Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

62. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, April 28, 1961, 6 p.m.

2269. Deptel 2111.² Problems here could scarcely be more complex or difficult to state coherently. Kasavubu is relatively weak, does not want real power and does not have important powers under constitution. For better or worse, he is only unchallenged institution functioning and he wants a Congolese solution with Western, not Communist help.

Ileo has been a weak Prime Minister, as we have often reported, and most unlikely to develop political muscle. For that reason and since he is broadly acceptable among many political factions, it has been argued that he might bring leaders together peacefully whereas stronger personality might widen breach. I have disagreed with such thesis and said in my telegram 1078 of November 1, 1960³ that Adoula would be better choice. I still think so and believe he will, with luck, eventually be Prime Minister. He could dump Ileo tomorrow if he wished but they are personal friends and Adoula would not like to hurt Ileo. Furthermore, Adoula would risk losing support of number Ileo followers and finally he probably is content to let Ileo receive the slings and arrows until the situation improves and he can find way to ease Ileo out gracefully. We are on very close terms with Adoula and as sure as we reasonably can expect to be that foregoing is accurate.

We have for long time felt parliamentary solution necessary and have consistently advocated it. The old difficulties remain, however; neither Katanga nor South Kasai parliamentarians likely attend and progress this regard at Coquilhatville has been backward. Even Orientale and Kivu delegates not certain to attend even though Gizenga continues call for parliament.

Regarding Gizenga, we have, as Department aware, done everything we could think of to encourage rapprochement with GOC on assumption he can be brought around, as patriotic Congolese, through patient negotiation. I have never however been completely persuaded that Gizenga wants such a solution and have had current feeling he is stalling until bloc has found some way put him in saddle at Leopoldville. Meanwhile they support him in Stanleyville. On several occasions he has backed out of conversations at last minute and while seeming to stand for conditional agreement, has made no real move toward it. I think we must carefully consider whether he will ever bring Orientale and Kivu back into Congo except on his terms and whether time, aside from Communist propaganda, is not on his side.

The latter assumption, if correct, leads me to think other means necessary to settle Orientale and Kivu problem. There has always been possibility that Manzikala and others in provincial government, who do not like Gizenga, will become fed up and throw him out. They do not feel strong enough at moment and Lundula also does not feel he can or should use ANC for such purpose. Without ANC such attempt could scarcely succeed. Mobutu has been making real effort bring Orientale and Kivu ANC under central control but we do not believe he has yet had much success.

Along this line of thought, I am not at all sure that Gizenga would risk a parliamentary solution if it were proposed in near future, and if Katanga and Kasai representatives expected attend. Unless he sure that bribes which he is prepared to use lavishly will be translated into votes, he would probably not win vote confidence. Furthermore, votes can be bought both ways as he also knows. His popularity rating is not high and would not be decisive factor. He might in such case, as he has in others, decide at last moment use some excuse to keep provincial delegates away.

It seems to me that most profitable policy lies in bringing Katanga back into Congo. Realize we have tried hard and failed so far but must keep up efforts since economic effect would be most important and political effect would be electrifying. It would certainly rule out a separatist South Kasai and bring in deputies who would vote against Gizenga out of conviction. If that did not make Gizenga realize his game was up and bring him back, he would eventually be under pressure which I doubt he could long resist.

In other words I think our efforts so far have been along right lines although the working assumption regarding Gizenga may well be wrong, i.e. that he can be won over on legitimate and reasonable compromise.

I think key to obtaining support from Kamitatu is clear identification of eventual power center in Congo. He is opportunist who is working both sides of street and being kept in funds by Communists and in regular touch with Gizenga. He still thinks Gizenga will come out on top but is not by any means ready to cut ties with GOC. Kasongo⁴ is miffed with GOC because he thinks and says they have ignored him. Adoula has assured us he and others have done everything they could to bring him in but he sulks in UN camp at Léopoldville and has sent his wife and children to Stanleyville. Weregemere⁵ is more likely to rejoin fold since his experience on the other side has not been entirely happy.

Coquilhatville round table again points up great difficulty Congolese find in settling problems among themselves. It has so far produced nothing hopeful but has seen Tshombe take even more intransigent position which will probably produce some colorful rhetoric when he returns to Elisabethville. I think it will be long time before another round table will be generally attended if held in Congo.

Their army, shaky as it is, has been steadily developing coherence and expressing more and more its desire to pressure the politicians into agreement without dictating terms. That explains Tshombe’s detention (not arrest) at Coquilhatville⁶ and seems to me so far hopeful sign. If UN can get on with reorganization and training and I believe it can be perhaps most effective instrument in unifying country. I have enough faith and confidence in Mobutu to think he would not use ANC to establish dictatorship for anyone including himself.

Timberlake

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4–2861. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, Elisabethville, London, and Paris.
2. Telegram 2111, April 20, stated the Department’s view that the reconvening of Parliament was necessary for progress to be made toward the peaceful reincorporation of Orientale and Kivu with the rest of the Congo and that Adoula seemed to be emerging as a leader who might be able to obtain some Lumumbist support for a moderate government and might well be a more effective Prime Minister than Ileo. It requested the Embassy’s views on these points and on what steps might be taken to nudge the Léopoldville leaders in that direction. (Ibid., 770G.00/4–2061)
3. Printed in Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XIV, pp. 561–562.
4. Joseph Kasongo, representative from Orientale and President of the Congolese Chamber of Representatives.
5. Christophe Weregemere, representative from Kivu in the Congolese Chamber of Representatives.
6. Tshombe was detained on April 26 by Congolese soldiers at the Coquilhatville airport, where he had gone with the intention of flying back to Elisabethville. He was subsequently placed under house arrest.