Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State¹

Brussels, May 5, 1961, 7 p.m.

1882. Paris for Finletter. USUN for Stevenson. I paid courtesy call on Spaak² this morning during course of which I stressed opportunity, with new governments in both Belgium and US, for strengthening the traditional ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. I mentioned my personal friendship with him of many years and said we wished to work very closely with new Belgian Government and would value their views on matters such as Congo, NATO, etc. Furthermore we would also like to feel able to discuss all matters of common interest with complete frankness.

Spaak said he fully agreed. While not wishing to criticize previous Belgian Government he felt that some misunderstandings had arisen between us through lack of close and intimate contact. With this in mind he proposed that I meet with him every Monday at 3 p.m. to discuss with frankness any matters which either of us wished to bring up. Such regular meetings would not preclude more frequent meetings when necessary, but he felt by having at least one intimate get-together each week we could keep in close step on any matters of common interest.

Spaak was obviously greatly pleased with Secretary’s invitation to meet with him in Oslo (Deptel 2164)³ and indicated that he warmly welcomed this opportunity for a full and frank discussion on the Congo, which represented an extremely difficult problem for Belgium.

I said to Spaak that I believed basic objectives of US and Belgium re Congo were the same, in that we both desired to see a unified, stable Congo in which economic progress could be made and social and political stability restored and maintained. He also fully recognized the important contribution that Belgian civilian technicians were making and that Belgium had certain legitimate economic interests there. While our objectives were the same, there had been some differences between us in the past as to method or approach, but we felt such differences could be eliminated or minimized by close and frank exchange of views. I said that Spaak should frankly know that many members of the UN held Belgium responsible, perhaps unfairly, for all the evils and ills of the Congo, and, furthermore, there was a strong feeling among many UN members that Belgium was unwilling to cooperate with the UN. We believed that the new Belgian Government could make a much more effective presentation of Belgium’s case. Also, anything that Belgium could do, such as speedily withdrawing Belgian military, para-military and political advisers would be very helpful in creating the impression that Belgium desired to cooperate with the UN.

Spaak said again that while not wishing to criticize the preceding Belgian Government, he felt that they had not always presented the Belgian case effectively. Insofar as he was concerned he believed strongly that Belgium should cooperate with the UN. In particular, he felt that the “political advisors” should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible and the sooner the better. In the past week, as he delved into Congo matters, he had discovered that the political advisors in egarble—Léopoldville?] and the political advisors in Elisabethville were frequently giving conflicting advice and were certainly not giving advice which corresponded with the views of the Belgian Government. This gave a most unfortunate impression of duality in Belgian policy. He therefore favored the speedy withdrawal of the political advisors.

He also favored the withdrawal of Belgian military personnel on a basis fully compatible with the recent agreement signed between the UN and Kasavubu;⁴ in other words, just as rapidly as the UN authorities and the Congolese central authority reached agreement on the withdrawal of Belgian military personnel. However, it was obviously important that all Belgian military personnel not be withdrawn at one fell swoop without having adequate replacement for them, as any such total withdrawal without appropriate provision for adequate replacement could lead to chaos within the Congolese armed forces. In his recent discussions with Sabhani he had made these points clear and stressed the desire of the new Belgian Government to cooperate fully and whole-heartedly with the UN and the Congolese.

Spaak then said that he felt it would be extremely useful for him to have a very frank talk with UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld so that the latter could hear first hand exactly where the Belgian Government stood. This might help to clear up some of the suspicion in the UN as to Belgium’s motives. With this in mind he hoped to proceed to New York for such conversations. However, it was not possible to go there this month because of the Oslo NATO meeting, the King’s visit to France and his responsibilities in connection with the organization of the work of the new Belgian Government, so he was planning to go in June. When he visited the UN in June he also wished to visit Washington to talk with the President and the Secretary, and he hoped most earnestly that they would be able to receive him. He planned to take this up when he sees the Secretary in Oslo on May 9. I said that while I did not know the President’s exact schedule in June I felt sure that in principle the President and Secretary would be glad to see Spaak in Washington if a mutually convienient date could be arranged.

Comment: Catlett,⁵ who accompanied me in the call on Spaak, and I were favorably impressed by Spaak’s very frank and forthcoming attitude in discussing the Congo, and by his obvious sincerity in wanting to work in the closest possible way with us on Congo and all other problems. With the fresh approach which Spaak is obviously bringing to the Congo problem there seems to be a real opportunity for us to work closely and constructively with the new Belgian Government. For our part, anything we can appropriately do to build up and enhance the prestige of Spaak and the new government should be helpful, particularly since a restoration of Belgium’s international standing from its present low should serve to strengthen Spaak and Lefevre domestically and thus enable them better to do some of the difficult things that must be done in the coming period. In this connection I hope most earnestly that President and Secretary will be able to seek Spaak in June as I believe that such a meeting could have a very constructive impact on Belgian policy.⁶

MacArthur

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.55/5–561. Confidential. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris Topol, and USUN.
2. Paul-Henri Spaak was Vice Premier and Foreign Minister in the new Belgian Government headed by Theodore Lefevre, which took office on April 25. For his recollections of the Congo problem, see Combats Inacheves: De l’Espoir aux Deceptions, pp. 242–268.
3. Telegram 2164, May 2, stated that Rusk would like to meet with Spaak during the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting in Oslo to exchange views on the Congo and related matters. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.55/5–261) Rusk and Spaak discussed the Congo briefly at their meeting at Oslo on May 9; a memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
4. On April 29, the Coquilhatville conference had adopted a resolution approving the April 17 agreement between Kasavubu and Hammarskjöld and adopted two resolutions requesting that Kasavubu take steps under this agreement for the removal of all foreign personnel serving without his consent in Katanga, Orientale, or Kivu.
5. Embassy Counselor for Economic Affairs Don V. Catlett.
6. Telegram 2327 to Brussels, May 25, expressed agreement in principle to a June meeting between Kennedy and Spaak. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.55/5–561) Spaak did not, however, visit the United States in June.