Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

404. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, January 6, 1963, 4:11 p.m.

1841. While Tshombe’s military capability by all evidence very small, he may still retain ability control destruction industrial properties, bridges, railroads, power stations in Kolwezi area. With delay, this ability may grow stronger.

Department concludes UN must be encouraged to resume promptly movement to Kolwezi (either with or without Tshombe consent) to establish full freedom of movement and protect population, industry, transportation and power installations. Before movement resumed two steps appear necessary:

1. Approach to Tshombe requesting him to aid and cooperate in UN movement should be made by UN by both civilian and military. Think presence of UMHK would also be helpful.

2. UNSYG should issue public statement announcing approach to Tshombe and decision to resume movement. We will have some suggestions on this tomorrow.

Approach to Tshombe would somewhat differ according to whether he in Kolwezi or in Elizabethville:

(a) In Kolwezi: High level civilian and military representatives, possibly General Noronha would communicate with Tshombe and announce publicly their willingness meet Tshombe promptly in Kolwezi going there by helicopter accompanied by UMHK officials, press representatives, etc., to work out details of UN advance of Kolwezi. They would reaffirm UN readiness guarantee Tshombe’s personal security and freedom of movement if he returns to Elizabethville to cooperate on implementation of U Thant plan and discuss political questions with GOC representatives.

(b) In Elizabethville: Tshombe might well be in Elizabethville and attempt to enter into negotiations with Gardiner and Bunche. UN approach would then be made by any civilian representative UN would choose supported by General Prem Chand but UN should again explain Tshombe’s political future depends on himself and Congolese people and is not responsibility of UN and refuse getting drawn into discussions or negotiations on Tshombe’s political future.

To make above approach more effective, would be desirable for Adoula announce he willing to send emissary to Elizabethville to work out with Tshombe any unsettled details U Thant plan in order to facilitate rapid and peaceful integration Katanga.

If Tshombe should refuse to give UN freedom of movement into Kolwezi area or even to meet with Noronha, UN would within 48 hours announce they will resume advance at speed dictated by military considerations.

Request USUN discuss the above with SYG and Dean explore with Bunche and Gardiner.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–663. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Eisenberg, cleared in substance by Cleveland and McGhee and in draft by Ball and Kaysen, and approved by Williams. Also sent to Elisabethville and repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, and Paris.