419. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Congo (Gullion) to President Kennedy 1

SUBJECT

  • US Action re Congo in Next Three to Four Months

In response to your request, I submit the following suggestions with respect to US policy in the Congo in the next three to four months.

1. Adoula Government

In the absence of acceptable alternatives we should continue to support Adoula but should press him to carry out measures we have already urged on him to unify the country, improve internal security, curb inflation, fight unemployment, and check corruption. We can help him in the formation of a new political party, the unification of the labor movement and the creation of a loyal and effective propaganda apparatus and the development of public works projects. If necessary, we should support the Adoula Government in taking strong measures to deal with an irresponsible Parliament.

2. The Army

As the UN force is removed, the Congolese army cannot reliably take its place. Highest priority in the Congo must go to army reform. We should push the UN to accept responsibility for coordinating military assistance but if the UN still balks a multilateral training effort by reliable nations should nevertheless be put into effect immediately.

3. UN Forces

The UN plans to reduce its forces to 6,000 by July 1. The US should strenuously oppose this reduction not only in discussion with the UN but also with contributing nations. As a minimum we should press for an 8,000 man force. This means the US will probably have to finance the extra 2,000 troops in spite of the position previously taken by us in a UN-[Page 850]finance committee that we would not contribute more than 32.02% to UN peace-keeping operations.

4. Police

The Congolese police and surete must be reorganized and redeployed throughout the Congo and an American survey mission is now preparing a precise estimate of needs. Police instructors will be supplied by other nations and the US should supply logistical support.

5. Economic Aid

The Congo will require approximately $150 million of external aid for each of the next two years. We have made it clear to the Belgians and others that our contribution cannot be more than 50%. The Belgians agree to consider an import assistance program in addition to technical assistance. In my own opinion, however, it is doubtful that as much as $75 million to match our contribution will be forthcoming from other donors, e.g. the European Economic Community, Belgium, Germany, the UK.

Financial stabilization and economic recovery in the Congo cannot be achieved without expanded technical assistance programs. High priority must be given to the provision of an adequate number of technicians in the Congolese ministries and provinces. The UN has had difficulty in recruiting adequate numbers of qualified personnel and we should assist it in every way possible.

6. Economic Aid Coordination

Coordination by the UN is preferable to uncoordinated bilateral assistance not only to provide a rational program but also to make it more difficult for the bloc to initiate substantial activities in the Congo. We appear to be reaching agreement with the Belgians, the UN, and the Congolese upon the necessary mechanisms.

7. Katanga

So long as Tshombe lives, Katanga separatism is not dead. Nevertheless withdrawal of Belgian support for secession robs it of sustenance. The Katanga gendarmerie remains a threat to internal security. To meet this threat the following actions should be taken:

(a)
The most reliable three battalions in the Congolese National Army should be permitted to move into Katanga. This movement could lead to clashes and incidents but without it it is difficult to see how integration of the country can be secured or how the Adoula Government could maintain its position. We should insist that the Congolese and the UN take every feasible precaution to reduce the risks, including, if possible, UN command, mixed patrols and judicious interposition of UN forces between ANC forces and population centers.
(b)
The UN should be urged to give an accounting of its mandate with respect to dispersal and expulsion of mercenaries, disposition of arms and registration of former Katangese troops.
(c)
The remaining border posts on the Angola-Katanga frontier should be promptly garrisoned by UN troops (i.e. Swedes).
(d)
Civic retraining and vocational placement plans should be put into effect for the discharged gendarmerie.

8. Angola

Tshombe has troops, some aircraft, and money in Angola and has secretly consulted with Portuguese authorities in Angola. The US should develop all the information it can about this situation and take appropriate means to block any Portuguese assistance to renewed secession. If there is any renewed attempt at secession we should support the UN in suppressing it.

Edmund A. Gullion
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Confidential. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was taken from the President’s weekend reading dated April 11. Filed as an attachment to a memorandum from Kaysen to the President, which was also attached to Document 418. Kaysen noted that decisions as to whether to finance 2,000 extra U.N. troops and whether to provide additional support for retraining the Congolese Army were not immediately necessary and commented that he thought Gullion was unduly pessimistic about the economic aid available to the Congo from other countries.