Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

Washington, January 10, 1962.

1.: On 6 January the President approved going ahead with the survey of Moroccan air force needs called for under NSAM No. 102, even though the US has not yet received fully “satisfactory private assurances” from Morocco that no further Bloc air force aid would be accepted. While recognizing that our chief objective is such preclusion itself and that we must be flexible as to when and how satisfactory assurances confirming it can best be obtained, the President nevertheless is anxious that we not lose sight of the desirability of appropriate assurances at some point.1
2.: Therefore, may I have a progress report by 1 February on: (a) such changes as have occurred since September in the action program for Morocco [Page 199] outlined in NSAM No. 102; (b) your assessment of the assurances received to date that the Moroccans will seek no further Bloc air force aid; and (c) your current views as to the best means of satisfying ourselves that we have the necessary assurances from King Hassan.

McGeorge Bundy

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 121. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense and Director,AID.↩
On January 15, Saunders sent Bundy a memorandum pointing out that recent reports that the King had decided to accept some Soviet tanks and other equipment underscored the importance of NSAM No. 121 asking Rusk to focus his attention on the political aspects of U.S. aid to the Moroccan air force. He recommended reminding Hassan discreetly that a monarch’s future with Moscow was dim and that he should show some concern for his increasingly clear image in the United States as a “blackmailer.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 121)↩

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa