Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

97. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 17, 1961, 7 p.m.

462. Congo. Department telegram 305.² Gullion, Yost and Eisenberg called this morning on SYG and Linner. In response queries from US side SYG commented on following points: SYG was moderately hopeful satisfactory solution Orientale Province would come out of current Adoula-Gizenga meeting. He feels Gizenga now in decidedly weak position in that most of his lieutenants and supporters have endorsed and are cooperating with Adoula government. Gizenga’s choices lie between participation in this government, probably futile attempt to maintain shadow regime in Stanleyville or inglorious exile. Hammarskjöld was inclined to think Gizenga would choose former in hope he will be able to achieve his ends from inside GOC, though SYG himself doubts Gizenga has personality or support to do so.

SYG is not unduly disturbed at “trickle” of arms which have been reaching Stanleyville³ inasmuch as he believes only 300-man gendarmarie, not Orientale ANC under Lundula, is loyal to Gizenga. However he also considers that, if constitutional Adoula government requests ONUC to check all incoming shipments by force if necessary, ONUC would thereby be given clear legal right to do so which had not existed under SC resolutions.

As to Katanga, SYG said Tshombe if he had his way would come to Léopoldville but that Munongo and others are still being “sticky”. However he considers that, if Léopoldville-Stanleyville agreement is reached, Katanga cannot long exist in isolation. He does not think Adoula government will have to use military force to establish its authority there.

In this connection he said solution problem Belgian political advisers is moving along satisfactorily but so-called Egge plan⁴ envisaging replacement military advisers and mercenaries over three month period is still awaiting Spaak’s agreement. He thought white mercenaries in North Katanga might still give trouble and have to be dealt with by UN.⁵

As to training ANC he said he had asked Emperor of Ethiopia to make Iyassu available for this exclusive purpose, and he hoped program could be initiated as soon as Orientale ANC could be included. He proposed former Belgian bases be used for this purpose as well as for civil aviation training, and hoped Belgians would raise no objection to such utilization bases in advance settlement their claim for compensation.

Though Gullion pressed him hard for prompt initiation broad stabilization program, SYG made it clear he does not wish to go beyond current and continued import program during next few weeks. He is apprehensive that substantial aid program based almost exclusively on US funds might be politically damaging to Adoula, at least as long as Gizenga is maintaining separate status. He prefers therefore await Orientale settlement and report by IBRD representative before going ahead with full stabilization program. In meantime he proposes seek further funds from countries other than US and may ask USG to assist in this canvass.

Obviously SYG generally optimistic. He did, however, attempt envisage possible future complications among which vague aspirations Youlou, possibly seconded by some French interests, but not French Government, to dominate Bakango grouping cutting across existing boundaries; also said Mobutu would bear watching and under certain circumstances might have attempted coup during Lovanium Parliament. Linner later told Gullion advisers around Mobutu unstable and cited as example Mobutu might make possible coup if bloc embassies reinstalled or if government swings left.

SYG agreed our projected representations Balewa and Houphouet-Boigny (as per reference telegram).⁶

Plimpton

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1761. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels.
2. Telegram 305 to USUN, August 16, suggested using a projected call on Hammarskjöld by Ambassador-designate Gullion to explore major Congo problems, such as plans for retraining the Congolese army, implementation of an economic stabilization program, withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign personnel according to the February 21 resolution, and measures to reintegrate Orientale and Katanga into the central government. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–1561)
3. Telegram 305 instructed USUN to express concern about recent unauthorized flights to Stanleyville, some of which had reportedly brought in arms.
4. The “Egge plan” was based on a report to Hammarskjöld by Colonel Bjorn Egge of the U.N. forces in the Congo. Telegram 355 from USUN, August 4, reported a conversation with Wieschhoff, in which he described the plan and summarized the U.N.-Belgian discussions concerning it. Wieschhoff commented that the establishment of a Congolese government with parliamentary approval rendered the Egge Plan somewhat irrelevant. Thereafter the government would determine the removal of foreign officers, and the U.N. forces could not prevent it from taking action against Katanga or Stanleyville. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–461)
5. Telegram 464 from USUN, August 17, reported comments made by General Rikhye during this meeting. Rikhye predicted that U.N. forces in the Congo would be reduced from 17,000 to 14,000 by November 1. Concerning Katanga, he indicated that the United Nations would take action against Katangan forces rather than permit ANC entry into Katanga before a political agreement was reached with Tshombe. In a subsequent discussion, however, Bunche described the U.N. position as “hands off” any attempt by the central government to subdue a regional insurrection. (Ibid., 332.70G/8–1761)
6. Telegram 305 stated that the United States was approaching Prime Minister Balewa and Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny to urge their support for the Adoula government. Instructions to this effect were sent in telegram 253 to Laos, also sent to Abidjan, August 17. (Ibid., 770G.02/8–1761)