Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

405. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, January 8, 1963, 6:59 p.m.

1054. Re: USUN’s 2632.² We have been unable persuade SYG to instruct his representatives in the Congo to take initiative in talking to Tshombe in Elisabethville unless latter has previously made a statement giving up his scorched earth policy and permitting the UN freedom of movement. However, after representations we and Belgians made to him this morning, he has now urged Bunche to find formula whereby UN would contact Tshombe after receiving assurances from him via third party that he would cooperate with UN. Our view, energetically and repeatedly expressed to U Thant (most recently this morning by Ambassador Stevenson over the telephone from Washington) has been that UN should assume that Tshombe came to Elisabethville of his own accord in order to capitulate, Gardiner, Bunche or Mathu should immediately seek him out and tell him that first item on agenda was his renunciation of his scorched earth policy and willingness to permit freedom of movement for UNOC. After he had done this, the talks would proceed with technical questions of UN occupation of Kolwezi and other key points and then, presumably with addition of representatives of GOC, to the integration steps contained in U Thant’s reconciliation plan. Main purpose of talks is to seek acceptance by Tshombe of UN freedom of movement. If this acceptance is not forthcoming, UN would be able to demonstrate to world that it had used Tshombe’s return to impress on him need for cooperation and to obtain from him assent to advance into Kolwezi and other key points. Should such advance become necessary without Tshombe’s cooperation, UN’s record of pursuing peaceful road to last moment would be established beyond doubt.

In our view basic UN philosophy, grounded in Charter, calls for parties to dispute to enter into discussions for peaceful settlement; it seems untenable to us and most harmful to UN public posture that UN, when itself a party to a dispute, should turn its back on this basic tenet.

Such a posture, doctrinally so at variance with the public image of the UN, can also cause great practical difficulties. Whether or not Tshombe is in effective control of his province, he is still accepted as Provincial President. It seems to us that the most effective way of building up his prestige is to refuse to treat with him. This is all the more true when UN apparently is unable at present to move militarily to Kolwezi and Tshombe may control detonator switches whose activation can bring destruction to installations vital to continued prosperity of a reunited Congo. Far more important, the lives of African and European civilians and UN soldiers may be jeopardized by refusal to treat with the so far unchallenged leader of the Katanga. The UN bears a heavy responsibility in placing protocol above dialogue.

We also continue to be disturbed by relationship between SYG and his representatives in the field. SYG told us frankly that his major problem in arranging talks between UN and Tshombe was Gardiner’s threat to resign if ordered to engage in negotiations with Tshombe. It behooves UN Reps not to let any personal animosities color their political judgment. It seems intolerable situation to us if basic UN policy is to be dictated by resignation threat of field representative. This can cause very serious problems for us in our continued support of UN.

Gullion should therefore seek out Bunche at once and express with great frankness difficulties our continued support will face if UN does not contrive to establish communication with Tshombe.

Dean should acquaint Mathu with our views.

Plimpton should continue press SYG as circumstances dictate.

Since foregoing drafted, Dept informed by UK Embassy Tshombe has promised make following statement: “I have come back to Eville for the sole purpose of bringing back as early as possible calm and peace to the Katanga and all its people. This consists essentially in rapidly applying the U Thant Plan without new effusion of blood and useless destruction. It follows from this that I should abstain in these circumstances from any declaration hostile to the UN.”³

If Tshombe makes some such statement, addressees should urge UN Reps to seize on it as basis for dealing with Tshombe as suggested above.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–763. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wallner, cleared by Williams and in draft by Beaudry and Kaysen, and approved by McGhee. Also sent to Elisabethville and USUN and repeated to Brussels and London.
2. Telegram 2632 from USUN, January 7, reported conversations between USUN officers and U.N. officials concerning the U.S. proposal that U.N. representatives talk to Tshombe about assisting the U.N. entry into Kolwezi. It reported that Thant was opposed to any discussion with Tshombe unless the latter publicly accepted U.N. freedom of movement in Katanga, renounced the scorched earth policy, and agreed to implement the U.N. plan. (Ibid.)
3. Tshombe returned to Elisabethville on January 8. Telegram 1157 from Elisabethville, January 8, transmitted another translation of this statement, which had been issued that day as a communique. (Ibid., 770G.00/1–863)