Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, March 12, 1961, 2 p.m.

1894. Department pass to military concerned. Carlucci² returned from Stanleyville last night:

1. Although situation Orientale outside Stanleyville has deteriorated practically into chaos, Lundula,³ aided by Gizenga has performed miracle in keeping order in Stanleyville following Lumumba death. Lumumba, Gizenga Chief Cabinet said Army so excited it almost turned against authorities when they exercised control. At least 3,000 of 8,800 soldiers on payroll now reasonably responsive orders of Lundula. Only serious incidents were arrest one European and wife yesterday and shooting Songolo group. Latter done by Salumu who then forced into hiding. He is now back. Authorities proudly and correctly point to fact that no one in UN camp at Stanleyville and that they have never attacked UN.

2. There are four centers political power.

(A) Lundula who now worshiped by Europeans and is almost too moderate and reasonable for Stanleyville.

(B) Gizenga and PSA group who have inherited going machine. Danger is that they “foreigners” to Stanleyville and over period time their position could weaken.

(C) Gbenye,⁴ Minister Interior in Gizenga Government and heir to Lumumba [as MNC?] President. Gbenye has support MNC youth group which has been chief trouble-making element. Gbenye is a potentially dangerous vindictive stupid racist.

(D) Provincial government which according Manzikala “has had enough of this central government and their friends who promise aid which never comes.” Whereas other three elements still work harmoniously Manzikala is struggling to get out from under. Trouble is he lacks strength and greatly lost face when Gizenga stopped him from proceeding Tananarive.

3. Financial situation now critical. Provincial government can not pay March salaries and Lundula will have difficult time paying troops. Far from producing change in political orientation continuance of blockade more likely result in downfall of moderates like Lundula and Manzikala and lead Stanleyville into chaos which will take years to repair. Chief sufferers will be Europeans.

4. Although they do not like UN and told Embassy Officer UN has deceived us by not using our money through entire Congo, Gizenga and company have decided as matter of policy to cooperate with UN. Gizenga recognizes authority chief state and told Embassy Officer he only wished Kasavubu would act as chief state for entire country and stop starving own people. While he might be willing attend conference on what he considers “neutral” territory (not Tananarive) Gizenga stated solution can come only through Parliament. He gave word of honor he would attend session if security assured, and if voted out, he would take position in opposition.

5. Reputable source reports parachute drops of ammunition at Komba on February 17 at 2200; and a landing at Banalia of a DC–3, possibly with UN markings, at 1600 on February 28. Cargo probably ammunition. Rumors of three Russians training army unconfirmed.

6. Despite above, which amounts to very little aid, authorities have made clear to bloc journalists they could not ensure their security, they have chased out one Greek Communist and jailed another, have placed extremist Kashamura under house arrest, and released moderate Weregemere. Three Yugoslav journalists presently in Stanleyville are discouraged and wish depart. All authorities Stanleyville claim no foreign influence exists in Stanleyville and that, in contrast to Kasavubu and Tshombe they are truly neutral. Lubuma offered take Embassy Officer on tour military camp to prove no foreign instructors present.

7. Most amazing change is attitude toward US. Carlucci who three weeks ago was labeled a spy was given red carpet treatment. Lubuma rushed to greet him and talked for four hours, Gizenga saw him privately for over hour and organized reception his house attended by General Lundula, six key members Gizenga Government and two members provincial Government. Courtesy was overwhelming although frank three hour discussion did include criticism US policy. All emphasized they not Communists and appealed for US understanding and aid. Even Gbenye asked for help.

8. Obvious inference is that entire group has become disillusioned with Russian promises which never materialized. Recognition was not even followed by Russian delegation and so far no country has sent Embassy recognizing Gizenga Government. Thus they emphasize that they are honest, clean living neutrals who trying restore order and will accept aid from anyone. Danger exists Russia might step up aid since UN withdrawing troops from Paulis and Bunia thus leaving major airfields unguarded.

9. This appears to be opportunity which should be siezed immediately. Probably three weeks exist before present picture changes. Need for medical supplies urgent. I intend ask Léopoldville authorities make offer supply medicine and we may have to back them up with stocks and transport. I will also take up plan with Abbas today.⁵ If GOC here makes public announcement they sending up medical supplies this could stimulate breakthrough on unifying country. In this connection believe we should start now to get one aircraft and medical supplies ready to bring to Léopoldville under UN auspieces. Thus while we do work GOC here will get credit. This should be done this week if possible.

Carlucci will proceed Stanleyville in advance to ensure security of aircraft and cargo.

Timberlake

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1261. Limited Official Use; Niact. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.
2. Second Secretary and Consul at the Embassy in Léopoldville Frank C. Carlucci III.
3. Victor Lundula, commander of the armed forces in Orientale and Kivu.
4. Christophe Gbenye.
5. Timberlake reported in telegram 1895, March 12, that he had discussed this with Abbas and McKeown, both of whom favored the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1261)/