Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

98. Telegram From the Consulate in Elisabethville to the Department of State¹

Elisabethville, August 20, 1961, noon.

216. Re Deptel 163.² Called on Tshombe yesterday morning and had half-hour discussion on situation of Katanga vis-a-vis Congo. Tshombe began by complaining of his weakened condition due to low blood pressure.

I began my approach by saying that I seriously worried and fearful over future prospects for Katanga in light of increasingly unfriendly statements issuing from Leopoldville and Tshombe’s failure to negotiate with Adoula. I said I foresaw Katanga facing invasion or other hostile pressure from Léopoldville as result of its isolation and encirclement, and Tshombe agreed, adding that coming events might result in untold destruction here. I replied that I could not understand why this need be, since Tshombe himself had qualities of leadership and sufficient economic and financial trumps in his possession to go to Adoula and negotiate peaceful settlement to crisis. I expressed opinion Tshombe can still bargain for satisfactory position in new Congo but that time is running out. I took occasion to point out that USG, other friendly governments and probably UN would be hard-pressed to find solution avoiding bloodshed if situation between Katanga and Léopoldville degenerated to breaking point and I underlined legitimacy with which Léopoldville regime endowed in eyes of whole world.

Tshombe indicated understanding of this position and substantial agreement therewith, but he pointed out that he considered Léopoldville leaders determined to apply solution of force and violence against Katanga in any event since they wish to destroy him personally. He said he had few friends among moderates in government—moderates being in reality Socialists and potential extremists—and that his true friends, Bolikango and Delvaux, not in government and only Mobutu likely to support him. He qualified Adoula as dangerous Socialist of Solvay Institute stripe and Kasavubu as ineffectual. Further, Tshombe said he informed Adoula regime now planning divide Katanga into four provinces, which would spell ruin for country. He added that report brought back by Minister Nyembo last week end not encouraging and that he hoped for more optimistic report from Minister Samalenge (also a deputy) who arriving this day from Léopoldville. Tshombe indicated these Ministers continuing to talk with Adoula team, and I took occasion to caution him against public admission that these lower-echelon talks transpiring. Tshombe also said he has sent personal message to Adoula.

I remarked that I believed that Adoula had not closed door to negotiations with him and that Tshombe, as legitimate provincial president, could still find way to save situation of Katanga, and legitimate economic and other interests of Africans and Europeans alike, by making concessions in return for certain guarantees. Tshombe then asked me for USG opinion of situation, to which I replied that it was as I had outlined it in my discussion, with accent laid on his negotiating at once in Léopoldville. I underlined our belief that substance of eventual negotiations strictly matter for Africans to determine and that, furthermore, we could not guarantee outcome. I cited Linner’s statement in New York as indication that UN believed Adoula still willing to talk to Tshombe, and I reminded Tshombe that Linner had offered to have him as guest in Royal Hotel during talks.

In leaving I asked Tshombe if I should tell Department that he pessimistic and believed negotiation now impossible, to which he replied that he still hoped to avoid test of strength with Léopoldville and held out possibility Samalenge would bring back new elements. Tshombe concluded, however, by remarking that, while hoping to find peaceful solution, Katanga determined to defend by force of arms its rights and its accomplishments of past year.

Comment: At no point in friendly and relaxed conversation did Tshombe show willingness to discuss practical measures which would prove seriousness of his intentions toward reconciliation and reintegration.

Canup

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–2061. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels, USUN, Paris, and London.
2. Telegram 163, August 16, instructed Canup to make a demarche to Tshombe, along the lines of his previous representations, to impress on Tshombe the need to pursue actively the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo. (Ibid., 770G.00/8–1661)