416. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Present Problems in the Congo: Information Memorandum
Despite some encouraging results from the events of December and January in Katanga, a number of important and difficult problems relating to the Congo remain. The Cleveland Report outlined many of the long-range economic and financial problems, and this memorandum is an effort to identify some of the more important short-range problems [Page 840] that are now outstanding. While there has been substantial improvement on many fronts, the basic problems—public disorder, political and economic instability, the possibility of a Bloc-oriented government, and Soviet intervention—which were responsible for the original large-scale US involvement in the Congo are still threats to the unity and stability of the Congo.
1. Public Relations
The events of December–January seem to have led to a public and Congressional impression that the Congo problem is now solved. This misunderstanding is very likely to cause difficulties for us during the next several months, particularly with the Congress as some of the problems mentioned in the following paragraphs become front-page news.
2. Retraining of the Congolese Army (ANC)
The ANC is not now capable of maintaining minimum standards of internal security in the Congo. To the extent that the ANC must assume responsibility for the maintenance of public order as the result of withdrawal of UN forces, we can anticipate public disorders that will undoubtedly involve Europeans and perhaps affect the ability of European-run enterprises to continue to function normally. There have already been some incidents in Elisabethville following the introduction of the ANC into that city. Such incidents will undoubtedly be exploited by Adoula’s opponents in the Congo and by the opponents of the US–UN policy outside of the Congo.
We are encouraged by the Belgian Government’s readiness to send 150–200 officers to the Congo to assist in retraining of the ANC. We have hopes that arrangements for implementing the Greene Plan can be completed in the immediate future. Implementation of the Greene Plan, and the reduction in number of the total manpower of the ANC that it envisages, is important not only for the creation of a disciplined army but also to relieve the Government of the Congo of a critical financial and inflationary burden.
3. Withdrawal and Reduction of United Nations Military Forces
The importance of retraining the ANC is of course related to the withdrawal and reduction of UN military forces. If the UN force is reduced or withdrawn before the ANC can be converted into a disciplined and reliable force, lack of internal security and public disorders may become problems throughout the Congo which will be beyond the capacity of the small mobile force the UN is now planning. In addition, such a premature reduction or withdrawal of the UN force could conceivably lead to a renewed attempt at secession in Katanga. Only a small fraction of the total 19,000 Katangan gendarmes have turned in their weapons and joined the ANC. Most of the remainder are still in the bush with [Page 841] their weapons and remain a threat to public order and, ultimately, even to the unity of the Congo.
Against the background of this difficult and dangerous situation the Soviet Union, in a letter to the Secretary-General on March 3,2 asked for the immediate withdrawal of all UN forces from the Congo on the ground that their function there had been completed and that their further presence was an infringement on Congolese sovereignty. This theme has since been repeated by Ghana and Cairo radio’s Voice of Africa is broadcasting it all over Africa. (“The new Soviet proposal provides a glimpse of hope to leave Congo to its sons, who are capable of running the Congo today.”)
The Soviet initiative has been followed by Ethiopia notifying the Secretary-General that it wishes to withdraw three of its four battalions within the next ten days. Ghana has also hinted at the withdrawal of its troops, and we understand the Swedes are considering a reduction in their contribution. If these unanticipated withdrawals should take place in addition to the anticipated complete withdrawals of the Tunisian and Indian combat troops, they might well snowball into drastic withdrawals of other contingents. As the apparent threat of civil war recedes and major troop contingents are withdrawn, governments that still have troop contingents in the Congo will find it increasingly difficult to justify their continued retention for many of the same reasons that brought US troops home from Europe at the end of World War II.
The problem of the withdrawal of UN forces is of course related to the problem of financing UN peacekeeping operations, which is now being considered by the Committee of Twenty-One in New York. The UN has just advised us that it plans to cut UN forces to approximately 6,000 by July 1, 1963. Such a drastic cut is undoubtedly motivated by financial considerations and the Secretary-General’s skepticism about being able to pay for a larger force during FY ’64. Another factor that is relevant to this financial problem is the concern that is being expressed by Afro-Asian representatives in New York about continuing large UN expenditures in the Congo which are not matched by similar expenditures in other parts of Afro-Asia.
4. Soviet and Related Initiatives
The Soviet Union’s efforts to achieve withdrawal of UN military forces from the Congo will probably be pursued through established propaganda channels, as Cairo radio’s broadcasts indicate.
The Soviet Union has also undoubtedly encouraged Ghana in its call for a Security Council meeting to discuss the report of the UN Commission [Page 842] that was appointed to investigate Lumumba’s murder.3 As you will recall, the report suggests the possible implication of members of the central government, as well as the Katanga government, in Lumumba’s death. Such a discussion in the Security Council at this time could only serve to embarrass the Adoula government (and its Western supporters) and to strengthen the Gizenga-led left-wing opposition in the Congo.
5. Reconvening of the Congolese Parliament
Parliament was scheduled to reconvene on March 4. Insufficient numbers of Parliamentarians have as yet arrived in Léopoldville to constitute a quorum, but a quorum will undoubtedly be obtained within the next week or so. It is anticipated that the opposition will quickly obtain a simple majority. The efforts of the Soviet Union and Ghana, described in the preceding paragraph, to effect withdrawal of UN military forces in the Congo will undoubtedly be used by the opposition in Parliament for a renewed attack on the Adoula government. The opposition will argue that the ANC is capable of maintaining order in Katanga and preventing new secession, that the UN’s job in the Congo has been completed, and that the further presence of UN troops is an infringement on Congolese sovereignty. It will also argue that the central government’s amnesty to Katangans should be extended to Gizenga, since Gizenga did nothing worse or different than Tshombe. Such arguments will no doubt strike a responsive chord with many Congolese.
