Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State⁰

Rabat, May 4, 1962, 4 p.m.

1909. King received me at 7:30 last night. Foreign Minister Balafrej and Minister of Interior and Agzic Guedira also present. Topics discussed were (1) Soviet arms and helicopters (2) our air transport program and third tranche of ground forces program and (3) President’s invitation to King. This telegram deals with first and second topics. The third is dealt with in Embtel 1910¹ and my overall comments contained in Embtel 1911.²

I opened conversation by referring to statement King had made on April 13 which I had conveyed to Washington (Embtel 1786 repeated Paris 457 and Madrid 202).³ I asked whether King had any further information which he wished to convey on Soviet arms or on helicopters. He replied in negative. In answer to my questions he said that “light arms” being received from Soviets (deliveries not yet completed) include tanks and artillery but will not require presence here of Soviet technicians or instructors and will not involve Moroccan training groups in Soviet Union. King is in no doubt our concern regarding these Soviet activities here but he finds difficult understand such concern in view his statements. He reiterated that preference and hence policy of GOM will be to continue obtaining, to extent possible, arms requiring technicians and instructors from West.

I then described our air transport program. Starting from point that survey and recommendations now approved by President designed fully meet Moroccan requirements as set forth last December, I described program in terms of (A) two and one half year period, (B) immediate shipment of 3 C-119’s and 3 C-47’s, (C) presence here of about 80 US instructors and technicians for maintenance and instruction and (D) our understanding that King would wish consider as purchase rather than gift and would accept terms similar those involved in ground forces package. I told him total value package about $15 million and that we would expect collect about 10 percent over 5-year period.

King expressed general satisfaction but stressed, as he has done before, his regret that earlier attempts to achieve cooperation between US and Morocco in military aviation field had been frustrated. He referred especially to episode involving General Wade early last year. He agreed with me that details of package could now be negotiated at military level between representatives of two governments.

I told King as emphatically as possible that in making available this package our understanding is that we are meeting complete GOM requirements in this field and would not be confronted with competition from any other sources. Balafrej interjected to say that what was involved was “amitie exclusive” (exclusive friendship). After some discussion King said that obviously GOM has no intention of seeking assistance in this field from any other source. (He did not raise question of command plane nor did I. This however is weak point our position which will come up in military level discussions and on which I regret we are not in position make constructive suggestion particularly as we wish avoid undesirable source for this requirement.)

I then raised question of third tranche of ground forces package and told King that President has approved ammunition increment requested by Moroccan military and that we are ready to go ahead as soon as necessary formalities at military level can be completed. He expressed appreciation. I raised, in this connection, our willingness accept Moroccan officers in US training schools and recalled that I had mentioned this to King when I saw him in February. He confirmed his interest in this possibility and said that he believed that by next October current reorganization of training concepts in Moroccan army would permit some of his officers to proceed to US (Embtel 1432).⁴

In view of above we are proceeding to approach Moroccan Minister of Defense in order formalize above arrangements.⁵

Bonsal

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56/5-462. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Madrid, Paris, CINCEUR, and CINCSAC for POLAD.
1. Telegram 1910 from Rabat, May 4, reported that Bonsal had raised the question of the King’s State visit to the United States and that Hassan asked him to thank the President for the invitation, which he accepted in principle. (Ibid., 771.11/5-462)
2. Bonsal reported in telegram 1911 from Rabat, May 4, that the King believed his statements should clear any misunderstanding that might have arisen regarding Soviet arms and helicopters, and would not accept the idea that U.S. or French military aid should involve assurances on his part as to conditions under which he would or would not deal with the Soviets. The Ambassador noted that in Morocco the United States was faced with strong and ruthless competition in the arms field. (Ibid., 771.65/5-462)
3. See Document 135.
4. Not printed.
5. At the conclusion of the conversation, the Ambassador told Hassan that he was ready to discuss with him a proposal under which the Government of Morocco might permit the United States to retain use of the Kenitra communications facilities after the end of 1963. The King replied that he was still full of “goodwill” on this subject, but would like to have the U.S. proposal submitted first to his Foreign Minister for careful study and examination. (Telegram 1916 from Rabat, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5-462)