Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

47. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 4 p.m.

2145. Congo. When I brought up subject of Congo, Khrushchev remarked US knew USSR considered UN guilty of Lumumba’s death and Hammarskjöld personally responsible and accordingly thought it necessary reorganize UN. I then covered points Deptel 1403.²

Khrushchev replied they considered Kasavubu had sent Lumumba to Katanga, that Tshombe had killed him with Hammarskjöld’s connivance, and all three men guilty and should be tried. He said international organization must be organization for peace, but UN has been used to oppress peoples and help colonialists retain colonies. He said USSR cannot support organization which assists colonialists, who are not only Belgians but also those who oppose struggle for liberation. He said USSR would not recognize Hammarskjöld and would ignore him. I replied we were not always satisfied with UN decisions either but for different reasons. We thought it wise to keep cold war out of Africa and we still think it possible achieve unified and independent Congo, although it would take time.

Khrushchev replied that in Congo Parliament had been elected, govt created, and this govt should have been supported. When it had asked UN for assistance, UN had sent troops and aid, but had arrested Lumumba, and Hammarskjöld had gone to Katanga instead of seeing Lumumba.³

I interjected to point out that when Hammarskjöld was in Katanga, Lumumba had already been dismissed by Kasavubu.⁴ Khrushchev answered Kasavubu did not have right to dismiss Lumumba since only Parliament had that competence. He asked how socialist states could support a policy of assistance to those who betray own people. He said policy of UN is policy of colonialists and that USSR would struggle against this policy with all its means. He said US and USSR had different positions on this question and prospects were not exactly bright. He said US has been banner of democratic bourgeois freedom but now unfortunately it has shown it does not support popular movements. He said he did not know what policy President would follow, but in fact policy of US in UN has not undergone any change. He said our positions are completely contradictory.

I acknowledged we seemed be very far apart on this question.

Later in our discussions Khrushchev again brought up question of changing UN machinery to prevent what has happened in Congo from occurring again. He said perhaps in future US would have minority position in UN like Soviet position at present time. He said UN is not parliament where decisions are made by majority. He said decision to provide veto for major powers had been wise one, because if major powers not in agreement decision could be imposed only by war. Referring to his proposal for three UN secretaries—“yours,” “ours,” and “neutrals”—he asked is that really bad? He said better to take no decision if one side is opposed.

I said I thought it was possible to have objectivity in Secretariat which would be loyal to organization rather than to any country. I said we had been disappointed in some UN decisions and had thought Hammarskjöld had supported other side. I said we accepted idea of organization not tied politically to any one. Such organization would be most important in event of any complete disarmament, since veto power would paralyze organization.

Khrushchev replied UN one-sided organization for US at present and they did not want UN to become organization for USSR, but desired truly international organ. If our side had Secretary-General, he asked, could you rely on us? He then said perhaps there is different way to prevent any side from suffering harm to its interests.

I agreed we must preserve veto right in Security Council, but pointed out Secretariat does not make policy, only executes it. I said if organization could not act because of lack agreement among three secretaries, organization would lose its value. I said for example suppose Secretariat were given some specific task such as supervising carrying out of an agreement on disarmament. If one side decided to cheat it could block inspection. Khrushchev got point but answered that such inspection would be the right of all. He then said that had there been three UN secretaries, perhaps in Congo there would be new govt, but one legally established, and Lumumba would still be alive. UN had become instrument not for peace but for inflaming of passions. I replied we did not agree on facts, yet we thought there is hope for settlement in Congo since nothing in situation there is basic to US or Soviet interests.

Khrushchev said you have your Belgian allies. I replied we did not claim Belgians have always acted well and we would be prepared bring pressure on them. Khrushchev at this point said it was clear we were in full disagreement on Congo and changed subject.

Comment: Noteworthy that throughout discussion Khrushchev referred to internal Congo situation only in terms of past and refrained from any mention of possible patterns for settlement there. He seemed particularly bitter about Tshombe, whom he characterized as stooge of Belgian mining monopoly.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Telegram 1403 to Moscow set forth U.S. views on the Congo, which the Ambassador should cover in an upcoming conversation with Khrushchev: 1) all military and para-military assistance to the Congo should be provided through the United Nations, and the United States would do its best to see that no other aid was provided to any faction in the Congo from any source; 2) the United Nations offered the best hope of an acceptable solution to the Congo problem, but if it did not succeed, the United States would have to review its position; 3) Kasavubu’s dismissal of Lumumba was legal, but a successor government would need Parliamentary approval and the Parliament should therefore meet at an early date; 4) Hammarskjöld had full U.S. confidence and support; and 5) all political prisoners should be released once the United Nations could guarantee their personal safety. (Ibid., 770G.00/2–2861)
3. Reference is to Hammarskjöld’s visit to the Congo August 11–15, 1960. He did not see Prime Minister Lumumba but accompanied the first U.N. troops into Elisabethville on August 12.
4. Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba on September 5, 1960.