Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

402. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State¹

Léopoldville, January 4, 1963, 10 p.m.

1681. Eyes only Secretary. Your 1020² understood and appreciated. Re paragraph 1, Embassy of course has only limited picture from one end of UNOC exchange with UNNY but it may be useful to Department to know that from beginning of his tour here, Gardiner has been almost obsessed with idea that record must show his acts within specific authority of UNNY. I have frequently had occasion over several months to ask him or caution him about making sure he was covered. He always answered that file will show he fully within his authority. I last asked him about this only yesterday morning with references to ONUC movements. He said with wave of hand, he had it “all there (in files), every bit”. At same time he read Godley and me his message to SYG saying he was halting column outside Jadotville.

Gardiner has horror of O’Brien period and the round about means then used by UNOC to justify its action. For this reason he insisted on his ultimative letter to Tshombe telling him what UN requiring of him.

I do not know whether there was any specific message from UNNY telling Gardiner to break off movement. If so I believe he would have told me. I am confident all movements except possibly actual occupation Kipushi made known to UNNY ahead of time. The movements conform pretty well to contingency plan we obtained and communicated to Department in August.

In any case, circumstances of move into Jadotville likely remain confused. After Gardiner’s stop order, a military decision (Elisabethville’s 1104 to Department)³ was made to go ahead because force was spread out at night straddling river with no bridge and under fire. Moreover, some reports reaching us show entry was sought by town’s occupants and was necessary to restore order. All reports concur entry was unopposed and applauded. Death of Belgian women was horrible incident (or accident) but fortunately no other casualties. (See ARMA evaluation Elisabethville’s 1120 to Department.)⁴

We and all Embassies here except communist bloc not excluding British and Canadian believe the occupation of Jadotville and early exercise of freedom of movement throughout Katanga indispensable key to achievement of U Thant plan objectives. I say this realizing USG may have to choose between West-oriented, integrated Congo on one hand and, on the other, some damage to UMHK and relations with our allies.

Reference paragraph 2, believe degree of emphasis in my representation to GOC against breaking with UK was appropriate to level of their resolution but I can get tougher as required. Happily we hope British seem to have veered away from taking excessively visible responsibility for premature replanting of Tshombe. Can only urge we avoid tar by association.

Reference 3, do not seem to have made self clear on some points. In past planning we never envisaged situation when we might not be dealing with Tshombe. Suddenly possibility has arisen this might actually hinder integration and that he might not be able exert much influence and this needs time to assess.

I think UN and GOC would let him back in if he presents himself at border. If, however, we get out in front urging or accomplishing such action it would be counterproductive, might well prevent his return and would severely damage our position here. If he came back his role in any case can hardly be that originally contemplated because he has been cut down in size, now it would probably be more administrating and less negotiating. Also concur with Dean that there should be conditions on his return.⁵ At very least we should not be in position of ramming him down anyone’s throat.

We concur South Katanga should be under its own leadership but we would only be sowing sure seeds of future conflict if we have all KATS on one side of line and all ANC on other. This would be like turning Mason-Dixon line into frontier after civil war. It would represent that partition which Soviet Ambassador here preaches is our policy for Congo.

I think we should start now merging Gendarmerie and KATS, as per U Thant plan starting with small numbers in staff and schools, and under Greene plan. In meantime we might, for example, put small unit of KATS in far north at Sudanese border and GOC units or customs guards under UN supervision on southern border, and the ANC Band and Color Guard in Elisabethville.

If there is to be any GOC it has to have at least some participation in Katanga at early stage and if we manage it this way we can control, limit, and isolate it. The UN will certainly squeeze it to minimum. Bomboko’s own proposals were sincerely intended to be moderate and would avoid the much more massive and dangerous intrusions on which the mass insisting. I do not believe the Katangese would oppose this kind of intermingling and controlled introduction of ANC under UN control and Dean apparently agrees.

Reference paragraph 4, all here in serene spirit and encouraged by prospects for end to Katanga problem at long last.

Gullion

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–463. Secret; Niact. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, and London.
2. Document 401.
3. Dated January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–363)
4. Dated January 3. (Ibid.)
5. Dean had recommended in telegram 1070 from Elisabethville, January 1, that if the Consuls were to facilitate Tshombe’s return, he should be required to agree to allow U.N. forces into Jadotville and to any other U.N. conditions. (Ibid., 770G.00/1–163)