Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

406. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Consulate in Elisabethville¹

Léopoldville, January 9, 1963, 8 p.m.

931. Policy—Congo. Re: Eville’s 1160.²

1. I think your absence in Jadotville during return of Tshombe was prudent and is windfall for us.

2. Strongly concur that Tshombe’s press statement is merely warmed over Tshombe.

3. Tshombe’s intentions including his desire “to establish administration”, cope with refugees, consider UN “terms” and return to Kolwezi for Cabinet meeting, are completely unrealistic and fall short of the categoric and immediate renunciation of sabotage, resistance to UN movement, and support of mercenaries which might save Tshombe. There is nothing in Tshombe’s remarks which will detain the UN and GOC an instant in execution of next stage of their movements.

4. Re your draft statement, concur that these are just the things on which assurance from Tshombe is needed. Dept may decide to instruct us differently, but I would vastly prefer that American Consul make no communication to Tshombe and that these assurances be extorted by the GOC, “a third party” or volunteered by Tshombe as a result of hitherto unproductive counseling of a Frenkiel.

5. We have so far walked a difficult tight rope with our NATO allies, UN and GOC and may get home free without getting in bad faith position with any. GOC does not connect us with Tshombe save and allies do not seem to grudge fact that GOC makes a distinction in spite of efforts paralleling theirs. On basis my conversation today with Bunche there seems at least a meager possibility that such declarations from Tshombe could be secured by Belgians or British and I think this would be better for us.

6. Would like to note, however, my concern that any approaches to Tshombe at the present time may play his game. Although in accordance with Dept’s instructions I have vigorously urged on Bunche a “third party formula”,³ UN thinks even this tends to set up Tshombe as an “interlocuteur valuable”, a position which he does not deserve and for which he may no longer qualify by being able to do what is expected of him, i.e. stop sabotage and control his men. (Bunche said he thought UMHK had at least as much influence over mercenaries as Tshombe. Would be interested in what you think.)

7. The situation is one in which I hope thinking men may differ but if the price of preventing damage to Kolwezi installations were to turn out to be return to Tshombe of his power to do harm, to frustrate will of legal govt, and Govt. of Belgium and of all nations in UN, to humiliate and defeat the UN; and to make the center of Africa ripe for radical leadership, then I think I would prefer to see Kolwezi damaged. (I hope that the alternatives are not exclusive.)

8. Finally, I have no reason to doubt GOB which says that UMHK reports gendarmes are in control of Kolwezi, but would point out that sabotage of UMHK installations does not so far seem to be on the announced scale. Would be interested in your continuing reports on sabotage possibilities and proportion of UMHK output and investment located at Kolwezi.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–963. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1764, received at 5:03 p.m., which is the source text.
2. In telegram 1160, January 9, Dean reported that he had been in Jadotville the previous day and had played no role in Tshombe’s return to Elisabethville. He commented that Tshombe’s press statement issued the previous day (see footnote 2, Document 405) fell short of U.N. requirements and reported that according to Tshombe’s Belgian advisers, Tshombe intended to “reestablish administrative services,” to wait for a few days to receive U.N. “terms,” and then return to Kolwezi to discuss them with his ministers. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–963)
3. In telegram 1160, Dean suggested the outline of a letter that he might send to Tshombe if the Department wanted him to obtain assurances from Tshombe that he was abandoning his earlier threats of sabotage and resistance to U.N. freedom of movement. Dean indicated, however, that he thought a U.N. letter would be preferable.