352. Editorial Note
The situation in the Congo was discussed at the daily White House staff meeting on December 10. A memorandum for the record by Colonel Lawrence J. Legere of the NSC Staff, dated December 10, records it as follows:
“b. (1) There ensued a long discussion about the Congo, triggered by Bundy asking to be brought up-to-date. Kaysen said that Spaak was making an approach to the UMHK (Union Miniere Haut-Katanga), who have been quite the villains in this piece, but no one is very optimistic about the outcome of this approach. U Thant’s idea of the next step is economic sanctions against Katanga.
“(2) After a little pessimistic brooding around the table, the discussion proceeded to broader issues. Kaysen said that the threat of a ‘Soviet presence or menace’ in the Congo was the gut issue—i.e., if we were certain that the Soviets would not rush in to replace us, we would probably try to leave and convince everybody else to do likewise. Kaysen and some of the others also agreed, not for the first time at these meetings, that it was extremely important to convince Adoula or any Léopoldville government that it must be prepared to negotiate with Tshombe; the trouble is that any Léopoldville government which honestly agrees to negotiate with Tshombe would probably not survive very long. Once again the knowledgeable people on this subject around the table expressed the view that Ambassador Gullion and our people at the UN felt that they must ‘beat’ Tshombe—i.e., that he must be made to yield on everything they think is desirable.
“(3) At this point Bundy, Kaysen and Dungan said that one of the best things that could happen might be for the Congolese National Army to drop a few bombs in the Katanga from a few aircraft which the United States would furnish them for that purpose. The idea seemed to be that this would tend to remove a lot of the intricate complexities of the Congo problem (UN, UMHK, etc.), and perhaps reduce it to a nice clean war between Léopoldville and Elizabethville. There was a little laughter around the table at this suggestion; for example, Bundy said that ‘we were all certainly a bunch of hawks’, but there was an unmistakable undercurrent of seriousness nevertheless. Bundy asked Kaysen to see Under Secretary Ball about the entire Congo situation sometime today.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 25, Chairman’s Staff Group, Dec. 1962–Jan. 1963)
In a telephone conversation that afternoon, Kaysen told Under Secretary of State Ball that “Bundy seems to detect from the President, or from himself, a disposition to use force.” Ball replied that the President had “explicitly outruled the possibility.” (Memorandum of telephone [Page 717] conversation, December 10, 3 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Congo)
A re-examination of U.S. policy concerning the Congo had begun a few days earlier. In a December 8 telephone conversation with Ball, Kaysen stated that Bundy had told him the President had the Congo “much on his mind.” Ball said the President had “asked a couple of days earlier for a paper to be prepared which would list all the alternative possibilities.” Such a paper was in preparation, but Ball stated that he intended to prepare a separate paper and for that purpose was meeting that day with members of the staff of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, December 8, 11:45 a.m.; ibid.)