangement of US and especially European military base rights in Africa could have a most serious impact on the United States and Free World defense posture.

7. From a military standpoint, the United States, in the interest of its own and Free World security, should:

a. Oppose in the United Nations or elsewhere efforts to establish the African continent as an atom-free zone.

b. Support regional arms control for Africa in the lowest possible key and only if it is politically necessary and can be separated from the “atom-free” notion.

c. Subject to the limitations in b above, support regional arms control measures provided that they are of such a form as to:

(1) Reflect genuine African sponsorship and initiation.

(2) Continue to permit bilateral arrangements for guaranteeing external security.

(3) Preclude jeopardizing the sovereignty and independence of African nations, through denial of aid for internal security purposes or otherwise.

(4) Avoid facilitating Communist subversion of the area.

(5) Permit the United States and the West continuing access to Africa in the maintenance of their defense postures.

(6) Require inspection and verification safeguards which are no less stringent than those currently being developed by the United States for use in East-West arms control proposals.

8. A more detailed discussion of the factors upon which the above conclusions are based are furnished in the Enclosure hereto.¹

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke

Chief of Naval Operations

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 65 A 3464, Africa 091 (27 Jan. 61). Top Secret.
1. Attached but not printed.