Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

61. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 26, 1961, 7 p.m.

2993. Congo.

1. Stevenson saw SYG yesterday afternoon to get his current estimation of Congo situation. SYG relatively optimistic about general outlook and presented his view of possible “next steps” by UN.

2. SYG said Congo problem now in “new phase” which was “most hopeful.” He said as early as last Aug it had been clear that fundamental problem from viewpoint of Congolese was not Kasavubu vs. Lumumba but Leo vs. Katanga. (Sovs also saw basic problem revolving around Katanga, SYG noted. As long as this problem open, they did not attack SYG; when they felt it closed, attack came.) In this framework entrance of UN troops into Katanga was essential as foothold even though entrance last summer was little more than symbolic except at Kamina. Tshombe’s desire to take control of all of Katanga was move that brought on UN counter-move, consisting of moving Indians to Kamina and incident at Kabalo.²

3. When Kasavubu realized UN was potential ally against Katanga he became more “interested” in UN. This, Hammarskjöld says, is explanation for Kasavubu’s acceptance of Nwokedi-Gardiner agreement. (SYG said interesting incident occurred few days ago when Kasavubu and friends requested UN to stop shipment of arms on way to Tshombe—this while UN still being kept out of Matadi.) Strength of UN operation in north Katanga has brought new “tone” from Tshombe. He is faced with growing political opposition internally. His attempt to arrange follow-up meeting to hold his gains from Tananarive was unsuccessful; instead, Kasavubu set up Coquilhatville meeting.

4. SYG noted incidents at Coquilhatville conference emphasize Kasavubu’s attempt to gain hegemony over Tshombe. Sendwe, for example, was present despite his bitter rivalry with Tshombe.³ Finally, Tshombe walked out since Kasavubu would not accept his conditions which were 1) Kasavubu repudiate his acceptance of latest SC res; 2) Kasavubu join in condemning Kabalo action by UN.

5. SYG now believes Gizenga and more especially his followers will take note that Kasavubu gaining upper hand over Tshombe and this will make even better chances for agreement between Leo and Stanleyville. SYG said UN now has confirmation of military agreement between Stanleyville and Leo forces.⁴ Lundula signed agreement for Stanleyville and Bombozo, commander of Thysville garrison, whom SYG described as “strongest man in Leo”, signed for Leo.

6. SYG noted Matadi situation about settled as result of exchange of ltrs. Moreover, he said Mobutu had swung into UN line on Matadi. SYG concluded Abbas had done very good job despite certain lack of cooperation from Kasavubu which he had not revealed publicly but which had been reported in cables to SYG.

7. SYG said in accepting Nwokedi-Gardiner agreement Kasavubu had in effect agreed that foreign personnel listed in SC res should all leave Elisabethville. As for those in Leo, all should leave except those President (Kasavubu) personally decided should remain. This again emphasized Kasavubu’s desire to get at Tshombe. (SYG noted while some in advisory comite had objected to such arrangement he had defended it and believed it was one UN would have to accept.)

8. SYG then turned to problem of Dayal. He said it was not desirable any longer from UN point of view that Dayal should remain since whatever facts of case might be, “others had their teeth so deep in him” they couldn’t be pulled out. On other hand, Nehru had foolishly committed himself in public to Dayal remaining—thereby engaging his prestige. SYG said, however, since new political phase was opening in Congo, new pattern of activity had to develop. This would involve UN “keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombe low.” In new circumstances question arose whether there should be just one over-all diplomatic representative of SYG. He said he was considering asking Dayal to propose new organization in Leo. It would consist of five top UN officials as follows: a) Linner for economic and technical assistance; b) McKeown, commander of force; c) Gardiner to handle negotiations with Kasavubu; d) if possible, Swede who helped train Ethiopian army to train Congolese forces; e) someone to assist Congolese in producing new constitution. (Hammarskjöld said he intended to suggest five or six men with name of Adrian Pelt at top of list. It would then be up to Kasavubu to request one.)

9. SYG said this led to question whether there was need for anything more than coordinator in addition to foregoing five. If UN had good relations with Kasavubu, which SYG seemed to assume, there did not seem to be any need for another senior official of high diplomatic rank to serve over five functional senior officials. What was needed would be coordinator or administrator rather than diplomat.

10. However, Hammarskjöld concluded, such arrangement could only be put into effect if Nehru convinced Dayal solidly backs it. He said Narasimhan and Rikhye (Indian members of Secretariat) favor such plan. SYG implied Dayal himself not yet fully aware of his thinking and must be led to it carefully. SYG has in mind Dayal going to Congo to put new organization into effect. He would announce his mission had been completed and new circumstances no longer made his presence necessary.

11. Both Hammarskjöld and Cordier emphasized Dayal has no desire to maintain his post in Leo but will not leave under fire. Therefore, plan Hammarskjöld now has in mind would have to be presented as Dayal’s proposal based on view that UN over the hump and he no longer needed.

12. In response to Stevenson’s questions at several points during conversation Hammarskjöld emphasized Abbas must go back to Addis Ababa. At no time did he suggest who might be “coordinator” he had in mind in addition to five functional heads of Congo operation.⁵

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/4-2661.Secret;Priority.
2. On April 7 and 8, U.N. forces at Kabalo in northern Katanga successfully fought off attacks by Katangan forces, sinking a barge carrying Katangan soldiers and capturing a plane with 30 mercenaries. See U.N. docs. S/4790/Add.1 and S/4791.
3. Sendwe was at Coquilhatville as the leader of a delegation from the self-proclaimed province of Lualaba in northern Katanga. His delegation was seated after Tshombe’s delegation left the conference on April 25.
4. Telegram 2212 from Léopoldville, April 18, transmitted the text of an ANC communiqué summarizing an agreement reportedly reached by military delegations from Léopoldville and Stanleyville providing for a cease-fire and the recognition of ANC authority by the troops of Orientale and Kivu. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5/4–1861)
5. A memorandum from Cleveland to Bowles, April 26, stated that Stevenson had reported by telephone on his conversation with Hammarskjöld. Stevenson had informed Hammarskjöld that Ambassador Timberlake would soon be replaced. “This information was received, according to Ambassador Stevenson, with a broad smile; the Secretary-General expressed the hope that Ambassador Timberlake’s successor would be a person with UN experience.” (Ibid., 123–Timberlake, Clare Hitem) Stevenson and Bowles had discussed the question of reassigning Timberlake in a telephone conversation on April 24. Notes of the conversation include the comment, apparently by Stevenson, “We do not want Timberlake to be the price of Dayal.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147, Chester Bowles’ Telcons)