354. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1
867. Eyes only Ambassadors. At moment we are pursuing UMHK payments scheme in hopes that some practical reintegration of the Katanga will be achieved. In meantime developments in Leopoldville in recent days cast serious doubt that stable moderate government can be maintained. While fully recognizing difficulties we have had with Tshombe, we must recognize that position of the present government in Leopoldville, and Adoula specifically, is so eroded that it cannot take actions required as long as Parliament remains millstone around his neck. As long as this situation exists, we probably not going to achieve any of our objectives: keeping out Communists; reconciliation of Katanga and maintaining a moderate government in the Congo, a government that in fact governs.
We have concluded that this apparent paralysis in Leopoldville requires us to take some specific measures. Regardless of who may be more to blame—Tshombe or Adoula—for lack of progress, fact of matter is that it will do us little good to pursue Thant reconciliation plan if government in Leopoldville not able do its share to achieve practical objectives.
[Page 721]Support for reintegration of the Katanga is essential to maintain a friendly Central Government, but does not assure it unless rapid progress made.
We are convinced that we have now reached the point where a variation in our approach is required if our objectives are to be achieved without massive bilateral US involvement.
We recognize lack of acceptable alternative to Adoula. We, like Spaak, after surveying the field, have concluded that Adoula, despite his many shortcomings, is the best choice available who is likely to command a wide degree of popular support. Moreover, he has the tremendous advantage—despite his recent poor showing in the vote of confidence—of having been voted into office unanimously by the Congolese Parliament. He therefore enjoys that degree of legitimacy which makes him acceptable to the international community as the accepted spokesman for the Congolese people.
A motion has been tabled in Parliament calling for “suspension of the UN plan,” and its adoption is a distinct possibility. If this vote, or some other vote involving fundamental GOC policy were to go against Adoula, whole underpinning of our present approach would be called into question. A new government brought in through the normal Parliamentary negotiating process would almost certainly be of a more radical stripe and therefore less desirable in terms of achieving our primary purpose. One alternative which has been considered in this connection is the possibility of installing a rightist government by a military coup. While this need not be ruled out in extremis, such a move would cause a number of difficulties—especially in light of the anticipated leftist opposition—and raise serious questions as to what support UN members would give to a Central Government of questionable legitimacy.
We therefore would appreciate your views on Adoula, with assistance of Kasavubu, Mobutu, Ndele and Mendaka taking decisive measures along following lines.
- First, Kasavubu should prorogue Parliament for a period of 30 days (which he can do legally. If necessary, this period could be extended even though extra-legal).
- Secondly, there would be understanding that moderate government with Adoula at head would be maintained in power by Mobutu et al.
- Thirdly, Adoula should take steps to make his government more efficient by including technicians who could help to re-energize executive in form more vigorous effort to achieve understanding with Tshombe.
- Fourth, we would be prepared urgently to assist GOC in creating small air force and to urge UN to take steps to neutralize Katangan air force.
[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
If such a plan were put into effect, there would have to be clear understanding between us and Adoula. We have taken number of steps in recent days to assist GOC. We also ready re-invigorate Greene plan, offering to increase amount of equipment, step up schedule of training for ANC and expect bring Air Panama contract to be ready GOC signature. We also prepared to help in other ways as required. But Adoula, with Parliament suspended and being maintained in power by Mobutu et al, would have to take more positive action—and would be in a better position to do so—in working out satisfactory arrangements for practical reintegration within framework of Thant plan. Such steps would include: stopping further military action north Katanga, sending high-level negotiator to Elisabethville, re-establishing mixed military and economic commissions and getting down to brass tacks to work out practical division of powers between GOC and Katanga.
Request urgent comments action addressees on above line of action. For the purpose of this exercise, you should assume a change in US policy to the effect that we will be prepared to support UN in its efforts to end Katanga secession with stronger measures than we have hitherto contemplated. You should not assume, however, that such a change in policy has in fact taken place.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1262. Top Secret; Priority; Noforn. Drafted by Sisco, Buffum, and Godley; cleared by Burdett, Cleveland, Williams, and McGhee; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Elisabethville and USUN and repeated to Paris for Rusk, who was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting.↩
- Telegram 2322 from USUN, December 13, commented that, under the circumstances, the program set forth here was best calculated to achieve the objective of strengthening the Adoula government. It expressed hope, however, that future negotiations between Léopoldville and Elisabethville could be conducted on a central government-provincial government basis rather than on a “two-equal-sovereigns basis.” It also warned against reverting to the situation before July 1961 and especially before January 1961, when the Congolese Government seemed to most African governments to be a “creature” of the Western powers. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–1362) Telegrams 919 from Elisabethville, December 14, and 1424 from Léopoldville, December 17, also commented. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–1462 and 770G.00/12–1662, respectively)↩