The Parliament will also reflect the distress among the Congolese people which results from the financial crisis (which is described at length in the Cleveland Report), the current shortage of food and consumer goods in many parts of the Congo, and the disappointed expectation that independence would bring prosperity. The Adoula government which has until now been preoccupied with the Katanga problem will have to bear the brunt of the criticism that these economic ills are generating. Hopefully, the Government will be able, with the help of the UN, the US, Belgium, and others, to mount crash programs that will relieve the situation and give promise of long-range solutions to these problems. Meantime, however, we should expect that Adoula’s Parliamentary opposition will exploit this situation.
The record of the Congolese Parliament is one of dangerous irresponsibility and incompetence. In order to be able to deal with it and control its more extreme adventures, Adoula needs to broaden the base of his government and, if possible, shunt Parliament off onto some special task (e.g., drafting a constitution). Unless such temporary palliatives are achieved, so long as Parliament remains in session, the continuation [Page 843] of moderate government and Western presence in the Congo is constantly endangered.
6. Situation in Katanga
It is impossible to predict whether another attempt at secession will or will not be made in Katanga. We do know that virtually all of the Katanga gendarmerie have disappeared into the bush, and we have reports that they remain in organized units and some apparently do not lack for weapons or money. We also have unconfirmed reports of the storage of numbers of aircraft (30) and other weapons across the border in Angola. On the other hand, many mercenaries have departed and, it is fair to assume, many gendarmes have dispersed and returned to their villages.
It is difficult to say what military adventures may be possible if the UN troops are reduced to such an extent that they no longer represent a clearly superior fighting force in Katanga. Contrary to the great concern expressed by our military attaches in the Congo, the UN military does not seem greatly concerned over the possible threat posed by the large numbers of Katangan gendarmes in the bush. Our attaches believe this lack of concern is related to the fact that General Prem Chand has been primarily concerned with the orderly departure of his Indian troops and that the UN has no other qualified military observer on the scene.
It is likely, however, that Tshombe (who is reportedly returning to the Congo this week) will be able to challenge the central government effectively on a number of issues. Further, if the ANC is involved in any incidents of public disorder, such incidents will be exploited by Tshombe’s propaganda apparatus in order to weaken the central government. (It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that Struelens has told the Board of Immigration Appeals that he does not intend to close his office before the end of March, that is, not before the withdrawal of the Indian and Tunisian troops.)
Tshombe may again make an alliance with the opposition (which includes the left tribal elements that advocate confederalism, etc.) for the purpose of attacking the Adoula government. If Adoula’s authority in Katanga can be successfully challenged, his government may well fall, and in the chaos that follows Katanga may make another attempt at secession just as it did during the chaos following independence.
Other political problems in Katanga pose a real dilemma for the central government. If Katanga remains divided into two provinces, Tshombe will undoubtedly be able to remain in power in South Katanga since it is populated almost entirely by his Lunda tribe. On the other hand, if the two provinces are reunited into the old province of Katanga it is not at all certain that the Lundas and the Lubas will remain in opposition to each other and thus it is not certain that Tshombe would be [Page 844] ousted in even this event. Moreover, if the two provinces are reunited, Katanga would become the most powerful province in the Congo.
7. Congo-Belgian Relations
We welcome the rapprochement that appears to have occurred between the Congolese and Belgian Governments and the spirit of close cooperation that is reflected in the recent Spaak-Adoula communique.4 Adoula’s visit to Brussels and our information as to what transpired there reflect once again that Adoula is our best hope for a moderate leader in the Congo and one who is committed to running his government in ways that are consistent with the basic objectives of the West. Nevertheless, the appearance of overly close cooperation by Adoula with the Belgians could be politically disadvantageous to Adoula at home, but Prime Minister Spaak is aware of this problem and the dangers to Adoula that can come from embracing him too tightly.
8. Aid Problems
As the Cleveland Report makes clear, the Congo is a potentially rich country and, given massive aid and technical assistance for the next two years or so, can become self-sustaining. We are making every effort to get Belgium and other countries to increase their share of this aid. Our own contribution must, nevertheless, be substantial. We anticipate difficulty in the Congress on this issue, not only from those whose primary concern is with aid programs generally, but also from those Congressmen who evidenced a great interest in the Katanga issue and who considered Tshombe the most reliable bastion against communism in central Africa. Because of their views on the Katanga issue, many of them can be expected to oppose appropriations for support of UN operations in the Congo or for aid to the central government. By so doing they will place us in a dilemma for, if from the US, Belgium and others aid is not forthcoming in substantial quantities, Adoula’s government may not be able to stand the strain and the door to intervention by the Soviet Union may thus be opened, thereby proving the arguments of those who have opposed our policy toward the Congo.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 The Congo. Confidential. Drafted by Ford. The source text bears the handwritten dates “3/7/63” and “3/8/63.”↩
- For text of the letter, dated March 2, see U.N. doc. S/5249; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 659–661.↩
- For text of Ghana’s March 4 letter, see U.N. doc. S/5253.↩
- Transmitted in telegram 1324 from Brussels, February 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 The Congo)↩