Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, August 11, 1961, 5 p.m.

334. Embassy assessment Adoula government and immediate future problems.

First ten days of Adoula government characterized by intense political and social activity. Latter included Balubad-Lulual Love Feast, Kasavubu, heads of chambers, and finally Adoula large receptions. EmbOffs attended all and from extensive conversations there and calls on politicians are unanimous in belief this is indeed honeymoon period. Former bitter enemies now warmly embracing, calling each other brother and loudly proclaiming desire collaborate in building nation. Adoula, Bomboko, Weregemere, Sendwe, Eleo, Lutula, Kiwewa, Delvaux, Koumorico, Galula, Ileo, Gbenye,² and others to a man profess desire let bygones be bygones and solve nation’s problems. Latter include in their minds national unity through security, nation’s economy, unemployment, education, controlling army. Have not sensed one overt discordant note except Bolikango³ continuing sulk whose stock never lower. Remains be seen how long honeymoon lasts but for moment all showing non-Congolese industry and will to get on with job. Even Gbenye now refers to EmbOff he had under house arrest as his closest friend and recently requested I consider new era and forget past.

Substantive UN officers and other diplomats here share this view of outward indications stability. All however watching developments closely and are still amazed at present era sweetness and light.

Notwithstanding foregoing there are certain undercurrents that could cause serious problems and nefarious elements currently lying low. First of course is enigma Gizenga whose influence with former [garble—supporters?] unquestionably at nadir. Physical removal from scene and absence direct leadership have incited unfavorable comment many his former ardent supporters. While reports clandestine arms importation and belief he may be preparing commit Jeunesse Lumumbiste forces disquieting, he would in such effort be facing legal government supported not only by vast majority Congolese but certainly UN. One of principal elements continues be Lundula and we have no hard information on what he planning do but fear he may continue follow Gizenga’s instructions. On opposite side coin is Gbenye who gives every indication being supporter Adoula and whom Adoula seems to have fenced in at Léopoldville.

Other source violent action, i.e., Mobutu army, currently appears quiet. Rumor still current re stresses strains within Mobutu-Bomboko-Nendaka –Adoula camp but these seem currently submerged and on all occasions, public or private, Mobutu appears relaxed and endeavoring emphasize his fidelity new government.

Last and perhaps in long run most serious problem continues Tshombe. Although his deputies currently integrated all aspects parliamentary life he continues remain Elisabethville and doubtful when and if and under what conditions he will proceed Léopoldville. Rumors prevalent violent Léopoldville action against Katanga once Gizenga brought to heel but we do not ascribe much importance thereto for moment due Adoula’s caution and spirit of compromise. Yesterday for example Linner prevailed upon Adoula, Sendwe and Gbenye send Tshombe ministers who are also deputies back to Elisabethville in effort bring about indigenous Katangese movement to withdraw gendarmerie from North Katanga where they have always been causing trouble with Baluba.

Foregoing considered significant for we understand Gbenye and Sendwe had been advocating vigorous steps there to curtail Katangan excesses.

Kalonji is for moment playing ball. He is still potential problem but for moment appears as compromiser but some fear may be using this attitude build local power position south Kasai.

Finally, Kivu continues be near state of anarchy and some sort of order must be restored there.

UN representatives here believe important phase UN operations now ended and that emphasis UN role should be shifted from military and political to economic, social and administrative aid. Are anticipating gradual reduction military forces and decentralization UN services from Hotel Royal to interested ministries. They believe UN technical and other assistance desperately required and must become more closely associated with GOC efforts. UN should no longer exercise governmental powers but build up Congolese authority by improving its administration and developing indigenous governmental efficiency which now non-existent. This modification UN role is reason for Linner’s presence UN next week.

Foregoing relatively rosy picture may of course change overnight but at end first ten days Adoula regime we are relatively optimistic that we may have some few weeks of respite. This calm, however, must be taken advantage of and used by US and other friends of Congo constructively. Re US we submit following recommendations or guidelines:

1. Assiduously avoid actions that might be interpreted locally as meddling internal Congolese affairs now nationalism running high and Congolese think they doing excellent job.

2. Early arrival Ambassador would be indication of confidence we have in new team.

3. Listen attentively to large number of requests for assistance we are receiving all sides. Every Congolese we have spoken to, after emphasizing will to get on with job, then says that this is critical period and Congo’s great friend, US must be prepared assist in every way. Nevertheless we are taking care point out US assistance great in past and we hope sizeable in future must be channeled or coordinated through UN.

4. Heartily endorse Department’s policy of not overtly rushing to acclaim Adoula. Believe now, however, time for African states come to his side and suggest discreet initiation such action possible where necessary through covert CAS assets.

5. Early approval Tempelsman diamond barter deal⁴ most desirable.

6. Early US initiative raise sizeable UN stabilization fund in neighborhood $100 million to permit UN sharply step up rate of import and [garble] on more than day to day basis.

7. Finally we anticipate great pressure from UN New York and contributing nations to withdraw UNOC forces precipitously. We recognize validity gradual overall UNOC force reduction but believe Kivu, Kasai and Maniema regions will probably continue for some time to require greater UN forces than presently exist these regions today.

Godley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–1161. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, Elisabethville, USUN, London, Paris, Khartoum, and Usumbura and pouched to Brazzaville, Lagos, Accra, Bamako, Dakar, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Rabat, and Monrovia.
2. Weregemere, Ambroise Eleo, and Joseph Lutula were newly-appointed Ministers for Agriculture, Economic Affairs, and Middle Classes, respectively. Victor Koumorico was the newly-elected President of the Senate. Albert Delvaux had served in the Ileo government and both he and Antoine Kiwewa had served in the Lumumba government in 1960. For a list of the members of the new government, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 827–828.
3. Bolikango was appointed a Deputy Prime Minister, but telegram 277 from Léopoldville, August 3, reported that he had resigned. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.13/8–361)
4. A U.S. firm, Leon Tempelsman and Son, was seeking U.S. approval for a barter transaction involving the exchange of approximately $54 million of Congo industrial diamonds for U.S. surplus agricultural commodities. Memoranda of conversations on this subject between Maurice Tempelsman and Rusk on July 26 and between Tempelsman and Bowles on August 9 are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Tempelsman enclosed a summary of the proposal dated November 9, 1961, with a letter to Stevenson of the same date. (Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Box 837, Maurice Tempelsman) Further documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 870G.2535.