417. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with the President on The Congo, Monday, March 25, 1963, 4:00 p.m., Cabinet Room
PRESENT
- The President; Mr. George McGhee, Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Ambassador Edmund A. Gullion, Mr. Robert West, Chief, U.S. AID Mission, Léopoldville, Gov. G. Mennen Williams, Mr. Edmond Hutchinson, Mr. Bronson Tweedy; Mr. Paul Nitze, Lt. Colonel Don P. Bolton; Mr. Carl Kaysen
Ambassador Gullion reviewed our achievements and problems in the Congo. We ended Katangese secession at a surprisingly low cost in lives, property damage and our relations with Belgium and Britain. If we compare our present position with the prospects in December on all these scores, it looks good indeed. On the other hand, the victory has not been complete. Tshombe is still hankering after secession. There are 8,000 armed gendarmerie still on the loose who have been paid for some months in advance. There is the problem of keeping the UN troops in the Congo in sufficient force to hold the country together. Adoula’s political position is weak, and he has been unable to capitalize on our victory. Local pocketbook issues have been much more important in working against Adoula than the end of secession has been in working for him. The situation has improved in the last week, but the question of whether Adoula can make the necessary accommodations with his opposition to survive remains open. It is very important that the U.S. give aid rapidly now in order to help overcome the economic problems, and thus save Adoula. There are no alternatives to keeping Adoula or someone close to him in power. We have examined them all, and none are appealing.
Ambassador Gullion suggested that Generals Prem Chand and Noronha, the Indian troop leaders who won the Katangese victory be received by the President since they will be returning to India via the United States. (The President indicated no reaction.)
Governor Williams reported on the talks with the Belgians over this weekend.2 They agree with our basic political assessment and our desire [Page 846] that aid be conducted under UN cover, but be sufficiently bilateral in substance so that we can be sure it is effective.
Mr. Cleveland talked about the problems of the UN troops in the Congo. Rikhye at UN New York wants to move down to 6,000 troops by 1 July. Our own estimate, on which both Léopoldville and the JCS agree, is that a minimum of 8,000 are needed to maintain order. The cost difference would amount to some $3 million over the remaining six months of the year.
Mr. Cleveland also discussed the problem of the UN’s desire for African participation in the training, and Adoula and Mobutu’s unwillingness to have it. On economic matters, Mr. Cleveland said that we had reached a fair degree of agreement on the total and the shares, with an arrangement for a UN clearance mechanism to deter Bloc aid. Ambassador Gullion was skeptical of contributions other than the U.S. and Belgian. He thought the EEC might well do nothing for a year, and he was not sure the Belgians would be politically able to meet the commitments they had made. The President stated that under no circumstances should we give more than 1/2, and Mr. Cleveland and Ambassador Gullion agreed.
Mr. West reviewed the domestic and economic picture in the Congo with emphasis on the integration problems. The President and Mr. West discussed the export potential of the Congo, which should reach $450 million a year, in two years. It was now less than $200 million. The need for aid to permit industries to get up to full capacity was clear. When they did, the country could be self-sufficient.
The President returned to the question of what we do if U Thant refuses to allow the UN to play a role in the troop training program we have requested. Mr. Cleveland responded that we might have to organize a Western cartel of ourselves, the Belgians, Italians, and Norwegians, and deal directly with the Congo Government on this basis. This raised the question of how we contain bloc offers without a UN cover. Mr. Cleveland said that we would know in a week whether or not we had to face this problem.
The President asked further about Tshombe and his attitude toward integration. Ambassador Gullion responded that he was at best giving lip service to it. The great problem for us and the Central Government was how to get ANC troops in operation in the Katanga. Even now, the border at Dillola is not under Congo or UN control. There are now at most 3,000 acceptable troops in the ANC, and even these could not be left loose in the Katanga on their own. It was urgent that training get started.
In response to a question by Mr. McGhee, Ambassador Gullion said that Tshombe was awaiting the opportunity to re-create secession, and [Page 847] he himself would prefer not to deal with Tshombe if we could avoid it. The President asked how we should move in respect to other countries on the problem of economic aid. Mr. Cleveland responded that the next step was to get a firm program in Léopoldville for the rest of 1963 and 1964, indicating requirements and tentatively assigning sources. If the UN approved, we would use this as a sales document in approaching other donors.
The President then raised the question of whether it was desirable for him to receive Sir Roy Welensky. After some discussion, Mr. McGhee agreed that he would get a recommendation.
Governor Williams raised the question of a Presidential Unit Citation for the Air Force Transport Unit in Léopoldville which had run the biggest airlift in our history without a single accident. The President asked Mr. Nitze to report to him on this problem.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Congo, February–July 1963. Confidential. Drafted by Kaysen; his handwritten notes of the meeting are filed with the source text.↩
- Reference is to talks held March 21–22 in Washington with Rothschild and Davignon on Congolese issues. Telegram 1459 to Léopoldville, March 22, outlined the facts concerning the talks. (Department of State, Central Files, POL The Congo) Circular telegrams 1640 and 1642, March 22 and 23, summarized the conclusions. (Ibid., E 1–1 The Congo)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