131. Editorial Note
On February 13, 1962, Bonsal reported that he was prepared to carry out the instructions in telegram 1152 and warn King Hassan that the United States considered its previous assistance poorly rewarded by Morocco’s recourse to significant Soviet military aid, but warned that this would be poorly received since the King presumably regarded such assistance as having been to a large extent a reward for maintaining important U.S. base facilities on Moroccan territory. Bonsal appreciated the wish to avoid cold war bargaining, but was afraid that so long as the cold war continued, such bargaining would have an irresistible appeal to many other governments. (Telegram 1376 from Rabat; Department of State, Central Files, 771.5622/2-1362)
The Department of State’s response noted that the nature as well as the timing of his approach to the King regarding the U.S. reaction to Moroccan acceptance of further Soviet military equipment had been left to the Ambassador’s judgment. Although the Department appreciated the complexities of such an approach, it seemed indispensable to further determine the most effective means of achieving essential U.S. aims. (Telegram 1193 to Rabat, February 14; ibid.)
In a discussion of U.S. military and economic assistance with the King on February 21, Bonsal raised the question of Soviet military materiel and described the problems this created for the U.S. Government. Hassan responded that it was his hope to give preference “so far as possible” to Western sources for such materiel, and indicated that the pending acquisitions from the Soviets consisted of light arms. However, he specifically stated that he did not feel able to give any binding assurances on these matters because he required freedom of action to meet Morocco’s needs. (Telegram 1432 from Rabat, February 22; ibid., 771.5622/2-2262)
The Ambassador also apologized to the King for the delay in receiving the conclusions of the U.S. base survey team, but noted that he had been increasingly impressed with the complexity of the problem of base conversion with minimum shock to the Moroccan economy. (Telegram 1434 from Rabat, February 22; ibid., 771.56311/2-2262)
On March 7, the Head of the Moroccan Base Survey Team, William O. Baxter, submitted the Team’s Report regarding the ways in which the United States could assist the Government of Morocco in post-1963 utilization of the U.S. bases to Secretary Rusk. Baxter’s transmittal memorandum stated that specific recommendations for action would be formulated in connection with the Report’s “Conclusions” and “Recommendations” sections, following appropriate staff coordination. (Report of Moroccan Base Survey Team; ibid., 771.56311/3-762)