353. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)1
Washington,
December 11,
1962.
Dear George: We have become increasingly
concerned by reports indicating that the situation in the Republic of
the Congo is deteriorating rapidly. While the capability of the
Congolese Central Government to control the situation is being undercut
by opposition factions, there are reports that the Soviet Government has
indicated its willingness to offer military aircraft and other military
supplies to assist the Congolese Government in ending the Katanga
secession. The possibility of Soviet military intervention manifestly
adds a new critical factor to the Congo crisis and compounds the
difficulties already confronting the UN and
the Congolese Government. These developments pose a threat to the
Congolese Central Government and to the UN
position which, in turn, threatens achievement of the US objective in
the Congo.
While I am aware of the UN, US and Belgian
political and economic measures which may be undertaken shortly in a
further effort to end Katanga secession, I am concerned that these
complex measures may not eventuate in sufficient time to favorably
influence the situation. Unless positive action is taken on an immediate
basis, the UN effort may collapse and the
Congo revert to the chaos of July 1960.
[Page 718]
Prior to his departure for the current series of NATO meetings, Paul Nitze requested the opinion and
recommendations of the JCS on the
following two questions:
- 1.
- Should the US make a positive offer of military support to the
UN and the Congolese Government
to counter the possibility of Soviet intervention?
- 2.
- If such an offer is considered warranted, what should be the
nature and dimension of the US military support offered to the
UN and the Congolese
Government?
The JCS views are contained in the attached
memorandum. I concur with their expression of urgency and their
proposals for US action. I recommend that these views be brought to the
attention of Secretary Rusk and
Ambassador Gullion and that we
take the necessary action to implement these proposals as soon as
possible. I believe it imperative that, at the earliest possible date,
the UN Secretary General be informed of our
determination to undertake such action to preclude collapse of the US
and UN efforts to bring about a solution in
the Congo.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense
McNamara
JCSM–983–62
Washington,
December 11,
1962.
SUBJECT
- 1.
- Reference is made to the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA), dated 7 December
1962, regarding recent Congo developments.2
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the central issue of
the Congolese problem is to keep a pro-Western regime in power.
Any such regime
[Page 719]
will
be in political jeopardy as long as the Katanga problem remains
unresolved. The persistence of the problem stems from the
inability of either the Congolese Government or the United
Nations to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Tshombe regime and its
supporters.
- 3.
- In August of 1962 the United States approved a military
assistance program for the Congolese National Forces which will
be implemented when approved by the Congolese Government. An
impact shipment of about $150,000 has been made. Further
implementation of the over-all program, coupled with a public
announcement of United States Military Assistance under the
UN umbrella, could have an
immediate favorable impact upon the stability of the Congolese
Government. In addition, the United States has been providing
equipment, and required military air and sea lift since 1960 in
support of UN operations in the
Congo. This support should be continued.
- 4.
- In view of the political defeat which the United States and
the United Nations would incur through collapse of the Central
Congolese Government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
additional actions should be taken to bolster the UN effort in the Congo in order to
insure preservation of a Western oriented Congolese
Government.
- 5.
- In accomplishing this objective, a direct commitment of US
forces under UN aegis should
provide the support required to maintain the present government.
It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, that such
a commitment should be made only if it is determined that
collapse of the Central Congolese Government is imminent. A
decision to commit forces under these circumstances poses a
degree of US involvement with such far-reaching political and
ideological ramifications as to require serious consideration at
the highest level before a decision is made to commit US
forces.
- 6.
- In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend
that:
- a.
- The United States undertake to revitalize present
UN political and
military efforts in the Congo.
- b.
- Simultaneously with the revitalization efforts, the
United States should, as soon as possible, implement the
approved military assistance program for the
Congo.
- c.
- If required to prevent the collapse of the Central
Government, offer the UN a
US military package consisting of one Composite Air
Strike Unit with necessary support elements and the
requisite base security forces. A commitment of US units
should carry with it recognition that, if necessary, the
United States will also furnish under UN auspices any additional
forces required to tip the balance of power decisively
in favor the UN forces in
the Congo. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
objectives of such a commitment are to destroy or
neutralize the Katangese air capability and to provide
immediate political support for the Central Government.
They recommend that US combat units be withdrawn as soon
as these objectives are achieved.
- d.
- Accompany any of the foregoing with timely
announcements that US actions are in support of UN operations in the
Congo.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Acting
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
