418. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy1
SUBJECT
- UN Troop Withdrawals from the Congo
You have asked if there is any action which should be taken to slow up the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Congo given the somewhat ominous news from Katanga.2Such action is not possible since all but a support group of the Indian forces have already left the Congo.
The departure of Indian troops has been partly offset by the arrival of 1,600 additional Indonesians. The UN’s total Congo force is now 13,360 men. Troop repatriations and rotations scheduled for April will [Page 848] reduce this to 11,560 by the end of the month. There are no known UN plans for further troop withdrawals for May or June. Therefore, action to limit UN withdrawals does not appear immediately necessary as the UN force level through April 30 appears sufficiently high to meet general security needs in Katanga.
While there have been a number of recent incidents, some involving Europeans, acts of violence have been characteristic of the Congo’s history, and some can unfortunately be expected whatever the UN’s force levels. In addition, while there are disturbing reports of the continued presence of Tshombe’s mercenaries and military equipment in Northern Rhodesia and Angola, there are no organized rebel or bandit groups known to be active in the Congo at present.
We may well be confronted with a problem of maintaining an adequate force beyond the middle of this year. The UN is still in the process of assessing what the minimum requirements will be, with General Kebede in the Congo insisting he needs at least 10,000 men, while the UN Secretariat is considering reduction to approximately 6,000 because of the precarious financial situation in which the Organization finds itself. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that a minimum of 8,000 troops are required. The extra 2,000 men recommended by the Joint Chiefs would raise the estimated cost of a 6,000 man UN force from about $5 million to $5.5 million a month.
The degree and extent to which the UN force can safely be reduced is, of course, directly dependent on the degree of progress in the retraining field. We are pressing for the early beginning of the ANC retraining program. The Secretary General, apparently influenced by African members of the Congo Advisory Committee, has been reluctant to endorse a program administered and paid for by individual nations under a UN coordinating staff. We are seeking to overcome this reluctance by representations to African countries both directly and through the Congolese Government.
Finally, as you know, the financial problem is critical. Funds even for the 6,000 troop minimum are not yet on the horizon. We are continuing to take a very hard line that, at this juncture, the US contribution to operations in the Congo should be no more than our proportion of the regular assessed budget, which is 32.02%, and we are pressing for others to pay their arrearages and purchase more bonds. The Special GA Session on financing Congo and Middle East operations will open on May 14. We will forward to you our recommendations in this regard by about mid April at which time we will have a clearer picture of what other members have done to reduce arrearages and purchase bonds.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was taken from the President’s weekend reading dated April 11.↩
- An April 1 memorandum from Kennedy to Rusk reads as follows: “The news is somewhat ominous from Katanga. Is there any action we should take to slow up the withdrawal of Indian troops until the Congolese are in a position to maintain order?” (Ibid.) Telegram 3565 from USUN, March 29, reported that Bunche had told Yost of a report that “possible fourth round in Katanga in making.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 The Congo)↩