335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium1
780. Eyes only for MacArthur from McGhee. Part II of Two. During discussions I attempted at all times explain Spaak’s position and obtain agreement line of action he had indicated to me was the most he could do. I was, however, forced to conclude their tactical suggestions, on the whole, were sound and that our only hope at this late hour lies in direct approach by the UMHK based on a clear decision on their part, which can only come about as a result of strong action by GOB, that they must now do business with Adoula. I believe they should now make this decision, and Robiliart, together with considerable technical staff, should come to Léopoldville. He could say to Adoula, “You have written a letter asking us to pay revenue and foreign exchange to you. We want to do this; we have come to discuss with you how we can make the necessary arrangements.” In the process, various types of assurances the UMHK feel they require can be discussed, including role of IMF. Perhaps the UMHK reps will derive same confidence from Adoula as other business concerns operating in Congo have. They could make the best arrangement they can and retire, stating matter must be referred to Brussels.
If GOB felt that political concessions were needed which not at that time been accomplished they could through Gardiner backed up by Rothschild’s visit and, if it was agreed to be desirable, by Gullion or myself attempt to achieve them. I gather, however, that both Gardiner and UN are skeptical that concessions on the constitution can be obtained by the GOB, particularly in relation to UMHK negotiations.
We shall, nevertheless, continue at all times to press to the utmost for positive movement on both constitution-making process and upon an amnesty. In the event that Gardiner should be wrong and it should appear advantageous or possible to make a link between commercial and political considerations, we shall not hesitate to make the attempt.
It is my honest appraisal that Belgians must now face their hour of truth. Airing of whole issue in SC or GA (in connection financing) seems inevitable before December 20 unless some striking sign of progress toward reintegration is evident in next two or three weeks. SYG was crisply positive about this. We believe it important for Belgians to confirm this urgency independently in contact with UN either through Loridan or, in view of its importance, by means of direct contact between Spaak and SYG which we understand Spaak is considering.
[Page 675]If UMHK is not willing make forthright decision to take initiative in attempting to reach accord with Adoula, no forward movement of consequence can be expected in next two weeks, and, since we do not at present have new proposals to make ourselves, we will not be in a position to deter UN from proceeding with their program of economic pressures. This could produce a rift and showdown between Adoula and Belgian companies which without some early overture by the latter could we fear result in a great reduction in their position or even their elimination from the Congo. If the UMHK does not take the initiative now, there could easily result the eventual closing down of UMHK operations in the Katanga and the transfer of much of the banking and other Belgian business to firms of other nationalities or new firms that might be created. Old antagonisms between the Congolese and the Belgians would be revived and chances for participation by Belgians in the future of the Congo would be prejudiced.
Under such circumstances US would not, of course, be willing to assume any responsibility for losses suffered by UMHK in Katanga. Particularly in the light of the recent refusal of UMHK to respond to direct appeal by their Foreign Minister, there would be little sympathy in American official circles or publicly and little incentive to protect UMHK from consequences of UN and Adoula’s economic actions. Tragic aspect is that even these actions may not, in the end, produce desired results but, rather than softening Tshombe up into a better negotiating posture, may drive him and Europeans who run the Katanga into hiding which could result in an economic breakdown in Katanga accompanied by a continued insurrection in the “bush” for an indefinite period.
We have tried very hard to shield the Belgian Government and companies from the full consequences of coming face-to-face with their own responsibilities. I am afraid that we are at the end of this row. It is my honest evaluation that if GOB and UMHK together cannot make decision which appears now to be called for, alternative is grim period of economic and political reprisals against Belgian companies and GOB, with possibility in end for complete economic breakdown and even hostilities in the Katanga.
Realize this is drastic reassessment of situation. Will, therefore, be very interested in Spaak’s reaction. Naturally USG will continue to do all it can to assist ally Belgium but overriding facts compel realistic approach.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870G.25/11-2262. Secret;Niact. Drafted by McGhee, cleared by Wallner and Davis, and approved by Williams.↩