49. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
2447. Verbatim text. Congo. Following is text SYG letter to Stevenson 12 March; request instructions re reply:
“We are now facing a crucial and, indeed, in some respects a more dangerous phase in the Congo operation. The new resolution is some four weeks old and, while everything has been done to speed up its implementation, we have been hampered by a temporary weakening of the military force which is now gradually being overcome by reinforcements.
In good or bad faith, reactions to the SC resolution of 20/21 February have been very negative in the Congo. This explains much of the considerable difficulties we have been running into at the time of our greatest military weakness. The resolution has been interpreted as requesting the disarming by force of the ANC, the occupying of the territory and the putting of the country under UN trusteeship. It is most [Page 105] regrettable that such grave misinterpretations and misrepresentations in many cases have carried the highest authority, as shown by documents circulated to the SC. Naturally, we have done whatever we could to straighten out these misrepresentations, but without any mass media at our disposal and being suspected by the authorities we have not so far managed to turn opinion in the right direction. It has been difficult to escape the impression that other influences, hostile to the UN and its operation, have taken advantage of the situation to kindle the fires of misunderstanding, suspicion and fear.
This is the situation I wish to bring to your urgent attention. We shall continue to do our utmost, in direct contacts, in official communications, and in such other ways as may be available to us, to explain over and over the purpose of the UN and the substance of the new resolution. We shall underscore once more that the UN neither would, nor could, establish itself as some kind of administering authority; that we only seek to get the army out of the political sphere and turn it into an effective, non-political national instrument for the maintenance of law and order; that we wish to provide a general framework of peace within which the Congolese could find their own solution to their problems; and that our guiding principle is to give full substance and weight to their independence and integrity while safeguarding international peace and security.
However, I would, through you, wish to appeal to your government to give urgent instructions to their representatives in Léopoldville to use energetically all their influence in the same direction, in support of the UN, and therefore ultimately in the best interest of the Congolese themselves. I am certain that if the voice of your country would be added to other voices, speaking for reason, giving a true evaluation of the UN purposes, it would carry considerable weight. I trust that along with the support your government has kindly given to the UN in its present effort, and especially its support for the SC resolution of 20/21 February, it may also wish to help the organization in the way I suggest.
An acute case in point is the arrival of the Indian re-inforcements. Rash words have been said in the Congo about these re-inforcements, the significance of which both for the maintenance of our force and for the total political balance is obvious to you. Were latent anti-Asian feelings of the kind we find in many places in Africa, combined with the misunderstandings of the resolution, with the present wave of hostilities against the UN and with the vain belief that this is a moment at which the Congo might afford a break with the UN, to lead to incidents at, or around, the arrival of the Indian re-inforcements, this might obviously have the gravest consequences, both politically and militarily. We do what we can to prepare the ground, and we have no evidence of any hostile plans, but we feel that all influence should be exerted to ease the [Page 106] transition and to get the force re-established at its necessary strength without obstacles or incidents, whatever their origin or direction, but in particular without incidents which would create open friction between the Congolese and important Afro-Asian countries.
I am certain that you will fully appreciate my motives in making this informal demarche through you to your government, and I know that I can count on your personal support.”2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1361. Confidential; Priority.↩
- Telegram 1770 to USUN, March 21, suggested that Stevenson reply either orally or in writing that the United States would continue its support for U.N. operations in the Congo and that it agreed with Hammarskjöld’s view of the U.N. purpose in the Congo. Stevenson should point out orally to Hammarskjöld that the United States had sought to reinforce U.N. actions “through every diplomatic means at its disposal,” but there could be no substitute for direct relations between Congolese officials and U.N. officials who enjoyed their trust and confidence. (Ibid.)↩