Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, March 16, 1961, 5:34 p.m.

1997. It occurs to Department recent developments, including Dayal’s absence,² Tananarive Conference³ and better attitude on part Gizenga and his followers, give us opportunity take certain steps which might further improve atmosphere. These would include:

1. GOC should be as forthcoming as possible in its negotiations with UN on return of Matadi and Banana.

2. Kasavubu should publicly reiterate his offer to accept a UN training program for the Congolese.

3. Kasavubu might publicly appeal to the leadership of Orientale and Kivu (if any) to send representative next round-table conference. He might be able enhance his position as chief of state by offering meet privately with rebel leadership in advance of next conference. If rebel leaders fear their physical safety, he could request UN sponsorship and protection.

4. GOC should publicly offer send non-strategic supplies such as food and medical equipment to Orientale as foreshadowed urtel 1877.⁴

5. McEoin should be encouraged urgently enter negotiations with General Lundula to secure agreement bring his forces under UN control. Financial lever may be useful in bringing present leadership to terms.

6. Pursuant SC February 21 resolution we must support UN opposition to Mobutu’s reported offensive. We realize these reported offensives may be journalistic embellishments but they attract great attention here and do not help case of GOC in UN.

7. Withdrawal of Belgian advisors should be accelerated and be well publicized from your end.

8. Kasavubu’s cooperation should be sought re inducing Congolese public opinion accept Indian troops although we agree of course heavy concentration these troops in Léopoldville most undesirable and possibly Kasavubu should be assured we are using our influence to avoid this if possible. FYI. If tension increases in Léopoldville, we would explore with SYG possibility bringing Indian troops into Luluabourg instead of Léopoldville and deploying them from there. In view Tshombe’s reaction reported Elisabethville Tel 624⁵ use of Kamina this purpose appears unwise but should be kept in mind if situation changes. Same could apply to Stanleyville. End FYI. (Sending you separately SYG aide-memoire on Congolese acceptance Indian troops⁶ and hope you will do what you can along lines he suggests.)

9. Kasavubu might be told US welcomes results Tananarive Conference and congratulates Congolese on success of this important first step. From our point of view, however, Congolese case would be considerably stronger if they would in future omit critical statements regarding Security Council Resolution⁷ and emphasize their efforts induce all Congolese leaders take part in new confederation.

Department transmits foregoing merely as general guidelines and you should feel free use your discretion in discussing them with Kasavubu, Ileo, Abbas, and Belgians. Your comments would be appreciated.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.49/3–1661. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Ferguson and Buffum, cleared by Wallner, and approved by Penfield. Repeated to USUN and Brussels.
2. Dayal was in New York.
3. Kasavubu, Ileo, Tshombe, Kalonji, and other Congolese Government representatives and provincial authorities met March 8–12 at Tananarive, Malagasy Republic. The communique, which they issued on March 12, announced that the Congo would form a confederation of states with Kasavubu as President. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 796–797.
4. Dated March 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–861)
5. Telegram 624, March 16, reported a conversation with Georges Dumontet, the new U.N. representative in Katanga. Tshombe had given Dumontet a note containing a statement that if U.S. aircraft transported Indian troops to the Congo, the Katangan government would recommend to the U.S. Consul at Elisabethville the evacuation of American families from Katanga. (Ibid., 332.70G/3–1661)
6. Telegram 1991 to Léopoldville, March 14, repeated telegram 2447 from USUN (Document 49), which transmitted Hammarskjöld’s letter. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1461)
7. Resolution No. 5 adopted by the Tananarive Conference called the February 21 Security Council resolution “inapplicable and unacceptable.” Telegram 2038 from Léopoldville, March 18, transmitted the texts of the conference resolutions. (Ibid., 770G.00/3–1861)